‘La Flor del Perú’

The political culture of the Catholic Monarchy through three expeditions to the southeast of Charcas in the second half of the sixteenth century

Mario Graña Taborelli

Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CLACS)

Institute of Languages, Cultures and Societies (ILCS)

School of Advanced Studies

University of London

Submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy.

Registration Number: SASREC 2021-643-PhD

2022

Declaration

I, Mario Julio Graña Taborelli, hereby declare that this thesis is purely my own work and is the written record of work carried out for the degree of Ph. D. at the Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies, Institute of Modern Languages Research, School of Advanced Studies, University of London and has not been submitted in any previous application for a higher degree.

Date: 1 July 2022

Signed: 

Abstract

This thesis examines the expeditions of La Plata encomendero Martín de Almendras (1564-1565), Perú viceroy don Francisco de Toledo (1574), and Potosí royal official Juan Lozano Machuca (1584-1585), from the perspective of the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy in the second half of the sixteenth century. Based on published and unpublished sources, the events are framed within the process of installation, consolidation, and expansion of jurisdiction, understood as the authority to establish law, and deliver justice, in an area, the southeast Charcas border, seen by the Spanish as devoid of law and order. This was a process done through coercion and violence, as well as negotiations and consensus. It involved the localisation of legislation and miniaturisation of politics, as the monarchy was only able to have a presence in such remote parts through a myriad of local agents who accepted yet adapted legislation to circumstances. This complex process was not free of tensions as jurisdictions frequently overlapped and agents had to fight and negotiate them in courts and on the ground. This study also rescues the symbolic dimension of jurisdictional politics analysing rituals and the imagery involved in the theatricalization of power. Finally, this thesis shifts from traditional views that characterise the period and its agents using anachronisms. Charcas' early colonial history neither prepared the region for modernity, nor was part of a state-building and centralising process that has been associated with the nineteenth-century independent Latin American countries. This study is an invitation to approach the expansion of jurisdiction in the district of Charcas from a multidisciplinary perspective, displaying a different hermeneutic, to explain Spanish expeditions to the eastern border.

Table of contents

'La Flor del Perú. The Political Culture of the Catholic Monarchy through three expeditions to the southeast of Charcas in the second half of the sixteenth century 1

Declaration 2

Abstract 3

Table of Contents 4

Acknowledgements 7

List of Maps 9

List of Illustrations 10

Introduction 11

Chapter 1
A background to the expeditions.
The southeast Charcas borders between *Tahuantinsuyu* and the early Spanish Conquest.

1. Introduction 24
2. A diverse geography 24
3. A diverse human landscape 26
4. Tahuantinsuyu expansion into Charcas 28
5. The creation of Tahuantinsuyu's southeast borders 31
6. Tahuantinsuyu under the Chiriguanaes' threat 35
7. The transition from Tahuantinsuyu to Spanish Charcas. Expeditions and *Encomiendas* 38

8. The Spanish and the unconquered and unconquerable natives 49
9. The creation of a stereotype: The *Chiriguanaes* 52
10. Invented borders, Invented peoples 56

Chapter 2

Jurisdictional entanglements.

The political culture of early colonial Charcas through the expeditions by encomendero Martín de Almendras (1564-1565)

1. Introduction 58
2. The Encomendero Group 60
3. The Almendras' network 63
4. Prelude to the 1564 Expedition 65
5. Mapping the Expeditions 74
6. Marching to the Chichas. Staging Jurisdiction in Remote Lands 76
7. A Final Journey to the Border 85
8. Polycentric Borders. Jurisdictional Entanglements and the Practicalities of Running Charcas 91

Chapter 3

'La Flor del Perú': A Viceroy's Journey to the Chiriguanaes

1. Introduction 94
2. The Initial Plan 97
3. Toledo on Tour. The Viceroy inspects the land and encounters Charcas 101
4. A Drastic Change. Toledo revisits his plan 107
5. Hostage hunting in the borders 110
6. Negotiating an expedition 115
7. Toledo's journey to the Chiriguanaes in company of 'la flor del Perú' 119
8. The legacy of defeat 128
9. The Endless Possibilities of a Polycentric Monarchy and the Limits of a Viceroy 130

Chapter 4

‘Miniature politics’: The Audiencia de Charcas and Juan Lozano Machuca's expedition in 1584-1585

1. Introduction 133
2. A body without its head 136
3. The southeast borders engulfed in jurisdictional conflicts 138
4. The Audiencia de Charcas faces the Chiriguanaes 147
5. Juan Lozano Machuca and the world of viceregal criados 152
6. An Audiencia de Charcas expedition in the making 156
7. Lozano Machuca's last journey 159
8. Epilogue: Miniature politics as the basis of the monarchy's resilience and endurance 163

Conclusion 166

Glossary of terms 172

Bibliography and sources 176

Annex. List of participants of the expeditions 220

Acknowledgements

Over the years that this work has been in the making, I grew indebted to individuals and organisations that made this dissertation possible. In Argentina, a fees-free and state-run university education, a luxury for many in the developed world, gave someone like me, the chance to undertake and complete, first his qualification as a high-school history teacher at the Instituto Superior de Formación Docente 41 in Adrogué in Buenos Aires province, and subsequently his degree as a historian, or Licenciado en Historia, at the Universidad Nacional de Luján. After a long hiatus, of seventeen years, I was able to resume my studies, and here, in the UK, at the University of London, the support, time, patience, and expertise in the field of Spanish America of Dr Linda Newson, this thesis' supervisor, have been invaluable for this work. The possibility of having a co-supervisor, Dr Ana Maria Presta, with her knowledge of sixteenth century Charcas and Latin American history has been of immense help. Dr. Presta, a friend and colleague, also a member of CONICET and the Programa de Historia de América (PROHAL) at the Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr Emilio Ravignani", part of the Facultad de Filosofía y Letras of the Universidad de Buenos Aires, has contributed with her inquisitiveness, honesty, and expertise to this study and my own research for many years.

This thesis also owes a great deal to a legion of archivists and librarians across many countries. My full admiration goes to them. In Bolivia, at the Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia (ABNB) archive and library, Nelva Celia Delgadillo Hurtado has always been ready to step in and help with document searches and copies. The work that archivists and staff in general do at the ABNB to preserve Bolivia's heritage is invaluable. María Ángeles Pacheco Fernández at the Archivo General de Indias (AGI) in Seville, Spain, also diligently and expediently answered my emails on various enquiries, sometimes in challenging conditions and under pressure because of the pandemic. I also owe gratitude to Joan Gosnell at DeGolyer Library at the Southern Methodist University in the US; Esperanza Adrados Villar at the Archivo Historico Nacional (AHN) in Madrid in Spain; Miguel Gómez Vozmediano at the Archivo Histórico de la Nobleza in Toledo, Spain; Asunción Miralles de Imperial and Pasqual del Pobil at the Biblioteca de la Real Academia de la Historia in Madrid; and María

Patricia Soto Vargas at the Biblioteca Nacional del Perú in Lima. Staff at the British Library have also been extremely helpful. At the University of London's Senate House library, Julio Cazzasa provided advise, help, and a friendly voice every time we engaged in conversations and discussed my dissertation.

I am also grateful to scholars with whom I exchanged views and materials over the years, including Kris Lane, Lia Guillermina Oliveto, Mauricio Onetto, Nathan Weaver Olson, Carlos Piccone Camere, Tatiana Suárez, Virginia Ghelarducci, Ainhoa Montoya, Juan José Ponce Vázquez, Felipe Ruan, Guillaume Candela, Sergio Angeli, Domingo Centenero de Arce, and the late Luis Córdoba Ochoa. Some of you are perhaps not aware of how much I appreciate your comments and suggestions, most of them done informally and many times over webcams, WhatsApp, Twitter, phone calls or via email. I also cherished the opportunities I was given to present preliminary material of this work in virtual discussions held at the Institute of Latin American Studies (ILAS) and its successor, the Centre for Latin American and Caribbean Studies (CLACS), housed at the Institute of Modern Languages Research (IMLR), now Institute of Languages, Cultures and Society (ILCS) in London, and the Universidad de Salamanca. I am also thankful to my two examiners Professors Fernando Cervantes and Christine Matthias for all the recommendations and advise during my Viva Voce and after that. This thesis also owes a great deal to the Internet. At a time of lockdowns and self-distancing, the world-wide-web brought home books and documents that complemented my previous years of research in the Archivo General de la Nación (AGNA) and the libraries of the Museo Etnográfico Juan B Ambrosetti and Instituto de Historia Argentina y Americana "Dr Emilio Ravignani" in Latin America, and the British Library and Senate House Library in the UK, making this study possible. Finally, at a more personal level, I also owe a great deal to my husband, Andrew Graña Taborelli, who has patiently and supportively accompanied this whole process. Thanks to you all.

List of Maps

1. Andean regional topographies 26
2. The region around the time of the Spanish Conquest 28
3. Tahuantinsuyu's expansion 33
4. Fortresses and indigenous peoples on the southeast borders 34
5. Area occupied by the Chiriguanaes. Early sixteenth century 44
6. Audiencia de Charcas. Jurisdictional changes 68
7. Southeast border area locations in the sixteenth century 70
8. Cities founded by Juan Pérez de Zurita 73
9. Between Talina and Culpina, area occupied by the Chichas 76
10. Route of Almendras' expedition to the Chichas 83
11. Toledo's journey into the Chiriguanaes 120
12. Villages and towns in the Southeast border 152
13. Juan Lozano Machuca's expedition route based 162
14. Torremocha that has been abandoned 165

List of Illustrations

1. Cover letter of the Información de méritos y servicios of captain Martín de Almendras. 65
2. “Quaderno de la Verdad de los Hechos desta Tierra”. 118
3. Anonymous painting representing the martyrdom of Albarrán and other Mercedarian priests. Probably dating from the eighteenth century. 143

Introduction

"O mundo nâo se nos dá em espetáculo; o mundo é o espetáculo que as sociedades constroem, organizando-o e impondon-lhe uma narrativa".

"The world is not displayed in front of us as a show; the world is a show that societies build, organising it and imposing a narrative on it".

António Hespanha.[1]

This research is dedicated to the study of the expeditions carried out in Charcas –present-day Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia and north-western Argentina- by Martín de Almendras, encomendero of La Plata –present-day Sucre- in 1564-1565; Peru viceroy don Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581) in 1574; and royal official Juan Lozano Machuca in 1584-1585, in a manner that has not been attempted until now. Because administrative, political, and judicial functions in government were not separate at the time, and it was understood that the ultimate purpose of rule -both divine and on earth- was justice, this thesis frames the expeditions within the long process whereby the Catholic Monarchy negotiated, implemented, settled, and consolidated its jurisdiction, that is authority to establish law and deliver justice, over Charcas.[2] Jurisdiction was not imposed from above, but was built from the ground, and on the ground, through consensus, as well as violence and coercion. The objective was to keep the "land in

[1] António Manuel Hespanha, *A ordem do mundo e o saber dos juristas: Imaginários do antigo direito europeu.* (Lisbon: Independently Published, 2017), 365. (Translation by this thesis' author).

[2] Jurisdiction is understood here as *iurisdictio* with its medieval legal and political connotations, see Pietro Costa, *Iurisdictio. Semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica medievale (1100-1433).* (Milano: Giuffre Editore, 2002 [1969]), Chapter III; Jesús Vallejo, "Power Hierarchies in Medieval Juridical Thought. An Essay in Reinterpretation," *Ius Commune* 19 (1992): 1–29; António Manuel Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho. Economía de la cultura en la Edad Moderna* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993), 66; Bartolomé Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia.," in *Real Chancillería de Granada: V Centenario 1505-2005.* (Granada: Junta de Andalucía, Consejería de Cultura, 2006), 122, 125; Alejandro Agüero, "Las categorías básicas de la cultura jurisdiccional," in *De justicia de jueces a justicia de leyes: Hacia la España de 1870*, vol. VI, Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial (Madrid: Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 2006), 31-32; Carlos Garriga, "Orden jurídico y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen.," *Revista de Historia Internacional* 16 (2004): 30; Javier Barrientos Grandón, *El gobierno de las Indias*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004), 45; Colin MacLachlan, *Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change*, (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991), 38; John Owens, *"By My Absolute Royal Authority": Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning of the First Global Age*, (Rochester (N.Y.): University of Rochester Press, 2005), 1.

peace" or *quieta*, a challenging task on the district's borders,[3] perceived as empty of 'King and God', of law and order.[4]

The historiography on these expeditions largely reflects the interest of historians seeking to contextualise these events as part of wider processes such as the Spanish occupation of Charcas, the creation of border societies, and the rise of the *encomienda* system which placed indigenous peoples under Spanish conquistadors.[5] Because of its scope, covering the period between 1535 and 1565, the classic work of Catalan historian Josep Barnadas only discusses the first of the expeditions, by *encomendero* Almendras, framing it in the wider geopolitical plans by the elite of Charcas to bring and keep Tucumán under its jurisdiction, an argument that this thesis explores in detail.[6] While only briefly, the works of Argentine historians Ana María Presta and Carlos Eduardo Zanolli also mention the same expedition, focusing their analysis on the encomenderos of La Plata and Omaguaca -present-day Argentina-, respectively, interpreting the encomienda system as a key element in the political and social construction of Charcas.[7] The implementation of the encomienda and the encomenderos of Charcas are a fundamental part of this thesis' analysis and are viewed here from the perspective of the expansion of political jurisdiction over Charcas. The works of Argentine historians Silvia Palomeque and Lia Guillermina Oliveto, which study the indigenous peoples of southeast Charcas under Spanish rule, read two of the expeditions, by Almendras and viceroy don Francisco de Toledo, as part of the process of Spanish occupation of the area. However, their analysis is not centred on the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy which, this thesis understands, underpinned

[3] This thesis uses the term 'borders' understanding them as both the boundaries that separated jurisdictions as well as the borderlands between those jurisdictions with all their unique characteristics. The 'borders' here were "tierras de frontera", or "tierras de indios de guerra" -borderlands or lands of warring natives"-.

[4] Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho. Economía de la cultura en la Edad Moderna*, 62; Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia," 2; José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, *Las dos caras de Jano: Monarquía, ciudad e individuo. Murcia, 1588-1648* (Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1995), 44, 146; Dario Barriera, *Historia y justicia: Cultura, política y sociedad en el Río de La Plata* (Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2019), 240.

[5] This thesis uses 'indigenous peoples' and 'natives' indistinctively. "Indians" is only kept as a literal translation from sixteenth century sources, understanding that *Indio* was a specific meaningful -fiscal and social- category in the Catholic Monarchy.

[6] Josep. Barnadas, *Charcas. Orígenes históricos de una sociedad colonial. 1535-1565* (La Paz: CIPCA, 1973), 52-53, 179.

[7] Carlos Eduardo Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad: Omaguaca (1540-1638)*, Colección Tesis Doctorales (Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005), 110-112; Ana María Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial: Los encomenderos de La Plata, 1550-1600*, (Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2000), 76-78.

such process.[8] The large volume of José María García Recio, which is centred on the creation of a border society in Santa Cruz de la Sierra, only covers the last two expeditions, by viceroy Toledo and royal official Lozano Machuca, and provides an interpretation of both events that is geographically limited to the area of the study. In this regard, this thesis integrates local events in Santa Cruz de la Sierra with those occurring in the whole of Charcas, re-dimensioning both expeditions.[9]

On the expeditions to the Chiriguanaes, a group of lowland natives that this thesis discusses, the study of Francisco Pifarré largely explores the events through the lens of these peoples' resistance against Spanish occupation, an argument this thesis understands, but one that only reflects part of the story as it neglects the active -coercively or not- participation of these peoples and Andean peoples in the expeditions and the complexities of indigenous agency.[10] French historian Thierry Saignes extensively studied the Chiriguanaes and their interaction with Tahuantinsuyu and the Spanish, describing the border as a "fossil frontier", solidified over the time, product of ongoing conflicts between two 'state-like' entities -Tahuantinsuyu and the Catholic Monarchy- and the 'free and independent' lowland natives.[11] The expedition of viceroy Toledo is largely seen, in a study by Saignes and French anthropologist Isabelle Combès, against this background.[12] This thesis shows that the border areas in question were highly dynamic and such dynamism was not a response to the presence of 'state-like' political organisations because the Catholic Monarchy was not organised in such manner at the time. The more recent works of American scholars Jonathan Scholl and Nathan Weaver Olson study the southeast Charcas regions and the interaction between lowland and Andean indigenous groups under Tahuantinsuyu

[8] Silvia Palomeque, "Casabindos, cochinocas y chichas en el siglo XVI. Avances de Investigación.," in *Las tierras altas del área Centro Sur Andina entre el 1000 y el 1600 D.C.* (Jujuy: EDIUNJU, 2013), 245; Silvia Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas. Las tierras de los chicha de Talina (1573-1595).," in *Aportes multidisciplinarios al estudio de los colectivos étnicos surandinos. Reflexiones sobre Qaraqara-Charka tres años después.* (La Paz: Plural-IFEA, 2013), 136; Lia Guillermina Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial y relaciones interétnicas en los Andes Meridionales. Tarija. Entre los desafíos prehispánicos y temprano coloniales." (PhD Dissertation, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2010), 153-163; 159-168.

[9] José María García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera: Santa Cruz de La Sierra en los siglos XVI y XVII* (Sevilla: Excelentísima Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1988), 95-104.

[10] Francisco Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo*, vol. 2, Los guaraní-chiriguano (La Paz: CIPCA, 1989), 79.

[11] Thierry Saignes, "Une frontiere fossile: La cordillera Chiriguano au XVIe Siècle" (PhD Dissertation, Universite de Paris, 1974).

[12] Thierry Saignes and Isabelle Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, (Lima, Perú: La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos; Embajada de Francia en Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2007), 69-96.

and Spanish rule and the creation of a border society around the turn of the seventeenth century, respectively.[13] Scholl characterises border relations during Tahuantinsuyu as cooperative; and under Spanish rule as dynamic, alternating between conflict and peace, which was the product of tensions over workforce triggered by the implementation of regulations against indigenous slave work. This perspective shapes how Scholl reads the expeditions of viceroy Toledo and royal official Lozano Machuca. This thesis however questions the effectiveness of such regulations, and therefore their importance in the relations between lowland natives and the Spanish, suggesting that more than restrictions, what shaped border dynamics was the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy and the indigenous and Spanish agencies that it created. Finally, the work of Weaver Olson analyses the expeditions as part of the complex social and racial dynamics of the border areas. This is an aspect this thesis integrates as part of the expansion of royal jurisdiction in the southeast of Charcas.

Although these authors contribute to this thesis providing a background and different theoretical approaches to the expeditions, the events are not exhaustively researched in their work and their focus is not on the political culture of the time. Other historians frame these expeditions as part of the political organisation of the border but from a teleological perspective centred on state-building and sovereignty consolidation and imposition, understanding Charcas' colonial past as a period that would ultimately prepare the region for its early nineteenth-century independence and the 'modern state' that came with it. This group of scholars emphasise the consolidation of the 'colonial state' and/or royal sovereignty as a process that deepened in the aftermath of the Civil Wars (1538-1555), continued during the 1560s, and reached momentum under viceroy Toledo's reforming administration. The expeditions are thus seen as part of a 'top-down' and centralised process that strengthened the Catholic Monarchy's colonial grip which was fiercely resisted by indigenous populations in border areas.[14] This view, however, ignores the fact that these events were constructed from below and limits the political agency of indigenous peoples who not only resisted the extension of

[13] Jonathan Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire: Incas, Spaniards, and the Ava-Guarani (Chiriguanaes) on the Charcas-Chiriguana Frontier, Southeastern Andes. (1450s-1620s)." (PhD Dissertation, University of Florida, 2015); Nathan Weaver Olson, "A Republic of Lost Peoples: Race, Status, and Community in the Eastern Andes of Charcas at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century" (PhD Dissertation, University of Minnesota, 2017) 69-70, 75-76.

[14] Arthur Franklin Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo. Fifth Viceroy of Peru. 1569-1581* (New York: Greenwood Press, 1938), 196-200; and Manfredi Merluzzi, *Politica e governo nel nuovo mondo: Francisco de Toledo viceré del Perù (1569-1581)*, (Roma: Carocci, 2003), 170-173.

jurisdiction but also actively participated in the expeditions that sought to help the Catholic Monarchy establish its authority in Charcas. The same view assumes that the monarchy was or could be in control of such a vast area, ignoring the communication challenges of the time. Finally, it portrays viceroy don Francisco de Toledo as a stateman and lawmaker part of a bureaucratic and centralised system in full control of the viceroyalty, something this thesis shows, was impossible given the political system at the time. In summary, it retrospectively invents a 'proto-modern state' when there was none.[15]

This thesis understands the expeditions as a means for the Crown to affirm, settle, and expand its jurisdiction. Whether this was carried out through a viceroy, an encomendero, or a royal official, the aim was the same: to make the monarchy present in an area where such presence was absent. Sometimes expeditions would entail the establishment of new towns, which prompted legal arrangements that involved viceroys and/or the *Audiencia*, a royal body of justice and government, on the one hand; and Spanish individuals with the social status and resources to be able to carry out the expeditions on the other.[16] Although the arrangements personally involved the expedition's leaders and the authorities, they also required the endorsement of those who would be part of the expedition, including religious orders that would be potentially involved, and even those who might already be at the site. Such arrangements were a manner to acknowledge these people's rights to create a new political community, a *respublica*, with powers to police and apply laws, effectively making the monarchy present along such borders.[17] Through such collaborations,

[15] Such 'pro-state' teleological views echo previous historiography on Latin America's colonial past which includes monographs such as José María Ots Capdequi, *El estado español en las Indias.* (México: El Colegio de México, 1941), 17, 47, 49; Richard Konetzke, *América Latina. II. La época colonial,* trans. Pedro Scaron, (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977), Chapter 5; Horst Pietschmann, *El estado y su evolución al principio de la colonización española de América* (México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989); and Clarence Henry Haring, *The Spanish Empire in America* (New York and Burlingame: First Harbinger Books, 1963), 4.

[16] On viceroys and Audiencias: Alejandro Cañeque, *The King's Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico*, (New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2004); Carlos Garriga, "Concepción y aparatos de justicia: Las reales audiencias de las Indias.," *Cuadernos de Historia* 19 (2009): 203–244.

[17] Cities, villages, and towns as politically organised communities were at the core and in constant 'conversation' through correspondence with the Catholic Monarchy. Jorge Díaz Ceballos, *Poder compartido: Repúblicas urbanas, monarquía y conversación en Castilla de Oro, 1508-1573* (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2020), Introducción; Carlos Garriga, "Patrias criollas, plazas militares. Sobre la América de Carlos IV," in *La América de Carlos IV*, vol. 1, Cuadernos de Investigaciones y Documentos (Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 2006); Karen B.

which resemble similar practices during the so-called "Reconquista" and earlier conquests elsewhere in Spanish America and the Canary Islands, the monarchy aggregated new territorial possessions piece by piece, which gave it its 'composite' and 'polycentric' character.[18] This resulted in a downscaling of its authority or jurisdiction on the ground, through a process known as 'miniaturisation of politics',[19] which enabled royal agents to 'localise' laws, dictate their own laws, or even accept yet ignore laws altogether. This made these agents responsible for any negative outcome from their decisions, keeping the monarchy's reputation and image safe.[20] This flexibility guaranteed the Catholic Monarchy a presence across its vast domains; and its agents and their networks, scope for action.

The Audiencia and viceroys were at the centre of the distribution of royal rewards and privileges and therefore played a key role on how such jurisdiction was shared, who should be recompensed, and who should not.[21] They were able to favour certain individuals and their networks over others, or even manipulate some characters against others, yet at the same time, they were also exposed to power games played by local elite groups.[22] Audiencia and viceroys competed over the administration of

Graubart, *Republics of Difference: Religious and Racial Self-Governance in the Spanish Atlantic World* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2022).

[18] 'Composite monarchy' was a concept originally developed by historian Helmut Georg Koenigsberger. John Elliott, "A Europe of Composite Monarchies," *Past and Present*, no. 137 (November 1992): 50; 'Polycentrism' as a concept was coined by Hespanha. Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho*, 112; Pedro Cardim, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibañez, Gaetano Sabatini, eds., *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 3-4; Bartolomé Yun-Casalilla, *Iberian World Empires and the Globalization of Europe 1415 -1668*, (Puchong, Selangor D.E: Springer Singapore, 2018), 148. John Elliott establishes similarities between this and previous "Conquests", including the war against the Moorish Kingdoms. John Elliott, *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970), 58-61. On the Canary Islands: Eduardo Aznar Vallejo, "The Conquests of the Canary Islands," in Implicit Understandings. Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 134–156.

[19] 'Miniaturisation of politics' was used by António Hespanha to characterise the political culture at the time, which was based on small communities, largely independent administrative/political posts awarded in line with merits and part of a solid patronage system, and political communication that relied heavily on personal contact which resulted in significant spatial limitations. Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho*, 100.

[20] Alejandro Agüero, "Local Law and Localization of Law. Hispanic Legal Tradition and Colonial Culture (16th–18th Centuries)," in *Spatial and Temporal Dimensions for Legal History Research Experiences and Itineraries* (Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, 2016), 101–129; Richard Ross and Philip Stern, "Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism," in *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850* (New York ; London: New York University Press, 2013), 109–143; Lauren Benton, *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900*, (Cambridge, UK ; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002) 7-15.

[21] Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia.," 121–148.

[22] Largely influenced by readings on anthropology, and describing a medieval setting, Clavero refers to this system of free and mutually binding obligations as "antidora", whereby every reward or privilege

jurisdiction, something the monarchy encouraged, to keep them in check, given the communication hurdles and distances at the time which made any direct control impossible.[23] On the ground, this approach presented challenges as jurisdictions frequently overlapped creating a 'legal patchwork', a situation that prompted regular conflict.[24] The expeditions to the borders clearly expose these complexities as viceroys and Audiencia navigated the complicated task of organising and executing such undertakings with some degree of local support and a variety of outcomes.

To the distant monarchy, without royal armies to command and exclusively relying on locals for the defence of its realm, the expeditions, and the affirmation and consolidation of jurisdiction that went with them, were subject to negotiations and required confirmation in the paperwork and through 'ceremonies of possession', which gave such events a theatrical character.[25] With the imprint of Catholicism, such rituals, which sometimes, though not always, included coercion and violence, made an absent monarch present, where his law and justice were absent, as in the border lands of Charcas. They were occasions of great display of political imagery, pomp, and circumstance, constituting a theatre of presence and invocation through spectacles that gave their participants and viewers an experience not dissimilar to a military procession/parade or a crusade, bringing the body politic of Charcas together in communion with their monarch, fostering loyalty and obedience.[26] Such presence was however only provisional and subject to the compromises reached on the ground.[27]

---

bestowed by someone with jurisdiction had to be reciprocated with loyalty from the recipient. Bartolomé Clavero, *Antidora: Antropología católica de la economía moderna*, (Milano: Giuffrè, 1991).

[23] Arndt Brendecke, *Imperio e información: Funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español*, trans. Griselda Mársico, (Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2016), 66.

[24] António Manuel Hespanha, "The Legal Patchwork of Empires," review *of Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850*, by Lauren Benton and Richard J. Ross. *Rechtsgeschichte* 22, 2014, 303–14; MacLachlan, *Spain's Empire in the New World*, 40; Benton refers to this as an "orderly disorder" situation. Lauren Benton, "Making Order out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the Spanish Colonial Borderlands," *Law & Social Inquiry* 26, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 373.

[25] Patricia Seed, *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe's Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640* (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995).

[26] William Egginton, *How the World Became a Stage: Presence, Theatricality, and the Question of Modernity* (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003), 35, 53-54.

[27] Amy Turner Bushell, "Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries. The Field of Frontier Latin America," in *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas* (London: Taylor Francis Group, 2002), 15–28.

Understood at the time as devoid of jurisdiction, without law, justice and Catholic religion, the borders of Charcas and their indigenous populations were invented using stereotypes. These were built upon 'hegemonic knowledges' that saw such peoples as perpetual minors and in need of guardianship, classing those who rejected and resisted Spanish jurisdiction by refusing to live in '*policía'*, as savages and cannibals.[28] Reworked, shared, and conveyed by local elites as 'strategic narratives', such stereotypes were widely manipulated in the discourse by these elites and the monarchy,[29] to justify punitive action against indigenous groups, who also learned to use those same stereotypes to their advantage, when possible.[30] The expeditions are testament to the presence of such stereotypes and their widespread political use.

Recent historiography on Spanish America's borders in the period in question reflects a wide range of theoretical interests.[31] These include, on the one hand, a focus on these regions as a locus for mestizaje, a process of cultural and social mixing that involved indigenous peoples and the Spanish as its main participants, though not the only ones.[32] And, on the other hand, a focus on such spaces as places of construction

[28] Germán Morong Reyes, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial. Los indios en el gobierno del Perú de Juan de Matienzo (1567)* (Rosario, Argentina: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2016).

[29] For a case study on this rework and use of stereotypes see Luis Miguel Córdoba Ochoa, "Guerra, imperio, y violencia en la Audiencia de Santa Fe, Nuevo Reino de Granada. 1580-1620" (PhD Dissertation, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2013).

[30] Strategic narrative is a term from the field of International Relations that has become prominent in the analysis of war, security, and strategic communications. They are defined as tools for "political actors to extend their influence, manage expectations, and change the discursive environment in which they operate. The point of strategic narratives is to influence the behaviour of others". Alister Miskimmon, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle, *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order* (New York; London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013), 3.

[31] For a summary on recent and past historiography on the subject see Fabricio Prado, "The Fringes of Empires: Recent Scholarship on Colonial Frontiers and Borderlands in Latin America," *History Compass* 10, no. 4 (April 2012): 318–333; for a summary on studies of missions and borders by the mid-2000s, see: Caroline Williams, "Opening New Frontiers in Colonial Spanish American History: New Perspectives on Indigenous-Spanish Interactions on the Margins of Empire," *History Compass* 6, no. 4 (2008): 1121–39; for an overview on indigenous populations: Linda Newson, "Indian Population Patterns in Colonial Spanish America," *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 3 (1985): 41–74; for a compilation on the subject: Danna Levin Rojo and Cynthia Radding Murrieta, eds., *The Oxford Handbook of Borderlands of the Iberian World*, Oxford Handbooks (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2019).

[32] Guillaume Boccara, "Génesis y estructura de los complejos fronterizos euro-indígenas. Repensando los márgenes americanos a partir (y mas allá) de la obra de Nathan Wachtel.," *Memoria Americana* 13 (2005): 21–52; Christophe Giudicelli, "Encasillar la frontera. Clasificaciones coloniales y disciplinamiento del espacio en el área diaguito-calchaquí. Siglos XVI-XVII.," *Anuario IEHS*, no. 22 (2007): 161–211; Shawn Michael Austin, *Colonial Kinship: Guaraní, Spaniards, and Africans in Paraguay* (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2020); Susana Truchuelo and Emir Reitano, *Fronteras en el mundo atlántico (siglos XVI-XIX)* (Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017).

of coloniality and subalternity.[33] These studies understand borders as zones of alterity and identity-making, with an emphasis on classification, resistance, permanence, and their legacy.[34] However, classificatory practices, such as the stereotyping of indigenous peoples, and to that effect identities and alterities, were contested fields, relational in nature, and highly dependent on context.[35] Indigenous peoples who were one day classed as friends, were the next day and under different circumstances seen as enemies. One set of Spaniards and their allies saw them as 'cannibals', and others as ideal partners. If the argument is shifted and the focus placed upon agency and claim making, borders are perceived as constructed through "complex processes of appropriation that were carried out by hundreds of individuals in thousands of daily interactions."[36] Alterities and identities become thus fields defined by political agency which was limited by jurisdiction. It was in relation to those able to establish law and deliver justice and in line with their concepts of status, race, and religion, that agents defined themselves, negotiating and contesting identities and labels. Along these borders of possession, where life was precarious, agency and political posturing, more than identity and continuity, provided means for political and social survivance.[37]

From this perspective, the borders of Charcas were political constructs built first under Tahuantinsuyu, when they were points of contention and connection between two geographically and culturally different worlds; and then under the Catholic Monarchy, which understood them as spaces empty of jurisdiction, meaning that law and justice had to be introduced. This would only be possible through expeditions designed to bring the monarchy's presence to these borders. Sometimes this involved individual arrangements with those prepared to establish towns, and

[33] José Rabasa, *Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier: The Historiography of Sixteenth Century New Mexico and Florida and the Legacy of Conquest* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2000), 6; Susan M. Deeds, *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya* (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003).

[34] The works of Radding and Scott are probably exceptions as they incorporate a new perspective on borders from an environmental and geographical approach. Cynthia Radding Murrieta, *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850* (Durham: Duke University Press, 1997); Heidi V. Scott, *Contested Territory: Mapping Peru in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries* (Notre Dame, Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009).

[35] Joanne Rappaport, *The Disappearing Mestizo: Configuring Difference in the Colonial New Kingdom of Granada* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2014), 5.

[36] Tamar Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015), 8.

[37] Two recent approaches to other Catholic Monarchy borders bring a similar image. Martin Austin Nesvig, *Promiscuous Power: An Unorthodox History of New Spain*, (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2018); José Miguel Escribano Páez, *Juan Rena and the Frontiers of Spanish Empire, 1500-1540*, (New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2020).

therefore share, install, exercise, and potentially expand jurisdiction. Through such settlements, the Spanish were supposed to engage with indigenous peoples clearing the way to their evangelisation, the exchange of goods, and eventually their transformation into the monarch's vassals. Other times, the purpose of such expeditions was punitive, in a political culture that understood justice and government as the same and saw the border indigenous populations in a paternalistic manner. Despite the Catholic Monarchy's intentions, because of jurisdictional politics, the southeast Charcas border regions were unstable and life there precarious, which made them a permanent war zone. The power to establish law and deliver justice on the edges, where checks were sporadic and the political balance was fragile, weighed more in favour of the recipients of such power, in this case borderland vecinos and their indigenous allies, and their agendas.

This study approaches all three expeditions through a wide array of documentary sources, including published and unpublished reports and letters. Because of the military nature of the events, reports on merits and services, also known as *Probanzas*, of those who travelled as expedition members, represent a large part of the documents analysed. Drafted with the help of notaries and lawyers, involving witnesses to past events, their aim was to secure favours and grants from the monarch.[38] Probanzas involved a large degree of self-fashioning and self-promotion and scholars have analysed them from this perspective.[39] The documents have also been approached from the perspective of indigenous and mestizo identities and how these were negotiated in Spanish America.[40] The focus in this thesis is to situate such

[38] Through such documents merits and services were commodified meaning that they could be passed down from one generation to the next and were integrated into an 'economy' of rewards and privileges. Javier Barrientos Grandón, "'Méritos y servicios': Su patrimonialización en una cultura jurisdiccional (s. XVI-XVII)," *Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos* XL (2018): 589–615.

[39] Murdo McLeod, "Self-Promotion: The Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios and Their Historical and Political Interpretation.," *CLAHR* 7, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 25–42; Robert Folger, *Writing as Poaching. Interpellation and Self-Fashioning in Colonial Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios* (Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011).

[40] Mario Julio Graña, "La verdad asediada. Discursos de y para el poder. Escritura, institucionalización y élites indígenas surandinas. Charcas, siglo XVI," *Andes. Antropología e Historia*, no. 12 (2001): 123–39; María Carolina Jurado, "«Descendientes de los primeros». Las probanzas de méritos y servicios y la genealogía cacical. Audiencia de Charcas, 1574-1719," *Revista de Indias* 74, no. 261 (August 30, 2014): 387–422; Ximena Medinaceli, "La ambigüedad del discurso político de las autoridades étnicas en el siglo XVI. Una propuesta de lectura de la probanza de los Colque Guarachi de Quillacas," *Revista Andina* 38 (Primera Mitad del 2004): 87–104; Felipe Ruan, "The Probanza and Shaping a Contesting Mestizo Record in Early Colonial Peru.," *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 94, no. 5 (2017): 843–69; Gabriela Ramos, "El rastro de la discriminación. Litigios y probanzas de caciques en el Perú colonial temprano," *Fronteras de La Historia* 21, no. 1 (June 2016): 66–90.

records, with help of other documentary evidence, in their wider social and political context, reading them as part of an extended archive made of thousands of documents interconnected with each other. This approach will enable a better appreciation of the cacophony of voices that can be elicited from these records. The information they provide can also be matched with that of other documents. Through probanzas it is possible to reconstruct backgrounds, social networks, and compare narratives of different agents of the same events, in a manner that very few other sources can match.[41] The around one hundred and forty probanzas examined for this thesis offer a unique glimpse, sometimes very intimate, difficult to find in other documents.[42]

The choice of expeditions discussed here provides scope for a diverse approach to events as they took place in three very distinctive moments of Charcas' history. The 1564-1565 expeditions of Chapter Two were undertaken by an encomendero, the recipient of a grant of indigenous peoples, captain Martín de Almendras, at a crucial time, little after the Audiencia was settled in 1561, and right when its judges or *oidores* and president were trying to negotiate its jurisdiction. From its onset, the Audiencia understood that communications across its vast geography were key to enforcing and sustaining its jurisdictional pretentions. This was particularly so along the southern route to Tucumán, which was seen as a potential route to deliver silver from Potosi, and alternative to the Pacific Ocean/Lima-Panamá-Atlantic Ocean route that was time consuming and expensive. However, because the Tucumán route was blocked by regular native unrest, but probably more importantly due to a unique opportunity to reconfirm the Audiencia's jurisdiction in Tucumán, two expeditions were mounted. These expeditions arranged by Almendras show an encomendero group allied to a new Audiencia working together to settle, consolidate, and expand royal jurisdiction, using rituals and political imagery in remote settings. The final expedition would be Captain

[41] Roxana Nakashima and Lia Guillermina Oliveto, "Las informaciones de méritos y servicios y el imperio global de Felipe II a través de la trayectoria de Francisco Arias de Herrera," *Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivos*, no. 5 (2014): 120–28.

[42] These probanzas date between the 1560s and mid-seventeenth century. They are complex documents, sometimes of just a few folios and sometimes hundreds of them, that often include copies of sections, or entire documents, from previous times, known as *traslados*, frequently used as evidence of merits and services. Probanzas have a starting date, but they were an unfinished work as more merits and services could be added at any time. Probanzas were to a degree archives within larger archives. Together, they were the collective memory of the services of vassals to their monarch and were a key element in the economy of rewards and privileges.

Almendras' demise, yet it would also be the Audiencia's opportunity to finally install its political presence in Tucumán and secure the Atlantic route.

Ten years later, in Chapter Three, the stage was totally different, as Peru's most famous viceroy, don Francisco de Toledo, mounted the largest expedition to the borders of Charcas ever. The historiography on Toledo's period, due to its focus on state-making based on the national states of the nineteenth century, has concentrated on his character as organiser, strategist, and lawmaker. However, the approach adopted in this thesis shows his role as leader of an expedition bringing a different image of him, one of defeat, which has not received the required attention. With royal instructions that urged him to settle and evangelise the indigenous peoples of southeast Charcas, leaving violence as an ultimate resort, and against a backdrop of uncooperative encomenderos, Peru's fifth viceroy launched an *entrada* or expedition largely funded by a windfall of silver generated by the introduction of the amalgamation process for treating mineral to Potosí. Toledo, who was prone to an arbitrary approach to rule, wanted to confirm and install the monarchy's jurisdiction in the border. The viceroy took with him, "la Flor del Perú", the best men of Peru, as Jesuit priest and author José de Acosta[43] referred to those who followed the viceroy in an almost religious procession to the dense Andean slopes inhabited by the Chiriguanaes. The 'King's living image' returned from the expedition in poor health. In the wake of his defeat, the Chiriguanaes and the Audiencia emerged as the main winners. The former because of how they humiliated the royal official, the latter because it only had limited involvement with the event.

Finally, and after a post-Toledan period along the southeast borders that saw the establishment of two new towns -San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija and Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina-, and more instability as a result, in the last expedition, in Chapter Four, the thesis moves from the embellished journey of Toledo to the border, to the entrada of one of his *criados*, Juan Lozano Machuca, a character close to him. This was a crucial time for the Viceroyalty of Peru, as Toledo's successor had passed, leaving the district without a viceroy. It was the opportunity for a consolidated and strong Audiencia de Charcas to show that apart from providing

[43] José de Acosta, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias* (Sevilla: Casa de Juan Leon, 1590), 590.

advice, as it had done during Toledo's period, it could be more involved in the government of its district and organise and command large-scale punitive expeditions to its border areas. This would effectively make the monarchy present there, with less expense and loss of lives than the Viceroy. This entrada in 1584-1585 provides a glimpse into an Audiencia increasingly aware of the importance of keeping the border in peace by negotiating concessions with those Spanish and mestizo captains and their networks who were already present there. It shows that its officials understood the miniaturisation of politics as the best way forward to expand jurisdiction with little cost and few responsibilities to bear. The idea was to leave behind the era of costly entradas of 'feathers, silks, and trappings' to the Chiriguanaes. It was now the time of the "practical men", "hombres platicos [sic]" as one witness to these entradas commented, who were able to handle matters using local manners.

These three chapters are preceded by Chapter One that sets the background for the expeditions and analyses the transformations experienced by these borders first under Tahuantinsuyu and then in the early years of the Spanish conquest. The thesis concludes with a discussion on Catholic Monarchy politics, Charcas, and its borders.

Chapter 1

A background to the expeditions

The southeast Charcas borders between Tahuantinsuyu and the early Spanish Conquest

1. Introduction

The present chapter sets the background for this thesis' expeditions. Beginning with a description of the geography and the peoples of the southeast borders of the region the Spanish called Charcas, that includes parts of present day Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia and the northwest of Argentina, the aim is to discuss the incorporation of these borders first into Tahuantinsuyu, a largely diverse and sophisticated polity historians mainly know through documents written after its collapse, and the subsequent transition these border zones experienced in the early Spanish period. The chapter then addresses the beginnings of the process of installation, consolidation, and expansion of the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction in Charcas through encomiendas and expeditions. This was a process that relied on the political organisation and legacy of Tahuantinsuyu. The Spanish inherited these borders from that polity and addressed the challenges it presented them with the religious and ideological tools they had at their disposal. After a brief analysis of the incorporation of native peoples into the Catholic Monarchy, the chapter moves on with the construction of stereotypes around one of such indigenous groups: the Chiriguanaes. Finally, it reflects on how borders and their inhabitants were invented through a process that mirrored politics under both Tahuantinsuyu and the first decades of Spanish presence.

2. A diverse geography

The landscapes of this thesis run along the edges of the Southern Andes, north to south, through the territories of today Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia and Argentina. This section of the *cordillera* is made of different mountain ranges known in Bolivia under names such as Azanaques, Chocaya, San Vicente, Central, de los Chichas, de Lípez, and de Los Frailes, and in Argentina as Sierra de Santa Victoria in Jujuy and Salta provinces. In Bolivia, such ranges are separated by depressions with valleys with altitudes between 2,000 and 3,000 metres above the sea level. Crossed by mountain rivers of variable flows, such as San Juan Mayo or San Juan del Oro, Tupiza, Grande de Tarija, Pilaya, and Cotagaita in Bolivia; and Santa Victoria, El Pescado, Nazareno, Iruya and San Francisco in Argentina, these fertile valleys are ideal for agriculture. The rivers are tributaries of larger rivers such as Pilcomayo, Bermejo, and Paraguay. To the east of these valleys, lie the so-called *yungas*, ideal for coca cultivation; and the Andean foothills, the sub-Andean zone, with altitudes between 1,000 and 2,000 metres above the sea level and a dense vegetation of low and thorny trees. Beyond, below 1,000 metres above the sea level, lie the Gran Chaco lowlands with its savanna vegetation of palm and quebracho trees and tropical high-grass areas.[44] In the northwest of Argentina, in Jujuy, the *puna* environment presents a terrain with average hights of 6,000 metres above the sea level and average lows of 3,800 metres above the sea level, crossed by a narrow mountain valley known as Quebrada de Humahuaca, with a north-south orientation and an extension of around 150 kilometres.

Along with such vast geography comes a wide array of climatic zones that vary in line with altitude, from the dry and cold high plateau, or *altiplano*, to the more benign mesothermic valleys, followed by the torrid and arid conditions of the Andean foothills and the humid and tropical climate of the Gran Chaco savanna or Chaco plain. Argentina's puna shares the type of climate of Bolivia's high plateau, with great temperature contrasts between day and night. Such geographic and climatic diversity is mirrored by a diverse fauna and flora and soil conditions that made possible the domestication of certain animals (camelids such as llamas and alpacas in the high plateau), and plants (corn, quinoa, potatoes, peppers, and chillies, to name a few), by

[44] Rodolfo Raffino, Diego Gobbo, and Anahí Iácona, "De Potosí y Tarija a la frontera chiriguana," *Folia Histórica del Nordeste*, no. 16 (2006): 85; Herbert S. Klein, *Historia de Bolivia* (La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1997), 22-24.

societies who either had dispersed settlement patterns to be able to maximise their access to multiple resources (in the Andean area) or who moved around with seasonal changes (in the foothills and Gran Chaco areas).



Map 1. Andean regional topographies. Adapted from B. P. Murray et al., "Oligocene-Miocene Basin Evolution in the Northern Altiplano, Bolivia: Implications for Evolution of the Central Andean Backthrust Belt and High Plateau," *Geological Society of America Bulletin* 122, no. 9–10 (September 2010): 1444.

3. A diverse human landscape

Scholars know about the societies that inhabited this vast space mainly through two sources. One is the archaeological record. The other, an immense corpus of records written during the Spanish era that echoes concepts and prejudices not only among the Spanish but also in Tahuantinsuyu. Researchers are thus faced with a double filter posed by both polities that makes understanding of such groups a complicated and confusing task. Names like *Chichas, Churumatas, Quillacas, Asanaques, Charcas,*

Caracacara, Moyos-Moyos, Juríes, Atacamas, Omaguacas, Tomatas, Chanés, Chiriguanaes or *Guaraní,* either refer to different groups, and/or locations in some cases, as they could either be ethnonyms and/or toponyms, yet very little is known about how these groups interacted with each other, if they did; or why and how they were named, or by whom. To complicate matters further, many groups were not original from the areas where they were found by the Spanish, as they had been moved as part of Tahuantinsuyu's expansionist policies. In summary, this means that the first human map of these areas is one that reflects the final times of Tahuantinsuyu rule in Charcas.

Based on this, the indigenous populations present in the area under study in this thesis could be divided in three groups, depending on their level of integration, or complete lack of it, to Tahuantinsuyu. A first group is made of Andean peoples, also called as *naciones de Charcas*, in the *Memorial de Charcas*, which was a long letter allegedly submitted to the Catholic monarch by their caciques between 1582 and 1591.[45] These naciones de Charcas were largely part of Tahuantinsuyu at the beginning of the sixteenth century. At the opposite end of the scale, there were the inhabitants of the lowlands beyond the Andean foothills, mainly Guarani/Chiriguanaes and Chanés, who were geographically and culturally a world apart from Tahuantinsuyu and the Andeans under its influence. Finally, in between, there were indigenous peoples who had been recently moved by Tahuantinsuyu to border areas to defend it from the Chiriguanaes and the other lowland inhabitants, where the Spanish would eventually find them. They include the Churumatas, Juríes, Ocloyas, Omaguacas, Moyos-Moyos, Casabindos, Lacaxas, Cotas, and Tomatas, who are more elusive in the historical record, despite intense research by scholars in recent decades.[46]

[45] The naciones in question were Charca, Caracara, Quillaca, Caranga, Soras, Chichas and Chuys. The names are quoted here as they appear on the documentary evidence. The "Memorial", a long letter submitted by their leaders between 1582 and 1591 is in the Archivo General de Indias in Charcas 45 (Hereafter AGI). There is a transcription made by Margarita Suárez in 1986. The copy that will be used here is published as part of: Tristán Platt, Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, and Olivia Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka: Mallku, Inka y rey en la provincia de Charcas (Siglos XV-XVII): Historia antropológica de una confederación aymara*, (Lima, Perú: La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos (IFEA); Plural Editores; University of London; University of St Andrews; Inter-American Foundation, 2006).

[46] Ana María Presta, *Espacio, etnias, frontera. Atenuaciones politicas en el sur del Tawantinsuyu. Siglos XV-XVIII* (Sucre: ASUR, 1995); Carlos Zanolli, "Los chichas como mitimaes del inca," *Relaciones de la Sociedad Argentina de Antropología* XXVIII (2003): 45–60; Rodolfo Raffino, Christian Vitty, and Diego Gobbo, "Inkas y chichas: identidad, transformación y una cuestión fronteriza.," *Boletín de Arqueología PUCP*, no. 8 (2004): 247–65; Silvia Palomeque, "Casabindos, cochinocas y chichas en el



Map 2. The region around the time of the Spanish Conquest. Adaptation from Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 488.

4. Tahuantinsuyu expansion into Charcas

To understand how Tahuantinsuyu turned geographical barriers into the first cultural, social, and political borders available in the historical record, differentiating peoples who had been incorporated into its structure in Charcas, from those who had not, it is best to approach first the political organisation of those naciones de Charcas, as the *Memorial* labelled them, as they would play a significant role in the creation of

siglo XVI", 233–63; Lia Guillermina Oliveto and Paula Zagalsky, "De nominaciones y estereotipos: los chiriguanos y los moyos moyos, Dos casos de la frontera oriental de Charcas en el siglo XVI.," *Bibliographica Americana*, no. 6 (September 2010); Ana María Presta, "Los valles mesotérmicos de Chuquisaca entre la fragmentación territorial yampara y la ocupación de los migrantes qaraqara y charka en la temprana colonia," in *Aportes multidisciplinarios al estudio de los colectivos étnicos surandinos reflexiones sobre qaraqara-charka tres años después.* (La Paz: Plural-IFEA, 2013), 27–60; Carlos Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*; Lia Guillermina Oliveto, "De mitmaqkuna incaicos en Tarija a reducidos en La Plata. Tras las huellas de los moyos moyos y su derrotero colonial.," *Anuario de Estudios Bolivianos. Archivisticos y Bbliograficos* 17 (2011): 463–90.

these boundaries. The existence of identity markers that separated them in line with their hunting and war weapons -with those using bows and arrows classed as lowland natives and those using clubs and slings classed as indigenous peoples from high altitude areas- could suggest that all naciones de Charcas were tied together into some macropolitical organisation or confederation along such divisions, yet their level of unification remains a subject of academic discussion.[47] Scholars find difficult to assess when these groups were tied together and whether this pre-dated Tahuantinsuyu or was a consequence of the polity's expansion into the region.[48] It could be proposed that given that the Memorial was only written at the end of the sixteenth century and that it largely reflects the interests of Andean leaders to self-legitimise their roles in the colonial context, that these naciones were only grouped in the wake of the Spanish Conquest and therefore such alliance was extremely loose and easy to break. This may well explain how after an initial resistance, the Spaniards were able to speedily negotiate their expansion into the area with the elites of these naciones. Regardless of the duration and depth of this Andean alliance, it is relevant to highlight that these were indeed polities connected with one another in ways still difficult to ascertain and that such links, and not clearly the lack of them, facilitated first their incorporation into Tahuantinsuyu and, in the early sixteenth century, the installation, settlement, and expansion of the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction over Charcas.

In contrast, among indigenous groups with a high degree of political fragmentation who inhabited the Andean foothills, lowlands, or the territory the Spanish called Tucumán, which roughly covered the northwest of present-day Argentina, their incorporation into Tahuantinsuyu and the expansion of Spanish influence were more challenging. Not only was integration into Tahuantinsuyu highly contested and superficial, if it happened at all, but the incorporation of these groups into the Catholic Monarchy was a process full of setbacks and unfinished as this thesis explores.

---

[47] See map 2.

[48]According to archaeologist Martti Parssinen, there is some evidence that political and military units larger than provinces existed in Tahuantinsuyu which he calls "Hatun Apocazgos" from "Hatun: The Great; Apo: The King- both in Quechua". This should translate as Great Kingdoms. Martti Parssinen, *Tawantinsuyu. The Inca State and Its Political Organization.*, vol. 43, Studia Historica (Helsinki: Societas Historicas Finlandiae, 1992), 261-269; In the Coya area, Elizabeth Arkush suggests a fractured or loosely confederated political landscape, *Hillforts of the Ancient Andes: Colla Warfare, Society, and Landscape* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011); Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 221.

Tahuantinsuyu incorporation of Charcas began with Inca Pachacuti (1418-1471) and was slow, not uniform, with advances and retreats, and according to how reciprocities and dynastic succession were understood by the parties involved. It was also highly ritualised and in this regard the region's further aggregation to the Catholic Monarchy would not be different. When not fiercely opposed, Tahuantinsuyu expanded through a complex set of alliances that had to be periodically nurtured and were renegotiated between every new Inca ruler and local lords.[49] This resulted in unrest upon the succession of a new Inca which was always followed by expeditions into the rebellious areas. Such alliances were based on the principle of large-scale redistribution of any imperial surplus through institutionalised 'generosity policy' that provided gifts to local chiefs in exchange for indirect control of labour and natural resources. They involved mobilisation of colonists or *mitimaes* who were transferred from their settlements, the construction of a highly sophisticated road network or Capac Ñan, and the organisation of an elaborate warehouse system.[50] Tahuantinsuyu rule was therefore in Charcas a negotiated matter that required the agreement from local elites, a situation that would be repeated when the first Spanish conquistadors arrived, as they would rely on material support, auxiliary natives, and logistics that Andean lords could supply. On the ground, jurisdiction expansion would require a collective effort not only from the Spanish but also their indigenous allies.

Returning to Tahuantinsuyu expansionism, its first test in Charcas took place after Inca Pachacuti's death and was faced by his successor, Topa Inca Yupanqui (1471-1493), as unrest gathered pace across the region. This culminated with a siege in the fortress of Oroncota, located at the eastern border, where the local populations

[49] AGI, Charcas 53, 1574-1576, Información de méritos y servicios de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 28. -statement by Chuquicota cacique don Pablo de Unciga-. This document has been partly published in Waldemar Espinoza Soriano, "El reino aymara de quillaca-asanaque, Siglos XV y XVI," *Revista del Museo Nacional de Lima* XLV (1981): 175–274; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka,* 884, 898-99, 928, 932, 938.

[50] John V. Murra, *La organización económica del estado inca*, trans. Daniel R Wagner (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1978); Terence N. D'Altroy, *The Incas*, (Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2002); María Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, *History of the Inca Realm*, trans. Harry B. Iceland (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999); Craig Morris and Adriana Von Hagen, *The Incas: Lords of the Four Quarters* (London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2011); Parssinen, *Tawantinsuyu. The Inca State and Its Political Organization.*

had gathered to battle Tahuantinsuyu armies.[51] This was a decisive moment as Tahuantinsuyu's presence in the area strengthened afterwards under Topa Inca Yupanqui's successor, Huayna Capac (1493-1525), thanks to a system of fortresses along the southeast border attended by mitimaes and *mitayos.* These indigenous peoples were fed by agriculturalists transferred from their original settlements as happened in the valley of Cochabamba.[52] This was the time when the southeast borders of Tahuantinsuyu took the shape that continued until the first Spaniards arrived.

5. The creation of Tahuantinsuyu's southeast borders

After the initial resistance to the new Inca ruler in Oroncota, the Chichas, who would actively participate in the extension of Spanish jurisdiction in the southeast border area as this thesis shows, were given an important role in the new phase of Tahuantinsuyu expansion. Those who sided with the Inca were given the status of 'Warriors of the Inca'.[53] Under this privilege, several polities located in pre-Hispanic Charcas were responsible for patrolling the southeast border from the newly-built fortresses in Pocona, Samaipata, and Cuscotoro, among other sites, that were located in the lowlands from Cochabamba to Tarija.[54] Economically, they contributed labour for the large-scale maize production centre that Huayna Capac set up in Cochabamba to feed his vast armies.[55] They were also deployed to control other groups and suppress any rebellions that may occur.[56] This policy extended well beyond the eastern slopes of the Andes into the northwest of present-day Argentina.[57] Such roles were a practical manner of integrating newly conquered groups into Tahuantinsuyu's structure and one

[51] Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia de los incas* (Madrid: Miraguano, 2001 [1572]), 114; John Rowe, "Probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores," *Histórica* IX, no. 2 (1985): 226.
[52] Mitayo was a male adult compulsorily serving by turn in different tasks. Mitimaes were people removed from their original settlements to occupy land as colonists of Tahuantinsuyu.
[53] AGI, Charcas 45. Memorial de Charcas, in: Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 842-843.
[54] Ana María Presta, "La población de los valles de Tarija, Siglo XVI. Aportes para la solución de un enigma etnohistórico en una frontera incaica.," in *Espacio, etnías, frontera. Atenuaciones políticas en el sur del Tawantinsuyu. Siglos XV-XVIII* (Sucre: ASUR, 1995), 240; Raffino, Vitty, and Gobbo, "Inkas y chichas: Identidad, transformación y una cuestión fronteriza.", 252; John Rowe, "Probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores," *Histórica* IX, no. 2 (1985): 226.
[55] Nathan Wachtel, "Los mitimaes del valle de Cochabamba: La política colonizadora de Wayna Capac.," *Historia Boliviana* 1, no. 1 (1981): 21–57.
[56] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 183; Zanolli, "Los chichas como mitimaes del inca," 54.
[57] Gustavo Paz and Gabriela Sica, "La frontera oriental del Tucumán en el Río de la Plata (Siglos XVI-XVIII)," in *Las fronteras en el mundo atlántico (Siglos XVI-XVIII)* (La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017), 295-296.

which gave both sides the opportunity to maximise the pool of skills and resources coming from the conquered peoples and their lands. It also gave the Andean elites involved a 'badge of honour' that they would use in accounts of their merits and services to demand similar privileges from the monarchy in the late sixteenth century.[58] Moved to new locations, many of those who had served the Inca would struggle after the fall of Tahuantinsuyu. These indigenous peoples found themselves occupying geographies they were not originally from, surrounded by other peoples they had been trying to subject in the name of Incas, who were hostile to their presence, and finally, had to face Spanish conquistadors. Many would return to their original settlements, and others would remain to either adapt or fight the Spanish.

Although the system of Inca alliances worked reasonably well among Andeans, that was not the case with other natives. The Incas failed to conquer the unruly and fierce Guaraní/Chiriguanaes and Chanés and the only alternative left was to follow a 'defence-in-depth border strategy' using Huayna Capac's fortress system.[59] The sites were used largely to contain any potential threat and were not only for war but used for other forms of exchanges, such for feasts and limited trade, in a cycle of alliances and conflict.[60] Far from impregnable, they were porous military borders that brought together Andeans and lowland peoples.[61] The former received exotic feathers and animals, honey, timber, and river fish; and the latter, silver, gold, and fine Inca clothing and textiles. This well-structured and organised system would be of invaluable help when Tahuantinsuyu confronted the advance of one of such lowland groups: the Chiriguanaes.

[58] María Carolina Jurado, "«Descendientes de los primeros»; Mario Julio Graña, "Autoridad y memoria entre los killakas. Las estrategias discursivas de don Juan Colque Guarache en el sur andino. S. XVI.," *Historica* XXIV, no. 1 (julio 2000): 23–47; AGI, Charcas, 79, N22, 1592-1593, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Francisco Aymozo [sic], cacique principal y gobernador de los indios yamparaes de Yotala y Quilaquila.
[59] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 199.
[60] Sonia Alconini Mujica, *Southeast Inka Frontiers: Boundaries and Interactions* (Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2016), 179.
[61] Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial", 49.



Map 3. Tahuantinsuyu's expansion. Parssinen, *Tawantinsuyu. The Inca State and Its Political Organization*, 73.



Map 4. Fortresses and indigenous peoples on the southeast borders. Adapted from Thierry Saignes and Isabelle Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 42.

6. Tahuantinsuyu under the Chiriguanaes' threat

In the final years of Tahuantinsuyu, a group of lowland natives that came to be known as Chiriguanaes, also referred to in some Spanish sources as Guaraní, started moving west towards the Andes.[62] They were not permanent nomads, as they lived in large dwellings called *malocas*, each measuring around 50-60m long and 20-25m wide, and each able to accommodate up to 250 people. The Chiriguanes grew their own maize and complemented their diet with wild game and foraged items.[63] Although frequently seen as independent and egalitarian, the politically fragmented Chiriguanaes were organised around strict hierarchies of nobles or *ava* warriors. They also had captives and servants or *Tapii*, who were frequently Chanés or other lowland settlers they regularly captured in battles and raids.[64] The Chiriguanaes groups are often referred to in Spanish sources as *facciones* or factions, which seem to have had different leaders and disbanded and regrouped over time. This suggests the absence of centralised and stable leadership and a fluid situation. Lacking an organised religion or cult, the Chiriguanaes believed in gods and spirits, and sometimes ancestors.[65] They began their expansion westwards by moving into areas not far from Tahuantinsuyu borders during the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries.[66]

---

[62] Isabelle Combès, "Grigotá y Vitupue. En los albores de la historia chiriguana (1559-1564)," *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Études Andines* 41, no. 1 (2012): 72.

[63] Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo,* vol. 2, 40; Catherine Julien, "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)," in *Resistencia y adaptación nativa en las tierras bajas latinoamericanas.* (Quito: Abya-Yala, 1997), 20.

[64] Less is known about the Chanés, who were settled in the Gran Chaco savannah by the early sixteenth century and whose history is mainly connected to that of the Chiriguanaes. They regularly appear in documents as peaceful natives constantly attacked by the Chiriguanaes and driven away from their habitat as a result. Isabelle Combès, *Etno-historias del Isoso: Chané y chiriguanos en el Chaco boliviano (siglos XVI a XX)* (La Paz, Bolivia: Institut Français D'Etudes Andines, 2005), 41-48.

[65] Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano,* 34-35.

[66] In a recent article, anthropologist Bret Gustafson, questions the idea of the Chiriguanaes as the product of a mixture of Guarani and Chane natives, stressing the colonial origins of such narrative. Gustafson bases his argument on a linguistic analysis suggesting that the Guarani were already present in the Andean foothills before the Spanish invasion and that successive waves of them continued to arrive, which also led to the arrival of the Chané. Although this is a possibility, which in effect this thesis does not rule out, it is also an argument that is difficult to identify in the historical record. Bret Gustafson, "Were the Chiriguano a Colonial Fabrication? Linguistic Arguments for Rethinking Guaraní and Chané Histories in the Chaco," in *Reimagining the Gran Chaco: Identities, Politics, and the Environment in South America* (Florida, US: University Press of Florida, 2021), 53-72.

Three different documents provide some clues to the reasons for this expansion. The first document, a 1556 account on the abuses by the Spanish of the indigenous peoples of Asunción by priest Martín González,[67] refers to the existence of

> infinite gold and silver mines that Indians from Peru who paid tribute to Guayna Caba used to work. These [Chiriguanaes] murdered them and threw them out of the land. […] They are called the old Guayna Caba mines.[68]

A second document, an early seventeenth century report by Priest Diego Felipe de Alcaya, narrates how Inca Huayna Capac sent a relative called Guacane to exert his influence beyond the borders and set a political alliance with Grigota, who was probably a Chané leader. This largely matches Tahuantinsuyu politics focused on securing alliances and reciprocal ties with other indigenous groups. The outcome of their discussions was the erection of the fortress of Samaipata (close to present-day Santa Cruz de la Sierra city) to provide protection to Grigota and his people. In exchange, Grigota allowed the exploitation of silver and/or gold mines in Saypurú -see map 4-. News of this wealth spread among the Chiriguanaes who, with the strength of eight thousand bowmen, clashed with Grigota, Guacane and their forces at Samaipata. The Spanish priest claimed that these Chiriguanaes managed to carve out a stronghold whose population would be the basis of future Chiriguanaes settlements in the area.[69]

A third document from 1612, by Spanish captain Ruy García de Guzmán (1559-1629), describes the story of Portuguese captain Alejo or Aleixo García who was left stranded off the coast of Brazil with some companions and travelled inland in

---

[67] Born in Villarrubia del Campo de Calatrava, Spain, around 1516, González arrived in the Río de la Plata as part of the expedition of Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca in 1541. Guillaume Candela, *Entre la pluma y la cruz: el clérigo Martín González y la desconocida historia de su defensa de los indios del Paraguay: Documentos inéditos (1543-1575)* (Asunción, Paraguay: Editorial Tiempo de Historia, 2018), 13.

[68] "Tienen despobladas infinitas minas de oro y plata abiertas y por abrir que los indios del Perú que daban quinto a Guayna Caba labraban. Y estos los mataron y echaron de la tierra. […] A éstas dicen las minas viejas de Guayna Caba." in Archivo Historico Nacional (hereafter AHN), Paraguay, Colección de documentos de Indias, 24, N17, in Guillaume Candela, *Entre la pluma y la cruz*, 120.

[69] AGI, Charcas 21. R1. N2, 1600, Relación cierta de Diego Felipe de Alcaya, ff. 18-27v. Transcription by Kristina Angelis requested by Catherine Julien available in the records of the research project "Andes orientales de Bolivia", University of Bonn under the reference AGI 20.

1526. García met the Guaraní or Chiriguanaes and raised a force of two thousand to attack the settlements of Presto and Tarabuco, both under Tahuantinsuyu influence (close to what would be the Spanish village of Tomina) where Charcas indigenous peoples fought them. After their raid García and his men withdrew to Paraguay, carrying fine clothing and metals they had looted. Shortly after, García was murdered by those natives he had commanded into battle. [70]

The common element in all three narratives is the search for Tahuantinsuyu's fine textiles and metals, something the Chiriguanaes appreciated and wanted. In this light, and although some scholars believe the Chiriguanaes westward journey to be part of a wider migration movement, and others refer to it as occasional raids, the common denominator is the search for items they cherished and perceived as luxurious, and which could either be exchanged or seized. Since these attacks became more prominent at the end of the reign of Inca Huayna Capac, they constitute evidence for the delicate situation of Tahuantinsuyu which was engulfed in a civil war. Such circumstances probably affected the exchanges of luxury items between the Chiriguanaes and Tahuantinsuyu. Looking for such precious goods, the Chiriguanaes were in the Andean foothills in the 1470s and were carrying out devastating raids from the 1520s onwards.[71] As happened during Tahuantinsuyu, these valuable goods would cement relations between the Spanish and Chiriguanaes. Their exchange would engage both parties in the establishment of Spanish villages and towns as well as in the provision of captive natives as cheap labour to the Spaniards.[72] Indirectly, these goods would help to establish Spanish jurisdiction in border areas.

---

[70] Díaz de Guzmán's account on this event is the most complete. There is also information in Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, *Relación de los naufragios y comentarios* (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1906 [1542]). Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, *Argentina: Historia del descubrimiento y conquista del Río de la Plata*, (Buenos Aires: Editorial de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2012 [1612]), 93-95; on Alejo or Aleixo García see: Charles Nowell, "Aleixo García and the White King," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 26, no. 4 (November 1946): 450–66.

[71] Catherine Julien, "Kandire in Real Time and Space: Sixteenth-Century Expeditions from the Pantanal to the Andes," *Ethnohistory* 54, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 263; Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 48. Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo*, 25; Erland Nordenskiold, "The Guarani Invasion of the Inca Empire in the Sixteenth Century: An Historical Indian Migration," *Geographical Review* 4, no. 2 (August 1917): 103–21; Erick Detlef Langer, *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830-1949* (Durham: Duke University Press, 2009), 12.

[72] Lia Guillermina Oliveto, "Piezas, presos, indios habidos en buena guerra, cimarrones y fugitivos. Notas sobre el cautiverio indígena en la frontera oriental de Tarija en el siglo XVI," in *Vivir en los márgenes. Fronteras en América colonial: Sujetos, prácticas e identidades, Siglos XVI-XVIII.* (México: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, UNAM, 2021), 29–66.

González, Alcaya and Díaz de Guzmán paint a picture of a fragile situation across the borders in the final years of Tahuantinsuyu, one corroborated by other documentary evidence which refers to clashes in another fortress, Cuscotoro, not far from the Pilcomayo River -see map 4-.[73] Scholars rightly point out that such deterioration shows the contradictions of the rapid and only superficial imposition of Tahuantinsuyu rule where incessant population relocations did not necessarily mean efficient control. They add that in the south of empire, where mineral wealth was important but locals were difficult to pacify, as a result control was less direct.[74] Indirect, fast, and superficial, Tahuantinsuyu's political presence in Charcas and along the borders would quickly vanish as the polity disintegrated in the chaos that succeeded first with the death of Huayna Capac and with it a new Inca civil war, and then with the assassination of Atahualpa at the hands of the Spanish conquistadors.

7. The transition from Tahuantinsuyu to Spanish Charcas. Expeditions and *Encomiendas*

With Huayna Capac's death in 1525, Tahuantinsuyu entered a new period of civil war, as had happened every time there had been a succession. The unrest was almost over when in 1532 the Spanish encountered Atahualpa (circa 1500-1533), one of the two descendants of Huayna Capac with the right to wear the *mascaipacha*, the knitted tassel fringe that only the Inca wore. After Atahualpa's execution by the Spanish and following the distribution of the gold and silver that had been raised as a ransom for his freedom, with help from *quipocamayos*, readers of corded knots that stored information known as *quipos*, the Spaniards started distributing the indigenous groups under Tahuantinsuyu's influence in encomienda. These grants were the most

[73] Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia de los incas*, 147; Martín de Murua, *Historia general del Perú. De los orígenes al último inca.* (Madrid: Cambio16, 1992 [1606]), 90-91; Joan de Santa Cruz Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, *Relación de antiguedades deste reyno del Piru: Estudio etnohistórico y linguístico*, ed. Pierre Duviols and César Itier (Lima, Institut Français D'Etudes Andines, 1993 [1613]), 171.

[74] Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 54; R. Alan Covey, *How the Incas Built their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 206.

precious reward a conquistador could receive from the Crown for military services.[75] They were therefore a key part in the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy as these grants were given to recipients as rewards based on their service records.[76] Through encomiendas, the monarch shared with encomenderos jurisdiction over his native vassals who had to pay tribute in return for receiving religious instruction and protection. Encomenderos had to be based in a Spanish village, town, or city, and became *vecinos*, with civic duties and rights that were at the core of Catholic Monarchy politics. Encomenderos were to exercise some form of tutelage over their indigenous peoples, who were perceived as 'perpetual minors' in need of 'paternal' guardianship. This placed these peoples under the supposed supervision of encomenderos and their extended families and social networks, who would also benefit from their labour. The system tied encomenderos and their natives to urban centres, sometimes remote from their sites of settlement. The encomienda system placed encomenderos in a privileged position as responsible for the implementation, consolidation, and extension of jurisdiction among such populations, in close association with Catholic priests and indigenous leaders. With powers to 'police' these peoples, overseeing their evangelisation and incorporation into the Catholic Monarchy as vassals, all three were active participants in the extension and installation of jurisdiction in Charcas.

This shift from Tahuantinsuyu, a large-scale polity capable of mobilising armies through its ties with regional elites to fight in remote corners, to a new political system under the Catholic Monarchy that relied on jurisdictions frequently vague and juxtaposed in control of encomenderos was for the natives living along the southeast Charcas borders both traumatic and chaotic. It meant that their protection moved from Inca armies and fortresses to the small group of men that their encomenderos could garner using their own wealth and influence and under obligation because of their encomienda duties. These indigenous peoples were also coerced into participating in Spanish expeditions to new areas and borders. This period coincided with their own fragmentation in different encomiendas and a population decline caused by the arrival

[75] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 20.
[76] Bartolomé Clavero, *Antidora: Antropología catolica de la economía moderna*, (Milano: Giuffrè, 1991), 100.

of diseases their immune systems could not overcome, combined with generalised violence and a state of permanent war.

With Atahualpa's ransom distributed, Francisco Pizarro and his companions set their eyes on receiving encomiendas. A first round of distribution of such grants took place in Jauja less than a year after Atahualpa's murder and the indigenous peoples of Charcas were placed in 'deposito', this is, kept for future encomienda grants, as the Spanish had not yet ventured into the region.[77] Two of Francisco Pizarro's brothers, Gonzalo Pizarro (1510-1548) and Hernando Pizarro (1504-1578), received indigenous peoples in 'deposito' in the west and east of Charcas, respectively.[78] Given the arrival of more Spaniards with ambitions to succeed in Peru, including the followers of Diego de Almagro, Pizarro's partner, civil wars became inevitable, and the first distribution was rendered obsolete. This was therefore followed by a second round of encomienda grants in Cusco.[79] By the end of the 1530s, the Spanish were fully aware of the mineral resources of Charcas and once the first stage of civil wars ended, these grants were finally made effective. Encomiendas granted between 1540 and 1549 included indigenous peoples living along the Andean foothills and the distant region the Spanish had started calling Tucumán. They either fought the Spanish or fled from their settlements fearful of the Chiriguanaes who pushed them westwards. The border as a result shifted in the same direction and the Chiriguanaes became largely in control. The Spanish were in no position to defend the fortresses that Tahuantinsuyu had so carefully erected, and their approach would be, at least for the time being, one that combined expeditions, or entradas, with the actions of individual encomenderos trying to protect their indigenous peoples from the damaging raids. The era of the vast Tahuantinsuyu armies parked in garrisons along the borders was certainly over, giving way to an era of downscaled politics.

To take possession of their encomiendas, and roll out the process of expanding jurisdiction, the Spanish needed to launch expeditions to explore the land, reach the

[77] Francisco Pizarro was legally authorised to grant encomiendas after receiving royal permission in 1534. Gregorio Salinero, *Hombres de mala corte. Desobediencias, procesos políticos y gobierno de Indias en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI* (Madrid: Difusora Larousse - Ediciones Cátedra, 2018), 124.
[78] Pedro Pizarro, *Descubrimiento y conquista del Perú*, vol. VI (Lima: Imprenta y Librería San Martí Ca, 1917 [1571]), 81; Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 56.
[79] Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*, 71.

indigenous populations, and establish villages and towns. The first large scale expedition into Charcas was headed by Francisco Pizarro's partner, Diego de Almagro (1475-1538). In July 1535, to avoid problems between his men and those of Pizarro, and with the *capitulaciones*, or legally binding documents he had secured from the Crown, Almagro set off on an expedition to Chile to take possession of his governorship of the newly created Kingdom of Nueva Toledo, that included Cusco and the land south.[80] Charcas was a region largely unexplored by the Spanish until then and one that, based on the accounts the Spanish had, promised great wealth. Almagro's entrada was in fact part of a large plot by rebel Inca Manco Inca (1515-1544), successor of Inca Tupac Gualpa and prisoner of the Spanish in Cusco, to eliminate Pizarro's main partner and his men, so he could put Cusco under siege and finally defeat the Spanish.[81] In company with Manco Inca's half-brother Paullu (1510-1549), the entrada gave Almagro and his men, many of whom would settle in Charcas in later years, the opportunity to explore a land with promising potential in terms of populations and resources. Scholars cannot come to an agreement over which conquistador was the first to arrive in the Charcas southeast borders, yet this is likely to have happened as part of this expedition.[82] Almagro survived his expedition and helped to lift the siege of Cusco, imprisoning Francisco Pizarro's brothers and Hernando Pizarro (1504-1578) and Gonzalo Pizarro (1510-1548), who would later become encomenderos of Charcas. However, Almagro's position quickly weakened as Gonzalo escaped imprisonment and Hernando was freed as an ultimate gesture of benevolence to Francisco Pizarro, a move that could not impede a fatidic end to this episode of the Peruvian Civil Wars (1538-1555) as both sides faced one another in the battle of Las Salinas on 26 April 1538.[83]

---

[80] John Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas* (London: Macmillan, 1970), 170; Barnadas, *Charcas*, 32.
[81] Ana María Lorandi, *Ni ley, ni rey, ni hombre virtuoso: Guerra y sociedad en el virreinato del Perú, siglos XVI y XVII*, (Buenos Aires: Barcelona: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Gedisa Editorial, 2002), 54.
[82] Barragán mentions a member of Almagro's expedition, Juan de Saavedra, as the first Spaniard to have ventured into the area. Ana María Presta adds Francisco de Tarifa and gives a date -1536-1537-, yet also stresses that there might have been others before them. Oliveto believes that the identity of the first Spanish to enter these borders is likely to remain an enigma. Mario E. Barragán Vargas, *Historia temprana de Tarija*, (Tarija, Bolivia: Grafica Offset Kokito, 2001), 24; Ana María Presta, "Hermosos fértiles y abundantes'. Los valles de Tarija y su población en el siglo XVI," in *Historia, ambiente y sociedad en Tarija, Bolivia.* (La Paz: Instituto de Ecología, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés-School of Geography, University of Leeds, 2001), 30; Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 111.
[83] Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, 226; Lorandi, *Ni Ley, ni rey, ni hombre virtuoso*, 61-63.

With Almagro's defeat and murder, Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro marched south from Cusco in company of Paullu Inca, who had effectively shifted allegiance to the Pizarro brothers and victors. They faced a first pocket of resistance in Tapacarí, not far from the Cochabamba valley, a fertile area that, as already said, Huayna Capac had turned into a large-scale maize production centre to feed his vast armies, and where Inca general Tiso, who was responding to Manco Inca, was waiting for the Spanish. After overcoming Tiso's force, Hernando had to meet Francisco Pizarro who was back in Cusco, leaving Gonzalo as the head of the expedition. The following pocket of resistance was in the valley of Cochabamba, where combined armies of Charcas under the command of Charca and Chicha chiefs Cuysara and Tiori Nasco, paired as 'Warriors of the Incas', faced the Spanish forces and their indigenous auxiliaries in a number of battles putting them under siege between August and November 1538.[84] The siege was only lifted after Hernando returned with reinforcements and Paullu Inca engaged both sides in discussions.[85] It can be noted the resemblance between this resistance and previous episodes of unrest each time a new Inca took the helm of Tahuantinsuyu. In effect, Paullu, who became Inca with the favour of the Spaniards after the death of his brother Manco Inca, had travelled through Charcas in company of Almagro (1535), representing his half-brother Manco Inca. However, accompanying the Pizarro brothers' expedition, Paullu entered the region as Inca ruler which guaranteed negotiations between both parties securing the loyalty of the indigenous peoples. Paullu's mediation was the key factor to ensure the surrender of the armies of Charcas and claim the region for the Catholic Monarchy. It was this Inca who extended royal jurisdiction over this new aggregated territory.[86] To seal the arrangements, the caciques unveiled to the Spanish the existence of one of their main *huacas*, the silver-rich mine of Porco, which marked the start of a new era in the region. This move brought the political cultures of the Catholic Monarchy and the Andean elites together as Porco was at the same time a gift handed by those elites as they had done in the past with the Incas and a donation that mutually bound them to the Catholic

[84] Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, 236; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 112-115.

[85] Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 111; Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, *La identidad aymara. Aproximación histórica. (Siglos XV y XVI).* (La Paz: Hisbol/IFEA, 1987), 29.

[86] As José Javier Ruiz Ibañez and Gaetano Sabatini have suggested, the initial moments of conquests were times in which briefly the "sovereign or his representative had to proclaim (ex novo or as a confirmation) the social status of those involved and this had a favourable effect on those well situated with respect to royal power", in this case Paullu, as well as those lords who rapidly surrendered accepting the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction. José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez and Gaetano Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy.," *The Journal of Modern History* 81, no. 3 (September 2009): 515.

monarch as his loyal vassals. The caciques were probably expecting their full incorporation as local nobles recognised through the use of the title of 'don' as finally happened.[87] With the presence of precious mineral deposits, there was now the need for a more stable Spanish population in Charcas, one that would give encomenderos a place to reside and handle their legal, political, and financial affairs more locally, exercising what they called '*vecindad*', a kind of citizenship, organizing themselves politically in a local urban settlement, from which they might bring 'policía' to the area.

Further expeditions mainly targeted the edges of Charcas and were commanded by men who felt they had not secured a sizable share of prestige and wealth and/or were simply hoping to find mythical riches. These entradas offered the opportunity to assess remote regions and eventually reach indigenous populations the Spanish only knew through the Incas. One such man was the Greek Captain Pedro de Candia (1485-1542), someone Hernando Pizarro distrusted. In company of Pedro Anzúrez de Campo Redondo, he set off south from Cusco, following the line of Inca tambos in an expedition that they funded themselves in 1538.[88] Candia marched into Tarija on his own, as Pedro Anzúres went north to Cusco on orders from Francisco Pizarro, leaving his own men in charge of captain Diego de Rojas (1500-1544). Rojas and Candia eventually met in Tarija and began preparations for the first documented expedition into the Chiriguanaes. However, without a precise knowledge of the area, the expedition ended up following the wrong path, one that was away from Chiriguanaes settlements.[89] Pedro Anzúrez returned and founded the first Spanish settlement in Charcas, Villa Plata, called La Plata later, present-day Sucre, between 1539 and 1540, finally giving encomenderos a legal, political, and juridical site of residence. With Villa Plata, a new urban political community was established beginning the long process of settling and extending Catholic Monarchy jurisdiction in Charcas, through installing a cabildo with authority over a vast area that included the region's southeast borders.[90] This process of jurisdiction settlement would reach

[87] Tristan Platt and Pablo Quisbert, "Tras las huellas del silencio: Potosí, los incas y Toledo," *Runa* XXXI, no. 2 (2010): 116.
[88] Jose Antonio del Busto, *La hueste perulera* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1981), 160-163; Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, 234.
[89] Rafael Sanchez Concha Barrios, "Las expediciones descubridoras: La entrada desde Larecaja hasta Tarija (1539-1540).," *Boletin del Instituto Riva Aguero* 16 (1989); Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial", 116.
[90] Arze Quiroga gives a date, 31 August 1539, to this development. Eduardo Arze Quiroga, *Historia de Bolivia. Fases del proceso hispano-americano: Origenes de la sociedad boliviana en el siglo XVI* (La

momentum with the establishment of the Audiencia de Charcas in the same city in 1561.



Map 5. Area occupied by the Chiriguanaes. Early sixteenth century. Based on: Tristán Platt, Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, and Olivia Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 108.

Key to Villa Plata's foundation was the fact that the natives in the area were granted in encomiendas to the citizens of this new urban centre. Spanish villages and towns required regular labour and were not able to function without such grants. Despite being far away from the new village, the Chichas, who this thesis follows because of their proximity to the border with the Chiriguanaes, were given in encomienda to Hernando Pizarro on 27 April 1539.[91] Others also present in the border, such as the Moyos-Moyos, Apatamas, Juríes, and Churumatas, were handed to Francisco de Retamoso and Alonso de Camargo in 1540.[92] They were in areas of

Paz-Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1969). Josep Barnadas settles for an earlier date, between November and December 1538. Barnadas, *Charcas*. 34. Without any foundation document, Presta prefers to date the event between 1539 and 1540. Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 19. Gunnar Mendoza suggests 16 April 1540. Gunnar Mendoza Loza, *Obras Completas*, Vol 1 (Sucre: Fundación Cultural del Banco Central de Bolivia-Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, 2005), 39-45.

[91] AGI, Justicia 406, 1539, Cédula de encomienda de Hernando Pizarro in Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 311-316; Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*, 71.

[92] Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 127.

difficult access that by then were regularly exposed to raids by Chiriguanaes.[93] Further south, in the region the Spanish called Tucumán, Juan de Villanueva received the Omaguaca, and Martín Monje, indigenous peoples in Casabindo and Chichas.[94] In documents years later Monje would acknowledge that it had been impossible for him to extract any tribute from his indigenous peoples because they were too distant and were at war.[95] These type of encomiendas, known as '*de guerra'*, or 'war encomiendas' clearly show the limitations of a model that would not work with peoples who would resist Spanish rule.[96] This was also the situation with the Chiriguanaes, Chanés and other lowland peoples who were politically fragmented and whose organisation made them 'unsuitable' for encomienda arrangements. The expansion of jurisdiction and implementation of encomiendas relied on indigenous cooperation and coercion and the existence of hierarchically politically organised societies, without which they were destined to fail. Furthermore, post-Tahuantinsuyu alliances such as those the Spanish were able to secure with Andean chiefs were simply impossible among border groups who had not been integrated into Tahuantinsuyu. For them, the only alternative was a fragile coexistence that combined peace and war and that transformed the borders into 'lands of warrying indigenous peoples" or '*tierras de indios de guerra'*, a status some of these areas would not lose for many centuries.[97]

For those encomenderos with grants in areas where Tahuantinsuyu control had never been deep and whose indigenous populations were now hostile, and had regained a large degree of freedom, the task of reaching their native tributaries and taking possession of their encomiendas became challenging and required new expeditions. Following the assassination of Francisco Pizarro in July 1541, that opened another chapter in the Spanish Civil Wars, the thirst for expansion seemed not to stop. Captain Diego de Rojas, a veteran of the Conquest, who had previously been with Hernando and Gonzalo Pizarro in Charcas, secured permission for his own expedition to

[93] AGI, Justicia 1125, N5, R1, 1551, El capitán Cristóbal Barba, con el adelantado Juan Ortiz de Zárate, ambos vecinos de la ciudad de La Plata, sobre el derecho a los indios moyos.
[94] Título de encomienda a favor del Capitán Martín Monje, otorgado por el gobernadora don Francisco Pizarro. 17 de septiembre de 1540 in José Toribio Medina, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile.*, vol. VI (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1896), 168-170.
[95] Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, *Relaciones geográficas de Indias: Perú*, vol. II (Ministerio de Fomento. Impreso en la Casa Real, 1885). XLIII; Presta, "Los valles mesotérmicos de Chuquisaca," 52; Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*, 72-81.
[96] Thomas Calvo and Aristarco Regalado Pinedo, *Historia del reino de la Nueva Galicia* (Jalisco: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2016), 217-218.
[97] Langer, *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree*, Introduction.

Tucumán in 1543. Rojas lost his life in this entrada and was replaced by Francisco de Mendoza (1515-1547).[98] Mendoza's main achievement was the discovery of a route between Charcas and the Río de la Plata, after reaching the confluence of Paraná and Carcarañá rivers. The new route, which would offer a new connection with Spain, avoiding the viceregal capital Lima, was strategic for Charcas, reorienting the region geopolitically to the Atlantic Ocean. This gave the Spanish elite in Charcas a new objective and ambition to eventually detach the district from the influence of Lima. However, for the time being, such a journey was perilous due to the hostility of indigenous populations and a largely unknown geography. This discovery made, nonetheless, the stabilisation of the southeast borders of Charcas an urgent matter.

Peru would not see peace for another decade. The first blow to the power of encomenderos would come from Blasco Nuñez Vela (1543-1546), who reached Peru as its first viceroy with orders to see the implementation of the New Laws of 1542. Their aim was to limit encomendero authority by not extending their grants beyond the life of the first holders of encomiendas, compromising future generations of encomendero families and descendants. They also banned obligatory personal services provided by indigenous peoples to encomenderos, something they relied upon.[99] Because of Nuñez Vela's inflexibility in relation to the implementation of these new regulations, due to his lack of authority, Peru's encomenderos relied on Gonzalo Pizarro, the last relative of the conqueror in the area, as their leader who was able to impose seigneurial authority as the heir of the Marquis of the Conquest to potentially overturn the New Laws. Pizarro began a large-scale rebellion that resulted in Nuñez Vela's death (January 1546), prompting the arrival of a new Crown envoy, Licenciado Pedro de La Gasca (1485-1567) in 1548. Contrary to the Crown's intentions, this period of anarchy saw the revival of encomendero factions, a situation reinvigorated by a new development. Around such time, news of Potosí, a silver mine that would become Peru's main source of wealth, had reached all corners of the viceroyalty and beyond. The new riches would finance, first Gonzalo Pizarro's war efforts against Nuñez Vela and then his new campaign against the Crown's new envoy. Mining at Porco and Potosí, located close to the natives Gonzalo enjoyed because of his

[98] Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 117-118.
[99] Lorandi, *Ni ley, ni rey, ni hombre virtuoso*, 72-73.

encomienda, made the encomiendas in Charcas more valuable and the availability of native labour an asset.

With the arrival of La Gasca, Gonzalo Pizarro's days were numbered. After his defeat and execution, there was a new redistribution of encomienda grants to reward those who had sided with the victors. With so many candidates and so few encomiendas, La Gasca asked for assessments of the actual value and size of these grants and their data was used for the redistribution pursued in Guaynarima in August 1548.[100] Because of the need for indigenous labour, Potosí had inflated the value of those encomiendas in Charcas significantly. The mining settlement, or *Asiento* as it was initially called, created new mercantile opportunities for those with labour and money to invest. The valleys not far from the Chiriguanaes borders, which could be used for agriculture production to feed the crowds of miners and Potosí's vecinos, merchants and mining entrepreneurs, acquired new significance, yet the threat of the Chiriguanaes was difficult to overcome. As Catholic priest Reginaldo de Lizárraga said, remembering the time half a century later, "Potosí was crowding" these valleys.[101] By then, prominent encomenderos of Charcas and their clients had farms along the southeast borders.[102] In time, the farms would be the starting point of many of the settlements, villages and towns that were arranged and established around them. At this point, the Chiriguanaes had become a nuisance to the authorities in La Plata who were seeking ways to penetrate their lands, establishing law, order, and monarchy in an environment they perceived as chaotic, or in their terms, that lacked 'policía'.

[100] These assessments were published by Rafael Loredo. Rafael Loredo, "Relaciones de repartimientos que existían en el Perú al finalizar la rebelión de Gonzalo Pizarro," *Revista de la Universidad Católica del Perú* VIII, no. 1 (1940): 51–62; Rafael. Loredo, *Los repartos; Bocetos para la nueva historia del Perú.* (Lima, Unknown Publisher, 1958).

[101] Reginaldo de Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, Libro uno (Buenos Aires: Librería de la Facultad, 1916 [1605]), 274.

[102] Traslado de la carta que el Mariscal Alonso de Alvarado y el licenciado Juan Fernández, Fiscal de la Audiencia, escribieron a la Audiencia, acerca de lo que habían hecho para la alteración de Don Sebastián de Castilla. Potosí, 20 de octubre de 1553 in Roberto Levillier, *Audiencia de Lima. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. (1549-1564)*, vol. I (Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1922), 95-96; Weaver Olson, "A Republic of Lost Peoples," 62-63; Catherine Julien, Kristina Angelis, and Zulema Bass Werner de Ruiz, *Historia de Tarija. Corpus documental.*, vol. VI (Tarija: Editora Guadalquivir, 1997), xiii.

In summary, at this end of this process, the map of the encomiendas, settlements and distribution of indigenous peoples close to the eastern borders of Charcas was as follows:

Encomiendas of 'Indigenous peoples at war' or in border areas by the 1550s

Encomenderos with grants in areas exposed to 'Indios de Guerra' or made of 'Indios de Guerra'	Encomienda	Awarded by
Hernando Pizarro*	Chichas	Francisco Pizarro
Francisco de Tapia and Hernán Nuñez de Segura	Cochabilca and Moyos-Moyos	Pedro de La Gasca
Martín and Diego de Almendras	Tarabuco	Pedro de La Gasca
Juan de Villanueva (inherited by his wife Petronila de Castro after his death and run by her new husband Juan de Cianca until his death in 1566)	Chichas and Omaguaca	Francisco Pizarro
Martín Monje	Casabindo and Moyos-Moyos	Francisco Pizarro

Source: Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, p. 258.

*Imprisoned in Spain at La Mota de la Medina del Campo as responsible of the execution of Diego de Almagro.

To wrap up this chapter's section, the disintegration of Tahuantinsuyu, the southeast border, built over the years through imperial policies which included the construction of fortresses and the relocation of native colonists, simply collapsed. The border enabled both confrontation and trade. As part of their efforts to implement and

expand jurisdiction, through expeditions, the Spanish learned more about the border, yet they also realised that the encomienda system that was installed elsewhere in Peru would not work among indigenous populations of the lowlands. Under pressure from Chiriguanaes raids, some of those natives given in encomienda to different Spaniards moved westwards, and with them so did the border. The Chiriguanaes posed a challenge and set the limit to Spanish jurisdiction. This situation was however not unique to Charcas. As this thesis is about to explore, elsewhere across Spanish America, conquistadors faced similar situations which prompted heated discussions about the nature of the Spanish conquest, the role of the monarchy, and the nature of its newest vassals: the indigenous populations.

8. The Spanish and the unconquered and unconquerable natives

As the conquistadors moved from north to south, from the Caribbean and Mexico to Peru, they encountered peoples who were unconquered and wanted to remain that way.[103] This triggered ethical and religious discussions that resulted in 1512 in the Laws of Burgos, cementing the idea that the monarchy was obliged to protect the natives of the New World. The use of violence as part of the process to extend jurisdiction over new possessions was questioned and remained a controversial subject as it placed the monarchy in a difficult position both at home and abroad.[104] A

[103] Juan David Montoya Guzmán, "La fabricación del enemigo: Los indios pijaos en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1562-1611.," *TRASHUMANTE. Revista Americana de Historia Social.* 19 (2022): 96–117; Linda Newson, *Supervivencia indígena en la Nicaragua colonial* (London, University of London Press, 2021); Linda Newson, *Life and Death in Early Colonial Ecuador* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995); Alvaro Jara, *Guerra y sociedad en Chile. La transformación de la guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios*. (Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1971); Salvador Alvarez, "La guerra chichimeca," in *Historia del reino de Nueva Galicia* (Jalisco: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2016), 211–62. For a more general review of all these borders: Thierry Saignes, "Las zonas conflictivas: Fronteras iniciales de guerra.," in *El primer contacto y la formación de nuevas sociedades.*, vol. II (Madrid: Ediciones UNESCO, Ediciones Trotta, 2007), 269–99.

[104] Spain's medieval code, the Siete Partidas de Alfonso X, had identified the just cause of waging religious war against infidels as part of the Reconquista struggle against the Moors based on three considerations: first, to expand religion and destroy those who oppose it; second, as part of vassal-lord ties; and third, for the protection and honour of one's dwelling place. *Las Siete Partidas del sabio rey don Alonso El Nono, nuevamente glosadas por el Licenciado Gregorio López del Consejo Real de Indias de Su Magestad*, vol. 1 (Salamanca: Andrea de Portonari, 1555), Segunda Partida, Título XXIII, Ley II, 79.

document best known as *Requerimiento* seemed the best way forward.[105] It was supposed to convey the rights and duties the natives had and was first read out loud in the Spanish American jungles in 1514. Adjusted in 1526 to make room for interpreters to ensure that the message was understood by its recipients, the Requerimiento was subject to further changes and written consent from priests was added as an extra requirement needed for any war declaration.[106] Despite all the legalities, such adjustments did not change the fact that indigenous peoples who were faced with the 'illocutionary force' of this document either had to surrender or being cast as hostile and suffer outright violence in the process.[107] This document did not certainly solve the polemics about the way the jurisdiction of the Catholic Monarchy over the New World was being extended, many times, to quote contemporaries; '*a sangre y fuego'*, 'with blood and fire'.

These debates, or 'polemics of possession', eventually resulted in the New Laws of 1542, designed to curb encomendero abuses.[108] Further changes were introduced making it clear that natives could not be enslaved by war or any other reason, yet the discussions continued. Between 1550 and 1551, Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda (1494-1573) and Bartolomé de Las Casas (1486-1566) hosted two sessions to debate the nature of Spanish conquests and whether they were lawful and just.[109]

---

[105] This document descends from medieval legal traditions circulating along Christian Europe in relation to just war and the rights of non-Christians, as well as traditions from the Reconquista and Moorish genres, specifically the Islamic *jihad*. Like many other legal documents at the time, the Requerimiento was staged. Paja Faudree, "Reading the 'Requerimiento' Performatively: Speech Acts and the Conquest of the New World," *Colonial Latin American Review* 24, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 456–78. Widely mocked, it was controversial from its beginnings, yet Cañizares-Esguerra suggests a contextual reading from the Bible, as he states that for those jurists who drafted the Requerimiento, the conquest was the fulfilment of "Joshua 3:7 and 6:16-21: Israelites/Spaniards gave the Canaanites/Indians an ultimatum to clear the Promised Land or face destruction". Jorge Cañizares-Esguerra, "Typology in the Atlantic World. Early Modern Readings of Colonization.," in *Soundings in Atlantic History. Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830.* (London: Harvard University Press, 2009), 251. Cervantes proposes to understand it as a sign that the Crown was becoming all too aware of its obligations to indigenous peoples and in response it was attempting to cover itself legally. Fernando Cervantes, *Conquistadores. A New History.* (London: Penguin Books, 2021), 82.

[106] Lewis Hanke, *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949), 112.

[107] Rabasa, *Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier*, 10-11; Herzog, *Frontiers of Possession*, 106.

[108] Understood as the debates over the right to possess and govern the Indies and its peoples. Rolena Adorno, *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

[109] What was at a stake was the application of infidel rights to the natives, which, as David Lantigua suggests, became a legal precedent for international relations between non-Europeans and the West. This was a debate that originated from the experiences along the Catholic Monarchy's borders. David Lantigua, *Infidels and Empires in a New World Order: Early Modern Spanish Contributions to International Legal Thought*, (Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2020), 2-3.

The question was never actually settled, yet by the 1550s there were regulations on the rights of natives and how to extend and settle jurisdiction over them, even if it had to be done with violence.[110] Stressing the 'minority condition' of indigenous peoples, who were perceived as lacking 'policía' because they were not living in fixed settlements and having what the Spanish saw as a 'civic life', and without knowledge of the Catholic faith, such regulations dictated how to wage war against unconquered natives, and when such actions were just or unjust.[111] With religion as a key argument for intervention and expansion, the Catholic Monarchy could arrange with individuals the extension of its own jurisdiction on grounds that it was an instrument of assimilation to Christianity thus justifying war.[112] Cannibalism, among other 'sins' attributed to some indigenous groups, gave moral ground for just war and their subsequent enslavement.[113] This argument was conveyed as part of strategic narratives and would resonate in letters and official documents every time the Spanish needed to justify expeditions to lands of 'Indigenous Peoples at War', from the Chichimecas in Mexico, the Pijaos in Nueva Granada, to the Araucanos in Chile, and the Chiriguanaes in Charcas. It was an argument that fed into a wider stereotype of those natives who were hostile to Spanish jurisdiction. It was also part of a narrative that would end up being manipulated by these same indigenous peoples to extract goods from the Spanish, in exchange of other natives they took as prisoners in their own battles. This narrative indeed worked both ways.

Native captivity was extremely common despite bans and regulations. Captives were generally the product of war, acquired largely through expeditions organised by the Spanish and their indigenous allies, or taken as prisoners by other indigenous peoples. This offered an extra incentive for expedition members who were entitled to the 'spoils of war', including captives. It created a market for captive indigenous

[110] Instrucciones para hacer nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones. Valladolid, 13 de mayo 1556. in Richard Konetzke, *Colección de documentos para la historia social de la formación de Hispanoamérica. 1493-1810.*, vol. Vol 1 (1493-1592) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1953), 335-339.
[111] Although the enslavement of indigenous peoples was banned by Royal Decrees of 1526, 1530, 1532, 1540, 1542, and 1543, as Patricia Seed rightly points out "both Spanish and Portuguese monarchs consistently made exceptions for their general decrees of freedom [of Indians] if the natives were accused of eating human flesh". *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Julian Paredes, 1681), 194; Patricia Seed, *American Pentimento: The Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches*, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001), 103.
[112] Ibáñez and Sabatini, "Monarchy as Conquest," 515.
[113] Seed, *American Pentimento*, 104.

peoples in border areas and beyond. Yet, it also made some indigenous populations dependent on securing prisoners to obtain items they treasured from the Spanish. Native captivity, hostages, and prisoners played an important role in the settlement, extension, and consolidation of jurisdiction into the border areas. Dressed as the moral and religious duty of the rescue of indigenous peoples who were captive, or as the spoils of just war, captivity was integrated into the system of merits and rewards for services provided to the Crown and was underpinned by stereotypes of border indigenous peoples.[114]

9. The creation of a stereotype: the Chiriguanaes

Stereotypical views of indigenous peoples were largely based on 'hegemonic knowledges' which constituted a philosophical and religious matrix through which the Spanish perceived their new vassals as mentally and morally inferior and therefore lacking capacity and in need of guardianship.[115] Scholars disagree on the issue of early perceptions of the Chiriguanaes. One view indicates that they had different names in Asunción (Paraguay) and Charcas, being called Guaraní in the former and Chiriguanaes in the latter. This argument adds that the Spanish in Asunción were fewer and had sufficient land and because the Guaraní/Chiriguanaes met their needs for food supplies and labour, they were seen as allies and friends. In contrast, in Charcas, where Chiriguanaes resisted meeting such needs and were seen as an obstacle to local elite's plans to control the southeast borders and exploit their fertile lands, these natives were seen as outsiders, invaders and enemies.[116] A second view stresses that regardless the area, Spanish perception of the Chiriguanaes changed over time, hardening as more of these indigenous peoples inhabited the borders.[117] Both views point to a same argument as they stress the changing perception of the Chiriguanaes based on their adaptation, or not, to the extension of jurisdiction by the Spanish in the border. Chiriguano identity was thus structured around their political agency which was limited by jurisdiction since it was in relation to those able to establish law and deliver

[114] Paola A. Revilla Orías, *Entangled Coercion: African and Indigenous Labour in Charcas (16th-17th Century)*, (Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020).
[115] Morong Reyes, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial,* Capítulo III.
[116] Julien, "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)," 18.
[117] Isabelle Combès, "De luciferinos a canonizables: Representaciones del canibalismo chiriguano.," *Boletín Americanista*, 2, LXIII, no. 67 (2013): 134-135; Combès, "Grigotá y Vitupue," 74.

justice and in line with their concepts of status, race, and religion, that they were defined. This is consistent with the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy in which identities were relational as individuals largely defined themselves in relation to others.[118]

As with other unconquerable natives in Spanish America, one of the main features of the stereotypical views of the Chiriguanaes was their cannibalism. It has been argued that there was a different approach to them in Asunción and Charcas. If the Guaraní of Asunción practiced cannibalism of any kind, it was certainly frowned upon by their Spanish allies, but it was never construed as an obstacle to alliance.[119] In Charcas, it was something the Spanish regularly used to depict the Chiriguanaes as savages. This shows that when the Chiriguanaes were seen as 'cooperative' with the Spanish, they were classed as 'peaceful' and 'friendly', otherwise they were 'warring indigenous peoples'. The demonisation of the Chiriguanaes in Charcas was a narrative reworked and built by local authorities and vecinos that fed into the views the monarchy had of those natives through letters, reports, and assessments that came from the district. It was also a narrative that was politically used and one that ideologically underpinned the expeditions and the extension of jurisdiction over the border areas.

Tracing back this stereotype can be challenging, yet correspondence shows its widespread and systematic use. As early as 1549, Crown envoy Licenciado Pedro de La Gasca wrote to the Consejo de Indias, the royal council responsible for the Indies, about the need to establish border towns as a solution to cannibalism,

> And established a town in Tucumán not only the Indians of Charcas would be defended from the Chiriguanaes, but the Chiriguanaes would also be settled and overcome their bestial habit and custom [in reference to cannibalism]. [120]

---

[118] Hespanha, *A Ordem do mundo*.101-102.
[119] Julien, "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)," 36.
[120] "y hecho el pueblo en Tucumán no solo se defenderá a los indios de los Charcas destos Chiriguanaes, pero aún los subjetarán y quitarán desta bestial costumbre e uso". Carta del Licenciado Pedro de La Gasca al Consejo de Indias. 17 de julio de 1549 in Marqués Miraflores and Miguel Salva, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. L (Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1867), 79.

It is interesting to note the extension of political jurisdiction through urban spaces based on such stereotypes. Jurisdictional politics relied on urban expansion, and this required classification of indigenous peoples who would either be hostile or friendly to Spanish presence. The letter conveys the idea that Spanish urbs, and the 'policía' that they could bring, extending the monarch's presence over the border would transform 'barbaric' natives into the Catholic King's vassals.[121]

Despite La Gasca's ambitions, the border remained, from the monarchy's perspective, a lawless area. By the early 1550s there were even fears of a large-scale attack by Chiriguanaes, headed by Spaniards who were living in the area and who were engaged in trade with them. This prompted calls for the establishment of an Audiencia in Charcas.[122] Without its presence, and therefore the 'monarch's presence', it was argued that it was impossible to settle and expand jurisdiction as well as to keep the land 'in order' or 'quieta'.

Yet, the stereotype persisted unabated. After the establishment of the Audiencia in 1561, in a letter by one of its judges, Juan de Matienzo, stressed that:

> In this land, near this city, there are some Indians who have recently arrived called Chiriguanaes, cruel and warring people, savages who eat human flesh and fight those Indians who live in the lowlands and when they want to catch them, they do so and capture six hundred or one thousand Indians, and then eat them, just after they seize them, or keep them to fatten them up, whereas they sell others, or keep others as slaves.[123]

[121] Díaz Ceballos, *Poder compartido*. Chapter 4.
[122] Traslado de la carta que el Mariscal Alonso de Alvarado y el licenciado Juan Fernández, Fiscal de la Audiencia, escribieron a la Audiencia, acerca de lo que habían hecho para la alteración de Don Sebastián de Castilla. Potosí, 20 de octubre de 1553 in Levillier, *Audiencia de Lima. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. (1549-1564)*, 95-96.
[123] "En esta tierra bien cerca desta cibdad ay vnos yndios aduenedizos que se dicen chiriguanaes gente cruel y de guerra yndomitos que comen carne humana y pelean con los yndios comarcanos que habitan en los llanos y quando quieren hazen tal presa en ellos, que toman y captiuan seiscientos y mill yndios y dellos comen luego en tomandolos, y otros tienen a engordar para este efecto otros venden y de otros se siruen como esclauos" Carta de Juan de Matienzo a SM, 20 de Octubre de 1561, Roberto Levillier,

Further evidence of Matienzo's role in the construction and propagation of this narrative comes from his political treatise *Gobierno del Perú* from 1567.

> In this land and province of Charcas, near this city and its area, there are some Indians who have only just arrived called Chiriguanaes, warring people, very cruel, who eat human flesh, and live in the hills, and whose only occupation is to fight, kill, and eat Indians and use them as slaves.[124]

Matienzo's views summarise very well the rework by local elites of the cannibal stereotype already used on other unconquerable indigenous peoples in Spanish America.[125] The monarchy relied on letters and other documents from officials and settlers to build an image of the situation. Through such communication channels this stereotype travelled to the Consejo de Indias and the monarch. In contrast, without a local connection, travellers and distant chroniclers presented a different image in which such stereotypes are absent.[126]

Cannibalism was not the only label attached to the Chiriguanaes. They were also seen as newcomers and invaders who occupied land that belonged to others perhaps providing a reminder that they had only moved into the Andean slopes in the

---

La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de Presidentes y Oidores. 1561-1579, vol. 1 (Madrid: Colección de Publicaciones Históricas de la Biblioteca del Congreso Argentino, 1918), 54.

[124] "En esta tierra e provincia de los Charcas, e junto a esta ciudad y sus términos, hay unos indios advenedizos que se dicen chiriguanaes, gente de guerra, muy cruel, indómitos, que comen carne humana, habitan en las cordilleras, y no tienen otro oficio sino pelear y matar y comer indios y servirse de ellos como de esclavos". Juan de Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú.* (Paris: Lima: IFEA, 1967 [1567]), 256. Chilean historian Germán Morong Reyes analyses Matienzo's *Gobierno del Perú* under the perspective of colonial discourse and hegemonical knowledge. Morong Reyes frames Matienzo's work within a wider colonial discourse that justified Spanish control of the indigenous populations based on their "natural predisposition" that rendered their inability for self-government. Morong Reyes, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial*, 291-294.

[125] Córdoba Ochoa, "Guerra, imperio, y violencia," 13.

[126] A revision of the description of the Chiriguanaes among chroniclers shows a completely different picture. Betanzos [1551] mentioned the Chiriguanaes but does not describe them at all. Murúa [1600] called them "raiders". Guaman Poma [1615] referred to them as "warring and strong". Juan de Betanzos et al., *Suma y narración de los incas* (Madrid: Atlas, [1551] 1987), 25, 32; Murua, *Historia general del Perú. De los orígenes al último inca*, p. 71; Felipe Guamán Poma de Ayala, *El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno* (México: Siglo Veintiuno, 2006 [1615]), 913. The only chronicler to call them cannibals was Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa, who was very close to viceroy Toledo who also shared this view of the Chiriguanaes. Sarmiento de Gamboa, *Historia de los incas*, 146-147.

early sixteenth century. They were also seen as inclined to engage in acts of 'sinful' nature.[127] Finally, they were also labelled apostates, as some had been baptised, yet rejected the Catholic faith. All these elements built a stereotype that, first the Cabildo in La Plata and then, after 1561, the judges of the Audiencia de Charcas, would regularly use every time they needed justification for expeditions and ultimately the captivity of Chiriguanaes needed to secure labour and extend the border. The Chiriguanaes were also aware of this stereotype which at times they would use to secure concessions from the authorities. They would stress they were ready to accept evangelisation, only to go back on their promises when their goals had not been fulfilled. Cannibalism also engaged the Chiriguanaes with the Spanish who found the practice an excuse for acquiring indigenous peoples the Chiriguanaes held captive on grounds they were rescuing them. In exchange the Chiriguanaes would receive iron tools, fine clothing, and even seashells, as they had done under Tahuantinsuyu.

For as long as the Chiriguanaes were seen as cannibals, there was going to be a trade in captive natives and both the Spanish and Chiriguanaes knew it. Also, for as long as this stereotype was alive, the entradas could be easily justified by Spanish conquistadors, captains, and other soldiers who, as members of the expeditions, were able to accumulate merits for future rewards and secure extra labour for different businesses and duties in Charcas. The stereotype also served as justification for the Catholic Monarchy's support for the expeditions as a moral duty to rescue captives held by the Chiriguanaes who would otherwise be eaten.

10. Invented borders, invented peoples

This initial chapter has discussed the Tahuantinsuyu southeast border and its transformation in the early years of Spanish presence in Charcas. The southeast border occupied a transitional area from a geographical point of view. In ecological terms, it was between the high plateau and the mesothermal valleys and the more tropical rainforest and savannah areas of the yungas and lowlands. Under Tahuantinsuyu, a

[127] Like practicing the *nefando* sin which was understood at the time as the involvement in what were seen as unnatural sexual practices some of which are today associated to homosexuality. Combès, "De luciferinos a canonizables: Representaciones del canibalismo chiriguano," 132.

sophisticated system of roads and fortresses created a border that could be used for both defence and trade. In typical Inca fashion, Tahuantinsuyu negotiated and outsourced the defence of its vast borderland to its allies who gained privileged status as a result. Under this approach, Chichas and other peoples located at the heart of Charcas deployed to watch the borders were reinvented by the Incas as 'Warriors of the Inca'. All this was put to the test under Inca Huayna Capac (1493-1525) as the first Chiriguanaes incursions took place. The border established under Tahuantinsuyu was one that mirrored the type of reciprocal ties that it fostered with all those cultures it encompassed. However, it was also a border that acknowledged that Tahuantinsuyu and Andean groups were radically different from those that inhabited the lowlands.

With the disintegration of Tahuantinsuyu and the advance of the Spanish conquistadors, the border was engulfed in chaos. Populations were decimated by disease and regular Chiriguanaes raids. Some moved westwards as a result. Through the expeditions, the Spanish built their knowledge about the Chiriguanaes who were increasingly hostile to Spanish presence. As happened in other areas across Spanish America, the unconquerable natives were stereotyped to justify recurrent entradas that were needed to keep them at bay, safeguarding populations near the border, and more importantly, in the case of Charcas, making the crucial route between Charcas and the Rio de la Plata safe. Furthermore, the stereotypes were known by the Chiriguanaes themselves who used them to extract gifts and concessions from the Spanish. The stereotypes also fuelled trade in natives enslaved by the Chiriguanaes under the pretext that otherwise they would be eaten by the 'cannibal' Chiriguanaes. From Charcas, the labels travelled to Spain and the monarchy used them to give the successive expeditions an ultimate meaning, promising those who went, rewards, providing the entradas were narrated in an epic way and reports of merits were presented in legal format of Probanzas. A new border was created, one that mirrored Catholic Monarchy jurisdictional politics, just as the previous one had mirrored Tahuantinsuyu imperial politics. This new border with invented inhabitants drove to a further reinvention of conquistadors, priests, and idle armed men into heroes or *beneméritos*. Taking from this theme, the next chapter focuses on the encomendero group through the expeditions of one of the most prominent vecinos of La Plata, captain Martín de Almendras, in 1564-1565.

Chapter 2

Jurisdictional entanglements

The political culture of Colonial Charcas through the expeditions of encomendero Martín de Almendras. 1564-1565

"¿Qué príncipes ocupan los catálogos de la fama, sino los guerreros? A ellos se les debe en propiedad el renombre de magnos. Llenan el mundo de aplauso, los siglos de fama, los libros de proezas, porque lo belicoso tiene más de plausible que lo pacífico".[128]

"What princes occupy the catalogues of fame, but warriors? Only they deserve the renown of Great Ones. They elicit the applause of the world, centuries of fame, books of exploits, for war exploits elicit greater admiration than peaceful enterprises".[129]

Baltasar Gracián

"Porque bien save vuestra señoría que todo el Perú sin Potosí y Porco no vale más que Tucumán".[130]

"You are well aware our lord that the entire of Perú without Potosí and Porco is not worth more than Tucumán."

Audiencia de Charcas judges.

1. Introduction

[128] Biblioteca Nacional de España (hereafter BNE), Ms 6,643. Baltasar Gracián, *El héroe*, f. 21, http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000128386&page=1

[129] Translation by David Castillo. David Castillo, "Gracián and the Art of Public Representation.," in *Rhetoric and Politics: Baltasar Gracián and the New World Order* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997), 206.

[130] Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM, 1566, in Blas Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay.*, vol. 2 (Asunción: Talleres Nacionales de Martín Kraus, 1901), 449.

Through the analysis of the final expeditions of encomendero Martín de Almendras, first to the Chichas and subsequently to the region of Tucumán -in present-day Argentina- between 1564 and 1565, the present chapter navigates a crucial time in the early history of Charcas. The creation of an Audiencia, the highest court of justice and government, in the district in 1561, initially removed all territories from within a radius of one hundred leagues around La Plata, including the city of La Paz, from the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Lima, which created friction and tensions between both Audiencias. Tucumán, where many indigenous groups had been given in encomienda to vecinos of La Plata, thus remained outside the new Audiencia's jurisdiction and under control of the Governorship of Chile, which was under jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Lima. The presence of those indigenous peoples and its strategic position along the route to the Atlantic made Tucumán a natural target for the young Audiencia's expansion plans.

With this new body eager to confirm, exercise, and extend its jurisdiction, La Plata's political gravitation over the southern portion of the Viceroyalty of Peru would increase dramatically, boosting the aspirations of the new Audiencia's encomendero group. Beginning with a description of encomenderos and men who, unable to secure a grant of indigenous peoples, were regarded as a potential source of political unrest, the chapter then focuses on how the ambitions of encomenderos and the necessities of these other men brought them close to the young Audiencia and its own political plans. It follows with the analysis of the encomendero network built by Francisco de Almendras and his nephews Diego and Martín de Almendras over several decades in the region. Martín de Almendras would play an important role in the Audiencia's consolidation and expansion plans.

Through two expeditions, designed to restore peace in an area under attack by indigenous groups, Almendras was expected to help the Audiencia de Charcas effectively put Tucumán under its sphere of political influence. Tucumán was governed by Francisco de Aguirre (1507-1581), allegedly dead. To justify such expeditions, the Audiencia overplayed fears of a large native revolt, resorting to stereotypes of indigenous peoples. It also secured the title of governor of Tucumán for Almendras, providing Aguirre's death was confirmed. Despite the rumours, Aguirre

was found safe, but he was taken prisoner to La Plata, never to recover the governorship of Tucumán. This chapter illustrates how in the mid-1560s, through an encomendero group, the Audiencia de Charcas began the journey to settle its jurisdiction and that of the monarchy along the southeast borders, turning them into borders run by its political allies. This process of confirmation and settlement of the Catholic Monarchy's political presence also involved a large degree of localisation, as borders growingly adopted a local character and the Crown had to negotiate, through its agents and regional elites, the terms of its presence there.[131] This transformation involved indigenous groups who negotiated and fought the terms of either their inclusion or their exclusion from the political project of the Audiencia de Charcas.

2. The Encomendero group

The journey from conquistador to encomendero was one many Spaniards hoped to make, yet only a few succeeded in accomplishing it. There were never more than five hundred encomenderos in the whole of Peru, including Charcas, a figure reached by 1540 that was stable thereafter.[132] Each of the 168 men that were present when Francisco Pizarro distributed the 'ramson' of Cajamarca in 1533 were effectively entitled to an encomienda, and with that, the possibility of holding a public office in a cabildo as city council members. Encomiendas were part of a wider 'economy of privileges and rewards' whereby the Catholic Monarchy recompensed merits and services of its loyal vassals in line with their honour, status, and background with *mercedes*.[133] Although encomiendas were many conquistadors' dream, they were also, in effect, grants created and held at the discretion of governors, adelantados or captains and were therefore a better basis for the accumulation of wealth and perpetuation of family status than rents and properties held in Spain, a situation that drove encomenderos into a constant search for business diversification and political recompense. Those with good connections were therefore in a much better position

[131] Garriga, "Patrias criollas, plazas militares. Sobre la América de Carlos IV," 18; Oscar Mazín Gómez, "Architect of the New World. Juan Solórzano Pereyra and the Status of the Americas.," in *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* (Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012), 27–42.
[132] James Lockhart, *Spanish Peru, 1532-1560: A Colonial Society* (Madison, Wisconsin: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974), 12.
[133] Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno,", 121–148.

than others to secure and retain good encomiendas and escape, as unscathed as they could, the turbulent years of Peru's Civil Wars (1538-1555).[134] Encomiendas could also not be held in absentia, since encomenderos had to defend the jurisdiction to which their grants belonged with their arms, horses, and men. They could however justify a short absence from their place of residence. Such restrictions and the characteristics of encomienda tenure anchored encomenderos and their political clients to a specific region, a situation that turned them into the first local elites in Spanish America. They were therefore key agents in the implementation and expansion of Catholic Monarchy jurisdiction in areas where such authority was absent.

By the 1560s, those encomenderos in Peru who had survived the years of upheaval of the Civil Wars (1538-1555), shared one or more common characteristics, such as a good social background in Spain, military experience during the conquest period, solid political connections, and/or seniority in the conquest of Peru. As a group, they were small and, even when there were substantial differences among them, they normally treated each other as equals. With the perpetuation of their grants in mind, they were able only to pass their encomiendas to their legitimate heir or wife, although if widows inherited the encomienda, a remarriage was expected to keep the grants within the family. In effect, encomiendas, like other privileges at the time, were granted to an individual but were supposed to realise the expectations of an extended family, including clients and countrymen, who also made their living from the enterprise.[135] Encomenderos built social networks around their grants that influenced not only cabildo politics but also government bodies such as the Audiencias. With their acquired wealth, from the labour of their indigenous peoples, encomenderos were able to enjoy a lifestyle that imitated or even exceeded that of Spanish noblemen, with the ideal of setting up a large family home, the '*casa poblada*', a large unit populated with relatives, friends, and servants, in an attempt to show the social status they held.[136]

As stressed before, the encomenderos were a minority in Peru as well as in Charcas. With an estimated 8,000 Spaniards in Peru, the 500 or so encomienda holders

[134] Ida Altman, *Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and America in the Sixteenth Century* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989), 222.
[135] Lockhart, *Spanish Peru, 1532-1560*, 17.
[136] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 31-32.

were clearly a small percentage.[137] For between two to four thousand Spaniards, who were not ecclesiastics, mayordomos, notaries, miners, doctors, artisans, merchants or sailors, an encomienda was simply out of reach. These men without a craft, or who were not in a religious function, were rootless and unemployed, and frequently perceived as a potential threat, normally referred to as soldiers, even when in Peru at the time there was not a regular army.[138] These unoccupied and transient men were 'neither paid, nor forced' to join expeditions and battles, and were certainly not part in a Spanish war machine.[139] Many had arrived too late to benefit from the 'booty' of Cajamarca in 1533 and were struggling to find a place in a society that was becoming more settled.[140] Governors regularly called for the 'land to be drained' of these men, and expeditions were a good route to dispatch them out of cities and towns giving them hope to find a better future.[141] Their participation in the numerous entradas organised by the Spanish to border areas is difficult to estimate, but it was certainly pronounced.[142] Apart from their service, which could form the basis for claims for rewards from the Monarchy, the so-called 'soldados' could have a share of the booty from expeditions. If the expedition involved the establishment of a village or town, they could secure land and potentially an encomienda, finally fulfilling their dream of being able to settle down with an extended family home, thus starting their path to wealth accumulation and eventually their return to Spain.

---

[137] Based on two documents, Lohmann Villena quotes that by the early 1560s there were 32 encomenderos in La Plata. Checking both documents, only one, López de Velasco, provides an accurate figure and it is much lower -14- and the other does not give any clear indication on numbers. La Plata was also the residence of 200 other Spaniards and its area of influence of a further 800. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, *Juan de Matienzo, Autor del "Gobierno del Perú" (Su personalidad, su obra).* (Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1966), 48; Marcos Jiménez de la Espada, *Relaciones geográficas de Indias: Perú,* vol. II (Ministerio de Fomento. Impreso en la Casa Real, 1885); Juan López de Velasco, *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias* (Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Fortanet, 1894 [1571-1574]), 497.

[138] Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú,* 270-271*;* Lockhart, *Spanish Peru, 1532-1560,* 136-137.

[139] Matthew Restall, *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003), Chapter 2.

[140] Barnadas, *Charcas.* 242-243.

[141] Expeditions were also an opportunity of social redemption, and the authorities sometimes offered individuals clemency for any legal cases in exchange for their participation in these events. Alejandro Agüero, *Castigar y perdonar cuando conviene a la república. La justicia penal de Córdoba del Tucumán, siglos XVII y XVIII* (Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008), 149-150.

[142] The lists of all men involved in expeditions existed yet in most cases are now missing. Whilst doing research for this thesis, two of such lists were found in two seventeenth century probanzas related to expeditions carried out in that century. They show that these men not only originated from Charcas, as many were from Paraguay, Rio de la Plata, Nueva España, and Spain. AGI, Lima, 241, N9, 1648, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Alonso Troncoso Lira y Sotomayor, capitán de infantería española, vecino de las fronteras de Tomina; AGI, Charcas, 81, N11, 1610, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Julio Ferrufiño, contador y juez oficial de La Paz.

3. The Almendras' network

Martín de Almendras' social position in Charcas was due to the strong connection between his uncle, Francisco de Almendras (1510-1545), and the Pizarros as they shared the same origin -Extremadura- and were countrymen or *'paisanos'* as a result. This loyalty was rewarded with gold and silver when the Cajamarca ransom was shared between Pizarro and his men in 1533 and when encomiendas were distributed.[143] In a culture in which family ties and origin played such an important role, being from a same region of Spain made these men feel close to one another.[144] Francisco de Almendras lived and died in the shadow of the Pizarros. These ties rendered him encomiendas and *vecindad* in Cusco in 1537. In the first distribution of encomienda grants in 1534, Francisco de Almendras was given the encomienda of Caracollo in Paria, in Charcas, along with someone else close to the Pizarros: Lucas Martínez de Vegazo (1511/1512-1566).[145] With the foundation of Villa Plata in Charcas both lost the encomienda on grounds that they had by then too many, but Almendras received another one which would be passed down through his family for many decades, in Tarabuco, on the eastern border of Charcas, which made him a vecino of Villa Plata. An active participant in the rebellion by Gonzalo Pizarro, to whom he was loyal until the end, Francisco de Almendras had the same fate as many of those who were present in Cajamarca. He was executed in 1545 by someone he loved as a son, Diego de Centeno, when Centeno had decided to switch sides.[146] His nephews, Diego and Martín, survived him and became the beneficiaries of their uncle's Tarabuco encomienda. Cleverly enough and at the last minute, just before Gonzalo Pizarro's defeat, both changed sides, and Licenciado La Gasca granted the brothers the encomienda previously enjoyed by their uncle with each keeping half of the grant.[147]

---

[143] James Lockhart, *The Men of Cajamarca. A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conqueror of Peru* (Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1972), 312-313.
[144] That type of ties, as Hespanha stresses, were not just emotional and frequently involved a political connection. Hespanha, *A ordem do mundo*, Chapter V.
[145] Martínez de Vegazo was also from Trujillo in Extremadura. Efraín Trelles Arestegui, *Lucas Martínez de Vegazo: Funcionamiento de una encomienda temprana inicial* (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1991).
[146] Pedro Gutiérrez de Santa Clara, *Historia de las guerras civiles del Perú (1544-1548)*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1904), 270-276; Pizarro, *Descubrimiento y conquista del Perú*, 167.
[147] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, Chapter 3.

With their uncle Francisco murdered, and because of Diego de Almendras' death in 1554, his brother Martín became the head of the encomendero family and network. An anonymous document written by a Dominican priest in the aftermath of Gonzalo Pizarro's rebellion calls Martín '*bullicioso*', which could be translated as 'bellicose'.[148] Arrogant and ambitious, Martín de Almendras had characteristics held in high esteem in his time, such as liberality and magnificence, virtues that embellished his lifestyle and emboldened his persona. In the footsteps of his uncle, by 1550s Almendras had secured a place in La Plata's cabildo and a marriage, to a *mestiza*, doña Constanza Holguín de Orellana, that brought two networks of prestige and wealth together.[149] Doña Constanza was illegitimate daughter of Pedro Alvarez Holguín (1490-1542), an Extremadura-born *'hidalgo'* who died in the battle of Chupas on 16 September 1542 fighting Almagro's son Diego de Almagro 'the young'. Her father's position and assets, as well as his relatives and business partners from Cáceres, made possible the marriage by offering a substantial dowry and the necessary status. All this added to Martín de Almendras' public persona carefully built over decades, designed to show, through paperwork and in ceremonies and festivities, his virtues, and values, those any true vassal of his Catholic majesty was supposed to display or should aspire to.[150]

[148] Memorial del provincial de la orden de Santo Domingo en el Perú sobre los traidores y los aliados de Gonzalo Pizarro in José Toribio Medina, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile.*, vol. VII (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1896), 164; Real Academia Española, *Diccionario de la lengua castellana en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces su naturaleza y calidad con las phrases o modo de hablar, los proverbios y refranes y otras cosas convenientes al uso de la lengua*, vol. I (Madrid: Imprenta de la Real Academia Española, 1726).

[149] By 1558 Almendras was Alcalde Mayor de Justicia, in effect helping Polo de Ondegardo who was Corregidor, with the running of Charcas. Bartolomé Arsans de Orzúa y Vela, *Historia de la villa imperial de Potosí.*, vol. 1, (Providence: Brown University Press, 1965, [1705]), 110.

[150] Hespanha, *A ordem do mundo*, 20, 32, 56, 102; Amedeo Quondam and Eduardo Torres Corominas, *El discurso cortesano*, trans. Cattedra di Spagnolo del Dipartimento di Scienze Documentarie, Linguistico-filologiche e Geografiche dell'Univ. Roma "La Sapienza" (Madrid: Ed. Polifemo, 2013), 82, 98 and 319.



Illustration 1. Cover letter of the Información de méritos y servicios del Capitán Martín de Almendras. AGI, Patronato 124, R9 [1580], f. 11v.

4. Prelude to the 1564 expedition

With the triumphal arrival in La Plata of the Sello Real, or Royal Seal, on 7 September 1561, a symbolic step and one of tantamount importance, the creation of an Audiencia and Chancilleria, came to fruition, yet the settlement, confirmation, and consolidation of its jurisdiction across the vast land it oversaw had only started.[151] It still had to be negotiated in a process that was sometimes long and challenging. The

[151] Carta a SM de la Audiencia de Charcas. 22 de octubre de 1561, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, 23.

seal was carried by judge Juan de Matienzo all the way from Lima, via Arequipa. It was welcomed in La Plata by crowds who marked the momentous occasion of the creation of a new court of law and government in Charcas -one that combined the Audiencia and its 'oidores' or judges and president-, and a Chancilleria -the body that hosted such seal, symbol of royal presence-.[152] The new court left the Audiencia de Lima without jurisdiction over a large portion of its territories in the south. In the political patchwork that the Catholic Monarchy was, where jurisdictional boundaries were unclear, overlapped, and variable, a new Audiencia only created additional tensions, largely with existing governors -such as those of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Tucumán and Chile- and with the Audiencia de Lima and its president.[153] Through a *cédula real*, the Audiencia de Charcas was given jurisdiction over a radius of more than one hundred leagues which, although included the city of La Paz, left Tucumán, Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Arequipa, Chile, and other important districts out of its reach. As a result, disputes with the Audiencia de Lima erupted very quickly. [154] The Audiencia de Charcas tried to confirm and extend its jurisdiction through a paperwork exercise that involved letters from Cabildo and Audiencia officials in La Plata to Philip II asking for a wider geographical scope that should include Tucumán, Chile, the Rio de la Plata, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, all to be put under the new Audiencia's influence.[155]

The death of Peru's viceroy, Diego López de Zúñiga, Conde de Nieva, in 1564, and the lack of an immediate successor, presented further problems, yet the Audiencia de Charcas would see in this an opportunity to assert its political authority and move forward with the process of confirming and consolidating its jurisdiction. Peru was left without a viceroy for five years and Licenciado Lope García de Castro in his position of president of the Audiencia de Lima automatically became governor of the entire district. This aggravated the clashes between the new Audiencia and the Audiencia de Lima which was now presided over by someone with influence over the whole viceroyalty, meaning that both Audiencias' jurisdictions now in effect overlapped. On the one hand, García de Castro was equal to the president of the Audiencia de Charcas,

[152] Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia," 2.
[153] Hespanha, "The Legal Patchwork of Empires."
[154] Real provisión publicada en Lima erigiendo una Audiencia en la ciudad de La Plata y señalándole distrito, 22 de mayo de 1561, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, 526-529.
[155] Barnadas, *Charcas.* 526.

yet as governor of Peru, his jurisdiction exceeded that of the Audiencia de Lima and covered the Audiencia de Charcas.[156] In a political culture that meticulously followed ceremonies and enforced protocol, and that was an observer of hierarchies, this was a situation that fuelled conflict. Scholars rightly highlight that Audiencias were more active in periods without viceroys, as in effect, they shared the administration of royal privileges and rewards with viceroys and without them they were able to dramatically increase their scope of government.[157] In the 1560s, this situation put the Audiencia de Lima and its president Castro on one side, and the Audiencia de Charcas on the other, at odds with each other, and in these power games the well-established Charcas encomendero Martin de Almendras was able to play his part.

As it was discussed in Chapter One, the creation of the Audiencia de Charcas was a geopolitical response to developments in silver mining in Potosí and the need for a route to the Atlantic Ocean via Tucumán. The Audiencia's leading judge, the 'strategist of Charcas', Juan de Matienzo, was convinced that the region's future lay not in the Pacific but in the Atlantic Ocean. Matienzo would author in 1567 one of the Catholic Monarchy's most important political treatises, his Gobierno del Perú, and his opinion and suggestions mattered.[158] The oidor saw the Chiriguanaes as a menace to the Audiencia de Charcas' plans to keep open communications between Charcas and the Río de la Plata, via Tucumán. They were a challenge to such geopolitical plans.[159]

[156] García de Castro was president of the Audiencia de Lima and as such had the same authority as his counterpart in the Audiencia de Charcas. Real Cédula del 12 de junio de 1559 in Victor Maurtua, *Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia. Prueba peruana presentada al gobierno de la República Argentina*, vol. 2 (Barcelona: Imprenta de Henrich y Cia, 1906), 3-4.
[157] Eugenia Bridikhina, *Theatrum mundi Entramados del poder en Charcas colonial* (Lima: Institut Français D'Etudes Andines, 2015), 29.
[158] Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú.*
[159] Barnadas, *Charcas,* 459-460; Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú,* 216-218.



Map 6. Audiencia de Charcas -Jurisdictional changes throughout sixteenth century-. Source: Revilla Orías, *Entangled Coercion*, 18.

By the early 1560s, the situation with the Chiriguanaes had deteriorated further and there were permanent raids in the region the Spanish called Chichas, after the indigenous groups of that name. The Spanish decided to contain the pressure the Chiriguanaes were putting on other populations along the borders.[160] Peru's third viceroy, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza (1556-1561), Marqués de Cañete, made an

[160] Barnadas, *Charcas*, 47.

agreement with Captain Andrés Manso for the foundation of a village in land occupied by the Chiriguanaes. Manso had planned an expedition to the area previously in 1541, being convinced of the existence of mineral deposits in Saypurú, a site of symbolic importance noted in Chapter One. This was a boost to the elite of Charcas' ambitions to expand eastwards, establishing an urban presence in land not far from Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Manso was made governor with the task of carving a new governorship in the area and he subsequently established Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja, honouring La Rioja, his birthplace, in the first half of 1559, along the Parapetí river (see map 7). The village was also known as Condorillo, carrying the name of the local Chiriguanaes leader, who is likely to have provided the new settlement with the labour and materials needed.

From the opposite direction, the east, the governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra Captain Ñuflo de Chaves (1518-1568) was advancing and established the settlement of La Barranca, with the idea of setting the boundaries of his own future governorship (see map 7).[161] The proximity of both villages created a conflict over political jurisdiction between Chaves and Manso. Chaves travelled to the Audiencia de Lima to legally challenge Manso's presence in the area and returned to arrest Manso who, after some time defending his case in Potosí, went back to Condorillo/Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja. Despite the legal quarrel between both conquistadors, which shows the conflictive character of jurisdictions, none of these villages would last. Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja and La Barranca were destroyed by a group of Chiriguanaes headed by their leader Vitapué in 1564.[162] Manso is likely to have perished being caught up in internal disputes among different groups of Chiriguanaes.[163] He was accused of participating with the Chiriguanaes in their raids aimed at securing captive natives and using Condorillo, which did not even resemble a Spanish town, as a base for that.[164] It could be argued that both Manso and Chaves

[161] Ñuflo de Chaves had been born in Santa Cruz de la Sierra not far from Trujillo in Spain, son of Alvaro de Escóbar and María de Sotomayor. His surname was taken from his mother's side. He joined the expedition of Río de la Plata adelantado Alvar Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca in 1540 and married doña María Elvira de Mendoza in the early 1550s. Hernando Sanabria, *Cronica sumaria de los gobernadores de Santa Cruz (1560-1810)* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Publicaciones de la Universidad Boliviana Gabriel René Moreno, 1975), 9-10.
[162] García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 94; Barnadas, *Charcas*, 61-62.
[163] Julien, "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)," 48.
[164] In Manso's case, a letter by Audiencia de Charcas judge Juan de Matienzo suggests that Manso was murdered after participating in a raid by the Chiriguanaes on lowland natives. Manso and his Chiriguanaes allies brought from such raid over 2,000 captive natives and shared these captives equally.

only managed to hold on to their settlements for as long as the Chiriguanaes allowed them to do so. It is also possible that the Chiriguanaes were aware of the conflict between Manso and Chaves and played one side against the other. Once in land where Spanish presence was more tenuous, both captains were entangled in a web of Chiriguanaes factions that made Spanish presence there precarious and totally reliant on indigenous allies. Apart from containing the Chiriguanaes, La Barranca and Condorillo also had another ultimate objective that was to establish new communication routes with the Atlantic Ocean, which was never fulfilled.[165]

Map 7. Southeast border area locations based on Google Earth. It can be seen how La Barranca and Condorillo were inland deep into territory claimed by the chiriguanaes and other lowland natives.

When Manso's allies felt that his presence there was not needed, they simply murdered him and his men. Carta Relación del Licenciado Matienzo a SM, 1566, in Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay*, 432. Another document provides a glimpse into the design of Condorillo. It shows that Manso's town was not different from Chiriguanaes settlements as the layout of the houses was not around a main square like in standard Spanish towns, but followed a dispersed pattern instead, with large houses separated from one another. Such unique design grabbed the attention of the report's author, Francisco Ortíz de Vergara, when he visited the town in the aftermath of the murder of Manso and his men. Luis Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía sacados de los archivos del reino y muy especialmente del de Indias*, vol. 4 (Madrid: Imprenta de Frias y Cia, 1865), 386.

[165] García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 347.

There were also obstacles for the Audiencia de Charcas in Tucumán, where some La Plata encomenderos had indigenous peoples as part of their grants who were either hostile to Spanish presence or inhabited land seen as still not conquered. Tucumán had an native population that largely refused to be put under the encomienda system. With the less important title of lieutenant, instead of governor, Juan Pérez de Zurita (1516-1595) headed to the region in 1557 with the endorsement from Peru's viceroy, Andrés Hurtado de Mendoza, Marqués of Cañete, and with the purpose of establishing new Spanish towns.[166] Paying homage to King Philip II's new wife, Queen Mary I, Zurita and his men founded Londres in 1558. This village was followed by the establishment Córdoba del Calchaquí in 1559 and Cañete in 1560 -see map 8-. At that point, the new governor of Chile, Francisco de Villagra (1511-1563), exercising his jurisdiction over Tucumán, decided to name Gregorio de Castañeda as the district's new governor.

Castañeda arrived in Tucumán in 1562 and his first job was to undertake Zurita's *residencia*, a legal review of the lieutenant's period in office, which resulted in Zurita's arrest and transfer to Chile.[167] Determined to erase Zurita's legacy in Tucumán, Castañeda decided to change the names of the towns founded by his predecessor, establishing the town of Nieva, in honour of Peru's new viceroy, Diego López de Zuñiga (1561-1564), Conde de Nieva. This was an affront to those vecinos who had actively participated in the foundations of these towns and deprived them from the status as founders and privileged members of these political spaces. Furthermore, it was a move to remove, at least in name, the basis of the jurisdiction that Zurita was trying to establish in the area on behalf of the Audiencia de Charcas, a jurisdiction that was being built from the ground through the foundation of towns established by members of successive expeditions with limited support, and sometimes against fierce resistance, from indigenous populations. Castañeda's new town did not survive because of the hostility of the natives around it.[168] Tucumán's new governor had prompted radical changes that also altered the arrangements that Spanish vecinos

[166] Born in Córdoba, Spain, Juan Pérez de Zurita served under Charles V from a very young age in campaigns against the Ottomans in the Mediterranean. He arrived in Perú in the 1550s. Hernando Sanabria, *Cronica sumaria de los gobernadores de Santa Cruz (1560-1810)* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Publicaciones de la Universidad Boliviana Gabriel René Moreno, 1975), 15.
[167] Roberto Levillier, *Francisco de Aguirre y los orígenes del Tucuman. 1550-1570* (Madrid: Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1920), 25.
[168] Luis Silva Lezaeta, *El conquistador Francisco de Aguirre.* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta de la Revista Católica, 1904), 184.

had with local indigenous groups, who were key participants in the establishment of towns in the new territory. Eventually this triggered a rebellion among such groups headed by Juan Calchaquí. Córdoba del Calchaquí was destroyed as a result, and Londres and Cañete had to be evacuated. [169]

By 1562 Juan Calchaquí had managed to position himself as an indigenous leader of the peoples of Tucumán and this began causing concern to the Audiencia de Charcas about fears that he was trying to spread his influence even over the Chiriguanaes.[170] As much as Castañeda tried to please Peru's new viceroy, due to the events in Tucumán, a new governor was named for the unruly district and the post went to the Chile encomendero Francisco de Aguirre (1507-1581).[171] Aguirre's main task was to bring the indigenous rebellion to an end, but his appointment was not welcomed in Charcas where the young Audiencia had pinned its hopes on Zurita's return to Tucumán to finish what he had started. Although in 1563 the monarchy finally placed Tucumán under the Audiencia de Charcas, Aguirre remained as governor and his presence was seen as an obstacle to the consolidation of the Audiencia's jurisdiction over its territory, and its strategy to fully integrate Tucumán to its sphere of influence.[172]

[169] Pedro Mariño de Lovera, *Crónica del reino de Chile*, vol. VI, Colección de historiadores de Chile y documentos relativos a la historia nacional (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta del Ferrocarril, 1865 [1594]), 263; Levillier, *Francisco de Aguirre y los orígenes del Tucuman. 1550-1570*, 26.

[170] Ana María Lorandi, "La resistencia y rebeliones de los diaguito-calchaquí en los siglos XVI-XVII," *Cuadernos de Historia* 8 (1988): 103-104; Ana María Lorandi and Roxana Boixados, "Etnohistoria de los valles calchaquíes en los siglos XVI y XVII," *Runa*, no. XVII–XVIIII (1988 1987): 263–419; Lorandi, *Ni ley, ni rey, ni hombre virtuoso*, 134-135.

[171] Barnadas, *Charcas*, 52.

[172] On 29 August 1563 Phillip II placed Tucumán under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas. Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*. 588-590; BNE, Ms 2,927, Libro de cédulas y provisiones del Rey Nuestro Señor para el gobierno de este reino y provincia, justicia y hacienda y patronazgo real, casos de Inquisición y eclesiasticos y de indios y de bienes de difuntos y de otras materias, que se han enviado a esta Real Audiencia de La Plata. http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000134117&page=1

Map 8. Cities founded by Juan Pérez de Zurita. Google Earth.

Summarising the situation until now. The Audiencia de Charcas was facing challenging conditions at the crucial time right after its creation. There were jurisdictional conflicts with the Audiencia de Lima, and with the government in Chile over Tucumán. Attempts by Manso and Chaves to establish a presence in areas occupied by the Chiriguanaes failed with considerable losses. Chichas, located at the west of the Chiriguanaes, was under pressure from regular raids. In Tucumán, actions taken by the government of Castañeda triggered an indigenous rebellion headed by Juan Calchaquí that had begun to unsettle other indigenous groups such as Casabindos, Omaguacas, and Chichas. The Audiencia feared this could result in an alliance between those indigenous peoples and the Chiriguanaes. The arrival of Francisco de Aguirre as new governor in Tucumán was expected to bring such rebellion to an end, yet a victorious Aguirre would also bring Tucumán closer to Chile, and away from the Audiencia de Charcas that was determined to confirm and exercise its jurisdiction over such district. All this was happening against the backdrop of the Taqui Onkoy indigenous movement in the Central Andes and a general feeling of crisis in the whole viceroyalty caused by difficulties with the articulation of the different layers of government, problems with the implementation of adequate fiscal policies, exhaustion of mineral resources because of the use of obsolete technology, and a worrying

demographic collapse among the indigenous populations of Peru.[173] At a local level, the Audiencia de Charcas needed to remove what it saw as the "indigenous threat" between La Plata and Tucumán, and politically re-attach the district to Charcas. It would recruit someone with the experience, background, and status to do that. The renowned encomendero of Tarabuco, Martín de Almendras, would be the person of choice and would head two expeditions, first to Chichas and then, what would be his final journey, to Tucumán.

5. Mapping the expeditions

The geography of the expeditions in this chapter covers a vast area between the highlands south of Potosí, (present-day Estado Plurinacional de Bolivia), the Atacama Desert (Chile), and the plains of northwest Argentina. The region the Spanish named as Chichas, an area inhabited by natives also referred to as Chichas, runs along the road from La Plata to Tucumán, covering a variety of landscapes within a short distance, including valleys between 2,500m and 3,700m above sea level crossed by San Juan del Oro river; highland oases in the Central Cordillera such as Ñoquera and Tajsara; and the fertile valleys of Tarija and Padcaya, situated at an altitude below 2,500m above sea level.[174] This diverse environment with its dense forests, mountains, rivers, and warm valleys offered its inhabitants access to a wide range of resources albeit disperse and their pattern of settlement reflected this. In the northwest of the region the Spanish called Tucumán -a vast region that included the present-day

[173] Taqui Onkoy is either seen by scholars as a nativist movement or as an attempt by priests to boost their own careers accusing indigenous peoples of idolatry or a mixture of both. It peaked in the mid-1560s and might well have been a symptom of a critical time in Peru. There is a vast bibliography on the subject: Pierre Duviols, *La lutte contre les religions autochtones dans le Perou colonial. "L'extirpation de l'idolatrie" entre 1532 et 1660* (Lima: IFEA, 1971); Luis Millones, *El retorno de las huacas. Estudios y documentos del siglo XVI.* (Lima: IEP, 1990); Gabriela Ramos, "Política eclesiástica y extirpación de idolatrías: Discursos y silencios en torno al Taqui Onkoy.," in *Catolicismo y extirpación de idolatrías. Siglos XVI-XVIII. Charcas. Chile. México. Perú*, vol. 5 (Cusco: Centro de Estudios Andinos "Fray Bartolomé de las Casas," 1993), 137–168; Nathan Wachtel, *Los vencidos. los indios del Perú frente a la conquista española. (1530-1570)*, trans. Antonio Escohotado (Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1976), 289; Nicholas Griffiths, *The Cross and the Serpent: Religious Repression and Resurgence in Colonial Peru* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996), 13; Steve J. Stern, *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640* (Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1986). 51-76; Sabine MacCormack, *Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru* (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991), 181-204.

[174] Raffino, Vitty, and Gobbo, "Inkas y chichas: Identidad, transformación y una cuestión fronteriza," 249.

province of Jujuy in Argentina- the puna environment presents a terrain with average hights of 6,000m above sea level and average lows of 3,800m, crossed by a narrow mountain valley, known today as Quebrada de Humahuaca, with a north-south orientation and an extension of around 150kms. Although both areas were populated by indigenous peoples -even when these names may also refer to geographical sites- identified in Spanish sources as Churumatas, Moyos-Moyos, Juríes, Apatamas, Omaguacas, Casabindos and Tomatas, this chapter focuses first on those who were the target of Captain Martín de Almendras's first expedition: the Chichas.

The origin and identity of this group are issues that still puzzle scholars today. Chichas was a generic denomination that may well conflate many indigenous peoples loosely related. However, the Chichas appear in historical records associated with others with whom they shared their environment, which may indicate that their identity was largely built around their agency in relation to them.[175] Chapter One has stressed how the Chichas were paired with other Andean groups as "Warriors of the Incas" and this status might give clues to that relationship. The "warring" Chichas were effectively established in the area crossed by the Camblaya and San Juan Mayo or del Oro rivers, scattered over the section between Talina and Culpina -see map 9-.[176] Early in the sixteenth century they were established along the Qapac Ñam.[177] This exposed them to regular raids by the Chiriguanaes, as well as to periodical expeditions by Spanish conquistadors on their way to Tucumán. They were strategically situated along the route between Charcas and the Atlantic Ocean which made their settlement and pacification of tantamount importance.

[175] Silvia Palomeque, "Casabindos, cochinocas y chichas en el siglo XVI. Avances de investigación.," in *Las tierras altas del área centro sur andina entre el 1000 y el 1600 D.C.* (Jujuy: EDIUNJU, 2013), 243; Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas, 119; Raffino, Vitty, and Gobbo, "Inkas y chichas: Identidad, transformación y una cuestión fronteriza," 260; Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 110.
[176] Presta, "Hermosos, fértiles y abundantes'. Los valles de Tarija y su población en el siglo XVI," 28.
[177] Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas," 120.



Map 9. Between Talina and Culpina, area occupied by the Chichas. View from the Andes toward the southeast. Google Earth.

6. Marching to the Chichas. Staging jurisdiction in remote lands

The scholarship on Martín de Almendras' expedition to the Chichas has framed the event as part of a process of deterioration of the relations between indigenous peoples and the Spanish, including the raids by Chiriguanaes groups along the southeast border and the Taqui Onkoy movement.[178] This thesis however suggests a different reading, one that integrates this expedition, with the subsequent entrada to Tucumán, framing both in the wider context of the jurisdictional conflicts between the Audiencias of Charcas, Lima and Chile over the remote district.[179] With Aguirre

[178] Barnadas, *Charcas*, 179; Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 76; Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*, 110-112; Presta, "Hermosos, fértiles y abundantes'. Los valles de Tarija y su población en el siglo XVI," 33; Palomeque, "Casabindos, cochinocas y chichas en el siglo XVI. Avances de investigación," 245; Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 153.

[179] This idea is somehow present in Barnadas who refers to the conflict between Charcas and Chile over Tucumán in 'geopolitical' terms. A perspective based on the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy brings a new and different dimension that also encompasses such terms. Barnadas, *Charcas*. 52.

feared dead at the hands of indigenous peoples in Tucumán, and the Viceroyalty of Peru in charge of the Audiencia de Lima's president, a window of opportunity opened up for the Audiencia de Charcas to assemble a number of expeditions with help from La Plata's encomenderos. It would be a collective work that would bring together encomenderos, indigenous populations in the disputed area, idle men without an occupation in La Plata and Potosí, and Andean chiefs and their peoples with knowledge of the terrain. The result would be the installation of a new governor in Tucumán bringing that district under the jurisdictional scope of the new Audiencia. To achieve this, in letters and reports, the Audiencia de Charcas would overplay fears of a large indigenous revolt, conveying them in a strategic narrative underpinned by stereotypical views of such peoples, to effectively confirm and settle its jurisdiction over Chichas first, and then Tucumán.[180] The first stage of this process would involve an expedition to the Chichas.

As the previous chapter has shown, the Chichas were granted to Hernando Pizarro, who had become an absent encomendero because of his imprisonment in Spain. They had to pay their tribute of a total of 3,500 pesos and 200 bushels of maize every year, both substantial amounts for a region that was constantly at war. Their tribute payments were nonetheless long overdue.[181] Instead, they had begun paying tribute to the Chiriguanaes, in goods those peoples appreciated, such as silver objects, axes, and fine clothing.[182] It was probably more convenient for the Chichas to pay for protection from the Chiriguanaes, knowing that the Spanish would be kept away from the area, than to support the Spanish expeditions that regularly travelled through Chichas lands, having to pay the rate of tribute established by the Spanish, and probably becoming labour for mining in Potosí. Regardless of the reasons, this provides clues as to how the area had drifted away from the core of Charcas, where Spanish authority had been consolidated.[183]

---

[180] Thierry Saignes, "La reencontré" quoted by Nathan Wachtel, "The Indian and the Spanish Conquest," in *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, vol. I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 242.
[181] Rafael Varón Gabai, *La ilusión del poder: Apogeo y decadencia de los Pizarro en la conquista del Perú*, (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos, Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 1996), 343.
[182] AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, corregidor y poblador de la villa de San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija y conquistador de otros pueblos de Perú, f. 36v.
[183] Varón Gabai, *La ilusión del poder*, 345.

Concerned about the situation, and as part of its overall wider plans to confirm and settle its jurisdiction, in March 1564 the Audiencia de Charcas entrusted Hernando Pizarro's mayordomo Martín Alonso de los Ríos with the task of collecting the overdue tribute from the Chichas.[184] Prepared for what was supposed to be the ceremonial welcoming of the Chichas back into the sphere of the Catholic Monarchy, as the payment of tribute by indigenous peoples was seen as an indication of their acceptance of their status as the monarch's vassals, De los Ríos promptly travelled to the area in company of two priests and three other Spaniards, totally unaware that the region was already in flames. Early in August 1564 two letters from the Mercedarian friar Gonzalo Ballesteros brought news to La Plata that the Chicha settlement of Suipacha, where the priest and other Spaniards had taken shelter after fleeing Tucumán, had been put under siege by Casabindo and Omaguaca natives. Seven churches had been burnt down in the area.[185] Assessing the situation, and fully aware that because of the lack of a viceroy, military duties fell within its jurisdiction, the Audiencia de Charcas began planning an expedition to the area. La Plata encomendero Martín de Almendras, someone with encomienda peoples within reach of the Chiriguanaes, was seen as the most suitable person for the task. The expedition was going to be financed either with funds the Chichas owed or with a loan from the assets collected from vacant encomiendas. A group of fifty Spaniards would accompany Almendras, including encomenderos with indigenous populations in the region at war. In addition, twenty or twenty-five men were to come from Potosí, largely Spaniards who owned mines that relied on the labour of Chichas natives, and two-hundred Chichas, 'because they should defend their own land', plus a further two-hundred indigenous peoples from the rest of Charcas.[186]

It was also decided to combine this expedition with a second journey, as Almendras was expected to be hosted at the Chichas' expense until he and his men

[184] José Miguel López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, vol. 1 (Sucre: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Bolivia, Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, Embajada de España en Bolivia, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, 2007). 5 de octubre de 1564, 117.
[185] Idem., 14 de agosto de 1564; AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, Statements by Diego Espeloca and Cosme Riera, 37r, 68v.
[186] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol 1, 14 de agosto de 1564, 104-105.

could move forward and travel to Tucumán where Aguirre, the incumbent governor, had reportedly been under siege by natives. By August 1564, there had not been any news about Aguirre's fate for eight months and speculation was mounting on whether he was alive or not.[187] As a reward for his efforts, the Audiencia de Charcas promised Almendras the title of governor of Tucumán, providing Aguirre's death was confirmed. Since this type of expeditions was a collective effort, Almendras, who probably had secret instructions from the Audiencia de Charcas about his mission to Tucumán, may have shared these with his men.[188] With Almendras' success, the Audiencia de Charcas would have brought the Chichas back to the monarchy's realm, cleared the path to Tucumán, and more importantly, it would have confirmed and settled its jurisdiction over Tucumán by placing one of its encomenderos at the helm of the district. For Almendras and the encomenderos and men that would go along with him this was a great opportunity to add official recognition to their already long list of merits, gain status, and amass extra wealth. They would be able to enjoy their encomienda grants and build prestige by participating in an entrada on behalf of the Audiencia and therefore His Majesty.

Negotiations between Audiencia judges and those who would head an expedition were tough and complex and involved various meetings and copious amounts of paperwork. Unfortunately, only a small fraction of the capitulaciones agreed for expeditions examined in this thesis have been found, yet summaries of agreements reached with the Audiencia de Charcas have survived as part of the Audiencia's '*Acuerdos'*.[189] Expedition documents were legally binding and gave the Audiencia the authority to oversee the accomplishment of the task, establishing punishments and fines if things went wrong. Once an agreement had been made, a summary of what had been agreed was written down in the 'acuerdos', and, in a ceremony typical of such highly ritualised society, those responsible for undertaking the task were asked to enter the exclusive room of 'acuerdos', remove their hats, and

[187] Ibidem.
[188] Levillier, *Francisco de Aguirre y los orígenes del Tucumán. 1550-1570*, 33.
[189] Of the three expeditions that form part of this thesis, only a fraction of such capitulaciones have survived, transcribed as part of the report on merits and services of Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha in 1606. They are some sections of the capitulaciones signed by Potosí factor Juan Lozano Machuca for his 1584 expedition. Since many of such legal processes were standard, it has been possible to reconstruct the process of such negotiations based on this account. AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1606, Información de los méritos y servicios de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, maese de campo, en la conquista de Perú, con el presidente Gasca, sirviendo contra Gonzalo Pizarro, 73v-76r.

swear allegiance to the arrangements by placing the documents above their bare heads.[190] All the documents were filed in the coffers of the 'acuerdos', along with any correspondence between the Audiencia and the expedition's leaders.[191] News of the expedition were made public through a crier and further documents, with the titles of those involved, were issued. All aspects close to the expedition had to be monitored by the Audiencia, at least in theory. If at any point there was a problem, the Audiencia would step in. As a royal body, the Audiencia had to make sure that the running of the expedition, a task arranged, in this case, with Almendras, would be smooth and conformed to the arrangements made.

Returning to the specific set of events, the Omaguacas and Casabindos were not the only groups active at the time. The Chiriguanaes took advantage of the fragile situation in Tarija. In September 1564 dramatic news from the farms of Juan Ortíz de Zárate arrived in La Plata. They had been raided by Chiriguanaes who caused considerable damages.[192] Ortíz de Zárate, a wealthy encomendero with homes in Potosí and La Plata, and rural property elsewhere in Charcas, that included mills, and Carangas encomienda peoples settled in both Tarija and Chichas, asked the Audiencia de Charcas permission to travel to his farms.[193] Learning the news about Aguirre and the raid on Ortíz de Zárate's farms, panic ensued and vecinos in Potosí started building a fortress in anticipation of, a largely remote and improbable, indigenous attack. [194] A month later, and with the situation deteriorating fast, the Audiencia de Charcas discussed the possibility of sending to the borders the La Plata vecinos Juan de Cianca and Martín Monje, the former, husband of an encomendera with indigenous peoples in the hostile area; and the latter Martín de Almendras' brother-in-law and an encomendero with natives in the same area.[195] Having already come to an agreement with Almendras, the Audiencia de Charcas sent him with twenty-four men to assess the situation and 'clear the land all the way to the Chiriguanaes'.[196] The Audiencia had

[190] Idem., 75r-75v.
[191] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol 1, 14 de agosto de 1564, 105.
[192] Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 283.
[193] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, Chapter 5.
[194] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol 1, 2 de octubre de 1564, 115.
[195] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 74.
[196] Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM, 1566, in Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay*, 449.

at this point asked García de Castro for Almendras' appointment as governor of Tucumán, but the president of the Audiencia de Lima was indecisive, perhaps hoping that Aguirre was still alive. Given the fact that García de Castro was in charge of the viceroyalty's government, this raised concerns that the Audiencia de Charcas' bold and fearless decision to name Almendras governor and arrange such expeditions might have potential political consequences.

Despite such concerns, using its military and governmental functions, the Audiencia de Charcas moved on with the standard process of consulting its vecinos on its plans.[197] On 9 October 1564, an advisory committee was set up with Martín de Almendras, Diego Pantoja, Polo de Ondegardo and Antonio Alvarez, all well-established encomenderos, to assist the Audiencia in any matters of urgency.[198] Without any exception, all had been conquistadors and had recently participated in the Civil Wars. However, there was still frustration as support for an expedition was lacking, as an Audiencia letter to the monarch from late October 1564 indicates. Arrangements for the expedition had been made, yet,

> It could not happen because, before things could move on, we thought it better to explain our plan to *regidores* and old vecinos in this land so they, as expert people in such matters, could give us an opinion. Instead, they made their best to derail the plan, saying that providing weapons to vecinos should be enough and even when two of us supported our plan, because one of us agreed with the old vecinos, we decided to put everything on hold.[199]

---

[197] AGI, Charcas, 418, L1, 1563, Registro de oficio y partes: reales cédulas y provisiones, etc., conteniendo disposiciones de gobierno y gracia para las autoridades y particulares del distrito de la Audiencia de Charcas., [note: when the document digitised and published online in PARES does not have a folio number, it is indicated in this thesis with the image number to facilitate its location online], (image 29).

[198] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol 1, 9 de octubre de 1564, 119.

[199] "mas no se efectuo porque antes que se hiziese no parecio que hera bien dar quenta dello a la justicia y rregidores y vezinos mas antiguos desta tierra para que ellos como persona mas esperta en semejantes negocios nos diesen su parescer los quales lo estorvaron y dixeron que bastaba se apercibiese la tierra de armas y avnque dos fuimos de parescer que se pusiese en efecto lo que primero se avía acordada por ser vno de nosotros de contrario parescer siguiendo el que los vezinos havian dado se suspendio". Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM. 30 de octubre de 1564 in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, 137-138.

Without a royal army, the defence of the realm fell on vecinos who had the capacity to command their men, clients, dependants, and indigenous peoples, and it was organised by viceroys or, in their absence, by the Audiencias. Entradas required a collective effort and as such they were subject to negotiation. Consensus was not something that could be easily attained and in line with the 'economy of privileges and rewards', it required appointments, concessions, and grants to engage these men. Faced with decisions that could jeopardise the credibility of the tribunal, Audiencia judges would frequently seek advice and garner support from aldermen and *vecinos*. This provides further evidence for the level of de-centralisation and localisation of authority in the Catholic Monarchy at the time. Faced with immense territories and communication hurdles, the political system was therefore structured around consensus and negotiation and the implementation of jurisdiction was indeed a negotiated matter.

Martín de Almendras and his men left La Plata for the Chichas in November 1564. The encomendero was in company of only fifty other Spaniards but large numbers of native auxiliaries with their caciques, priests, and probably slaves and notaries. The sight reflected previous Spanish entradas. Similar to past missions, Almendras travelled with splendour, being carried by an army of indigenous peoples in a sedan-chair or litter-chair, fed and assisted each time the expedition stopped along the route.[200] Quillaca, Charca and Colla chiefs don Juan Colque Guarache, don Fernando Ayavire Cuysara, and don Juan Calpa, who were respected and collaborative regional lords, went with Almendras, probably also carried in their Tahuantinsuyu-era litter-chairs surrounded by their relatives and their peoples.[201] Their participation was essential as they knew the area after accompanying several expeditions since the 1535 entrada by Diego de Almagro who had received assistance from don Juan Colque Guarache's father Guarache.[202]

[200] Pedro Cieza de León, *Crónica del Perú*, Cuarta Parte. Vol 2 (Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1994 [1551]), 141.
[201] Don Juan Colque Guarache was appointed by the Audiencia in La Plata Captain of the indigenous peoples that went to the expedition. AGI, Charcas, 53, 1574-1576, Información de don Juan Colque Guarache, 48r -statement by Toribio de Alcaraz-; Platt, Bouysse-Cassagne, and Harris, eds., *Qaraqara-Charka*, 871.
[202] AGI, Charcas, 53, 1574-1576, Información de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 3r.

Almendras also travelled in company of Mercedarian friar Gonzalo Ballesteros, who had already been in Tucumán and knew the area relatively well. The Mercederians were an order close to Conquistadors and encomenderos and their presence in Tucumán had been disrupted by their jurisdictional disputes. Francisco de Aguirre was not fond of the presence of religious orders in the area and Ballesteros was hoping to secure stronger support from Almendras, and through him the Audiencia, to establish the Mercederians in Tucumán under their protection, and help extend royal jurisdiction in the area.[203]

Map 10. Route of Almendras' expedition to the Chichas (1564). Based on Juan de Matienzo's description of the route used to travel to Tucumán. View from the Andes toward the southeast. Google Earth; Juan de Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 280-281.

[203] Fray Pedro Nolasco Pérez, *Religiosos de la merced que pasaron a la América española* (Sevilla: Tipografía Zarzuela, 1924), 293-295; Francesco Leonardo Lisi, *El tercer concilio limense y la aculturación de los indígenas sudamericanos: estudio crítico con edición, traducción y comentario de las actas del concilio provincial celebrado en Lima entre 1582 y 1583*, (Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1990), 41.

Almendras and his expedition first stopped where Juan Ortíz de Zárate had his farms in order to expel the Chiriguanaes who were besieging him and his men, and from there it continued their journey to Chichas.[204] Upon arrival, Almendras and his entourage encountered the Chichas in the valley of Suipacha.[205] They probably camped in an old fortress, later renamed as "Almendras' *Pucará*".[206] According to don Juan Colque Guarache's probanza, negotiations, instead of confrontation, ensued. The Quillaca chief and captain of the indigenous peoples along the journey suggests that such discussions did not follow the Spanish but the Andean 'etiquette' instead. Reception based on reciprocity, gifts from both parties, and food and drinks from the hostess, played a fundamental part, while Almendras was in the background overseeing the process as the following statement suggests,

> And this witness heard from caciques of Chichas Indians how the said don Juan Colque played a big part in these Indians' pacification because he praised them and treated them in such manner that brought them to peace. [207]

The notary and translators used the word '*halagar*', 'to please' in Spanish, reflecting the reciprocal bonds between native chiefs. As a closing ritual to these negotiations, the leading Chichas cacique, whose name is not disclosed in the sources, let Martín de Almendras hold his hand in a sign of submission.[208]

---

[204] Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM, 1566, in Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay*, 450.

[205] AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, 1580, Información de los méritos y servicios de los generales Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, desde el año de 1536 en la conquista y pacificación de Perú, habiéndose hallado en el cerco de la ciudad de Cuzco perseguidos por Mango Inca, cuyos servicios hicieron en compañía de los capitanes Hernando y Juan Pizarro. Constan asimismo los servicios hechos por Diego de Almendras, hermano del general Martín de Almendras. Statement by Alonso Muñiz, (image 529). There are two reports of merits and services by Almendras' descendants. This thesis will be using the one in AGI, Patronato, 129, R9, 1580 (see Illustration 1) and not the one in AGI, Patronato, 124, R5, 1580, Méritos y servicios: Martín de Almendras, which seems to be a smaller version and is largely included in the former.

[206] Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia (hereafter ABNB), 1674, EC25, Visita de Agustín de Ahumada, 24 de julio de 1573, in Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas. Las tierras de los chicha de Talina (1573-1595)," 177.

[207] "oyo este testigo dezir a caciques e yndios chichas que el dicho don juan colque fue mucha parte para que se pacificasen los yndios chichas porque los halago mucho y tuvo con ellos tales tratos que los hizo benir de paz". AGI, Charcas, 53, 1574-1576, Información de méritos y servicios. Don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 59v.

[208] Ibidem., -Statement by Antonio de Robles- f. 12r.

Such rituals were similar to the seigneurial practices that happened when an encomendero took possession of his grant.[209] Almendras was not the Chichas' encomendero but after that ritual was recognised as royal authority. Bearing in mind the *capitulaciones* and *asientos* that had been agreed and patiently negotiated with the Audiencia, Almendras was obviously acting on behalf of the Catholic monarch. He had been commissioned to re-attach the Chichas to the realm and the ritual could not be clearer. This was a ritual of submission and recognition of the King's authority. As any other ritual, it was staged openly and in public. It symbolically and theatrically made the King present in a remote border. Viewed from this perspective, the expeditions and the rituals that accompanied them played essential roles in the confirmation and consolidation of jurisdiction, and through it, royal presence. After this ritual, the main Chichas chiefs travelled back to La Plata where they paid tribute and were baptised confirming their identity as Catholic and loyal vassals of His Majesty.[210]

7. A final journey to the border

With the Audiencia's jurisdiction over the Chichas confirmed, Almendras was able to move on with the second step of their plans, the entrada to Tucumán. The encomendero returned to La Plata to raise funds and put together the expedition. Learning that there was still no news about Aguirre's fate, Almendras stressed that it was impossible for him to go on a new expedition without financial support and therefore entered a new arrangement with the Audiencia. The encomendero would borrow 10,000 gold pesos from the tribute paid by the Chichas that was deposited in the Royal coffers in Potosí. Ambitiously thinking of the rewards that would be obtained from his journey to Tucumán, Almendras pledged to repay the loan over three

[209] AGI, Justicia, 658, Cédula de encomienda de don Gómez de Luna, ff. 118v-120r in Martti Pärssinen and Jukka Kiviharju, eds., *Textos andinos: corpus de textos khipu incaicos y coloniales*, Vol 2, (Madrid: Instituto Iberoamericano de Finlandia, 2004); Silvia Smietniansky, "El uso motivado del lenguaje: Escritura y oralidad en los rituales de toma de posesión. El caso de Hispanoamérica colonial," *Revista de Antropología* 59, no. 2 (August 2016): 131–54.

[210] This process would be consolidated, and the Chichas' identities as Catholic Monarchy's vassals reconfirmed, during their resettlement arranged by viceroy Toledo early in the 1570s, see: Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas. Las tierras de los chicha de Talina (1573-1595)," 136; AGI, Charcas, 53, 1574-1576, Información de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 64r.

years, placing the revenues from his encomienda as collateral.[211] This loan was insufficient, and Almendras borrowed a further 30,000 pesos to buy supplies in Potosí. Almendras and his men would travel to Tucumán in all their glory and display. They were going to install the encomendero as the district's new governor, and this would be achieved through an aggressive, loud, and colourful stance that was hoped would prompt negotiations with Aguirre, if he was alive, or simply trigger the process of Almendras' installation as governor. Once in Tucumán, encomiendas and rewards would be distributed and the Audiencia would be able to confirm and settle on the ground the jurisdiction that had been secured on paper.

In March 1565, Peru governor Lope García de Castro finally appointed Captain Martín de Almendras governor of Tucumán, yet such appointment entirely relied on confirmation that Aguirre was effectively deceased.[212] Pushed by Castro's decision, Almendras had to rush to assemble his expedition to march to Tucumán. However, a month later, Almendras had not still left, having only gathered 70 of the 120 Spaniards he was supposed to take south. The encomendero was also struggling to secure native auxiliaries. Concerned that he may not be able to enrol the necessary men, and therefore fail to accomplish his side of the bargain, the Audiencia made it clear to Almendras that there would be inspections along the path to Tucumán four days journey from Potosí.[213] The young Audiencia's own prestige was at risk if anything went wrong.

Almendras finally left for this final entrada between May and June 1565. Unexpectedly, before his departure, news through Aguirre's son-in-law that Aguirre was in fact alive arrived in Charcas. Once the news reached Lope García de Castro, governor of Peru and president of the Audiencia de Lima, he re-confirmed Aguirre in the post of governor, expecting the Audiencia de Charcas to withdraw the nomination of Almendras and bring him and his men back to La Plata.[214] The Audiencia de

[211] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol. 1, 21 de febrero de 1565, 136; Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 76.
[212] Carta del Licenciado Castro a SM, 6 de Marzo de 1565, in Roberto Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 3 (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1921), 55-56.
[213] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol. 1, 12 de abril de 1565, 149.
[214] Carta de Lope García de Castro a SM, 23 de septiembre de 1565, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, 97.

Charcas did not acknowledge García de Castro, yet it did recommend Almendras to shorten his journey and stop in Salta (present-day northwest Argentina), to avoid confronting Aguirre having two governors of Tucumán at the same time. Almendras was to wait, "at least until the governor [Aguirre if he was alive] or the Audiencia command otherwise".[215]

Following the well-known route through the Chichas, Almendras moved into Tucumán with 120 Spaniards, including his lieutenant and partner Jerónimo González de Alanís; together with encomenderos with indigenous populations in the area such as his brother-in-law Martín Monje, a large number of auxiliary natives with supplies and 300 horses.[216] They travelled as wealthy encomenderos, wearing the best armour and garments they could afford, surrounded by crowds of Indigenous servants, and in company of friends, acquaintances, and relatives. With plans for the establishment of a village in Salta, there was also a sense among them that as a group they would eventually form a political community as vecinos members of a local cabildo of a new town. The journey was arduous and after months marching the group had its first skirmishes with indigenous peoples at Jujuy.[217] Almendras died in a clash at the hands of the Ocloyas in the province of Omaguaca (present-day Northwest Argentina) probably early in September 1565.[218]

Leaderless, his men continued with Alanís as their head, searching for Francisco de Aguirre. They auctioned Almendras' belongings, including horses, clothing, and weapons worth up to 8,000 pesos.[219] This sum represents nearly a quarter of the extra funds that Almendras borrowed to buy supplies, which demonstrates that

---

[215] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*, Vol. 1, 14 de agosto de 1564, 105.

[216] AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, Información de los generales Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, (image 14). Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 76.

[217] AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, 1590, Información de Juan Mejía Miraval, f. 15v.

[218] Lope de Quevedo in his statement as witness to the probanza of Juan Mejía Miraval recalled that Almendras was killed by natives from Ocloyo. Ocloyas is today a location in the Argentine province of Jujuy. AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, 1590, Información de Juan Mejía Miraval, f. 15v; AGI, Justicia, N1, R2, Jerónimo de Alanís, mercader, vecino de la ciudad de La Plata contra los herederos del Capitán Martín de Almendras, sobre el pago de 8.000 pesos, ff. 75, 88, 93, 106v. [with compliments to Dr. Ana María Presta who lent me access to this document].

[219] The inventory of the goods Almendras took with him was reportedly left in Santiago del Estero. It has not been located yet. AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, Información de los generales Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, (images 165 and 602).

an encomendero, emulating the feudal Castilian lords, would only travel with the comforts and perquisites required by someone of his social status. After facing starvation and hostile natives, who murdered several members of the crew, including Juan de Cianca, Almendras' men eventually found Aguirre, who by then had received support from Chile.[220] Aguirre had orders to march towards the Río de la Plata and consolidate the Atlantic Ocean route for Charcas. Instead, he decided to shift route and head to Cuyo -in present-day Argentina-, with plans to add this new area to his own jurisdiction in Tucumán.[221] Cuyo was dangerously close to Chile in the eyes of the Audiencia de Charcas that probably saw Aguirre's move as another attempt to detach Tucumán from Charcas. At this point it became clear to Almendras' men that the chances of securing the rewards they had been promised when they left La Plata were very slim. Supported by the bishop of Tucumán, Licenciado Martínez, and under Gerónimo de Holguin, countryman of Almendras as they both were from Extremadura, they mutinied and took Aguirre prisoner under charges of heresy. Aguirre was taken to La Plata where he spent three years in prison.[222] Without significant substantiated evidence for what would otherwise have been classed as minor offenses, on 15 October 1568, Aguirre was sentenced to pay a fine of 1,500 pesos.[223] Many of the men on Almendras' expedition eventually settled in the recently founded villages of Esteco, Nuestra Señora de la Talavera, and San Miguel de Tucumán.[224]

Aguirre had the misfortune or fortune, whichever way it is looked at, to have been found alive. The Audiencia de Charcas had placed its hopes on Almendras, who had re-attached the Chichas to the Catholic Monarchy, confirming the Audiencia's jurisdiction over the district; and who was expected to reaffirm the Audiencia's presence in Tucumán, clearing the path to the Atlantic Ocean, a geopolitical project of

---

[220] Carta de Lope García de Castro a SM, 12 de enero de 1566, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, 149.

[221] Carta del Licenciado Pedro Ramirez a SM, 1566, in Garay, *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay,* 463. In a letter by Hernando de Retamoso to the monarch dated 25 January 1582, he clearly explains that Aguirre never had any intention to open the path between the Atlantic and Perú. Roberto Levillier, *Gobernación de Tucumán. Probanzas de méritos y servicios de los conquistadores. Documentos del Archivo de Indias. (1583-1600),* vol. 1 (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1920), 521.

[222] Levillier, *Francisco de Aguirre y Los orígenes del Tucumán. 1550-1570*, 40-41.

[223] José Toribio Medina, *Diccionario biográfico colonial de Chile.* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1906), 25-26; José Toribio Medina, *Historia del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Lima. (1569-1820),* vol. I (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Gutenberg, 1887), 42.

[224] AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, Información de los generales Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, (image 14); Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 321.

Audiencia de Charcas judge Licenciado Juan de Matienzo. Almendras was encomendero in La Plata and his political clients and loyalties were there. He represented the Audiencia de Charcas and its elite groups with their aspirations of an Atlantic connection that, in their eyes, would make Charcas as important as Lima. To make a strong argument for the expedition, the Audiencia overplayed the threats that Taqui Onkoy, the Chiriguanaes, Chichas, and the leader Juan Calchaquí and his peoples posed to Potosí and Porco. Looking at the distance that separates the highland mines of Potosí and Porco, it would have been impossible for any indigenous groups such as the Omaguaca, Casabindo, Chichas or Chiriguanaes, to ever mount a full-scale invasion of those mines. Many of these indigenous peoples were politically fragmented and while Juan Calchaquí had provided leadership, it was not strong enough for a pan-indigenous movement. The original Audiencia plan did not quite work accordingly because of Almendras' death. However, with Aguirre in prison, the Audiencia de Charcas was able to consolidate is presence in Tucumán and continue with its plans there.[225]

Almendras' final journey shows the risks for those who, following their ambitions with uncertain or false information, decided to borrow and gather resources and men to embark upon what they saw as the next step in a ladder of social progress. He travelled as a royal agent on a commission agreed with the Audiencia de Charcas and with a royal post, of governor of Tucumán. Such expeditions were, if successful, convenient to all sides involved. For the Audiencia de Charcas and the vecinos in La Plata they were the perfect opportunity to 'drain the land' of men, as it was frequently stated in documents at the time, who would otherwise cause trouble. Those in charge of such expeditions would also gain political recognition and formalise their ties with royal officers of high rank who would therefore expand their network of political clients into new districts. They were also convenient for the monarchy that was able to expand at the expense of ambitious individuals, leaving private individuals to provide the financial backing. The monarchy could also be ritually and theatrically staged and made present in remote parts of its realm, confirming its presence through ceremonies of possession. The expeditions were also supposed to provide unemployed and potentially problematic men with the chance to become vecinos of newly founded

[225] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 79.

towns and rebel natives the opportunity to negotiate concessions and their status within the Catholic Monarchy, if only provisionally.

With the Audiencia de Charcas at odds with the president of the Audiencia de Lima, and governor of Peru, Licenciado Lope García de Castro, two sides emerged. Wary of the Audiencia de Charcas' growing authority and strength, García de Castro backed Francisco de Aguirre, to keep the plans of the Audiencia de Charcas in Tucumán and the consolidation of its Atlantic route in check, even though the Audiencia de Charcas effectively had jurisdiction over the unruly province.[226] Viceroys in Peru, as well as those in similar roles like García de Castro, often tried to exercise their own authority through playing one Audiencia against the other.[227] The Audiencia de Charcas found in Martín de Almendras the possibility of pacifying first the Chichas and then conquest the unruly Tucumán to confirm and settle its jurisdiction. With Almendras dead, the Audiencia had to arrest and imprison Aguirre.

The expeditions show the difficulties of a political system of juxtaposed and often overlapping jurisdictions which emerged in conflicts over the appointment of governors and other minor authorities. García de Castro as governor of Peru and president of the Audiencia de Lima, and the Audiencia de Charcas, both had such authority, yet the final decision would be made in Spain, sometimes months or even years after the appointment. This created jurisdictional problems and clashes between those who intended to expand their rights to exercise authority. This also kept the monarch as the overseer and only one with a final word on all matters. Finally, as far as the southeast border of Charcas was concerned, the expeditions did very little to either expand jurisdiction or restore peace since the area continued under the influence of the Chiriguanaes and their various factions.

[226] Carta de Lope García de Castro a SM, 15 de junio de 1565, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, 92.

[227] This was a political system in which conflict was not the exception but the norm. Ultimately, this placed the monarch as the only legitimate and valid mediator. Domingo Centenero de Arce, "Una monarquía de lazos débiles? Circulación y experiencia como formas de construcción de la Monarquía Católica.," in *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica. (Siglos XVI-XVIII).* (Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2012), 142.

8. Polycentric borders. Jurisdictional entanglements and the practicalities of running Charcas

The first years of the Audiencia de Charcas were decisive as it struggled to confirm and settle its presence over its own political space, with recurrent disputes with the Audiencia de Lima and its president, the governor of Peru, Lope García de Castro. This translated into copious correspondence between Audiencia de Charcas members and the monarch, aimed at securing jurisdiction over a geographical area larger than the initial one hundred leagues. Yet, this also had to be negotiated and confirmed on the ground. With royal confirmation in 1563 of the Audiencia de Charcas' jurisdiction over Tucumán, a space disputed with the Governorship of Chile, it was a matter of time before the Audiencia de Charcas tried to move into the remote area with help from its encomenderos. Aguirre's appointment as governor of Tucumán was an obstacle to such plans, yet rumours over his death at the hands of indigenous peoples, prompted the organisation of two expeditions by the ambitious encomendero Martín de Almendras and his men. One entrada would confirm Almendras' credentials as a warrior and peacemaker by pacifying the Chichas and rescuing Juan Ortíz de Zárate and his men who were under attack from the Chiriguanaes in Tarija. The other would have placed Almendras as the new governor of Tucumán, providing Aguirre's death had been confirmed.

Jurisdiction, the authority to establish law and deliver justice, was at the centre of these political conflicts. Because jurisdiction was shared by the Crown with a myriad of agents, competition over who could exercise such authority and who could make the monarchy present in Charcas was intense. Along the Catholic Monarchy's borders, which were perceived as empty of 'law and order', this 'emptiness' of jurisdiction was filled with stereotypes that made the borders meaningful to both to the Spanish and the peoples that inhabited them. The indigenous populations along the southeast borders of Charcas had begun to adapt, or not, to a new political reality that, based on the polycentric character of the Catholic Monarchy, distributed authority and with it, its jurisdiction. Stereotyped and labelled in a strategic narrative hyped by the imaginary threat of the destruction of Potosí and Porco, unwillingly, these indigenous

peoples helped the Audiencia de Charcas and the local elite to advance their ambitious plans.

The clash of the Catholic Monarchy, with its strategy of dispersing authority and political agency on the one hand, and the worlds of indigenous groups such as the Chiriguanaes, on the other, fostered further political fragmentation on both sides as well as stimulated debate about the unconquerable natives and the alternatives the monarchy faced for their incorporation. Their permanent captivity, albeit an ultimate option, was always on the table, but also required local adaptation of royal provisions and decrees that, although seen as guidance, were clearly against such an option. Such debates fostered a pragmatical approach, that privileged local experience and knowledge. This was a view shared in Charcas by its elites and its Audiencia judges and president. Underneath a thick layer of political rituals and ceremonies was a down-to-earth approach that recognised the vast distance between Charcas and the court in Madrid and the need for decisive action, compromise, and adaptation. Yet, jurisdiction also had to be staged and ritualised. The physical absence of a monarch who ruled his vast possessions from Spain meant that jurisdiction on the ground was more than simply authority over a district. It had to be negotiated and agreed upon. This meant decisions over how to make the monarchy present in its territories and what type of symbolic and political tools were needed for the task. A political geography was always a geography of presence. Such presence was always negotiated at a local level and based on the circumstances and situation at the time. Political battles were over presence which made political posturing necessary, and this required the display of imagery through visual and public rituals that ornamented every political stage, including the entradas.

In the next chapter, the thesis will move to the land of the Chiriguanaes and the 1574 expedition by Peru viceroy don Francisco de Toledo. While Almendras, exploited the juxtaposition of jurisdictions by travelling to the Chichas and Tucumán with the aim of expanding the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas, Toledo only went to the Chiriguanaes after all other options to organise expeditions to punish the rebel natives had failed and with the aim to restore law and order and expand the authority of the Catholic Monarchy. In 1574, with an encomendero group largely

reluctant to participate, Toledo had to rely on his own political clients. Without support from local elites and consensus, the monarch or his alter ego were faced with a daunting task.

Chapter Three

La Flor del Perú: A Viceroy's Journey to the Chiriguanaes

"La biografía de Don Francisco de Toledo podría llevar de subtítulo: 'Doce años de vida del virreinato del Perú, en su período de mayor organización legislativa y administrativa, y en su brillo máximo de creación de ciudades'".

"Don Francisco de Toledo's biography should bear the following subtitle: 'Twelve years of viceroyalty of Peru's life, in its period of the highest legislative and administrative organisation, and at its brightest in terms of the establishment of cities'"

Roberto Levillier, 1935.[228]

"Yo salí de la cordillera harto flaco y malparado por averme dado en ella una enfermedad muy rrezia, bendito sea nuestro Señor que me ha dado salud después que llegué a esta ciudad".

"I left the cordillera [of the Chiriguanaes] very thin and unwell due to a harsh illness. God bless Our Lord that gave me health afterwards when I reached this city [La Plata]"

Don Francisco de Toledo, November 1574.[229]

1. Introduction

This chapter is at the centre of the dissertation and shows, through the expedition to the Chiriguanaes in 1574 by Peru viceroy don Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581), how the administration and government of the Catholic Monarchy's most troublesome and wealthiest possession, Peru and more particularly Charcas, was

[228] Roberto Levillier, *Don Francisco de Toledo. Supremo organizador del Perú. Su vida, su obra. (1515-1582)* (Buenos Aires: Colección de Publicaciones Históricas de la Biblioteca del Congreso Argentino, 1935), 13.
[229] Carta de don Francisco de Toledo al fraile mercedario Diego de Porres, Noviembre de 1574, in Fray Victor Barriga, *Los mercedarios en el Perú en el siglo XVI. Documentos del Archivo General de Indias. 1518-1600.*, vol. 3 (Arequipa: Establecimientos Graficos La Colmena SA, 1942), 314.

a negotiated ground that exposed the tensions and conflicts between the monarchy and local elites. Toledo has been admired and vilified, described by scholars as "the supreme organiser of Peru",[230] "the most outstanding figure in the history of the viceroyalty of Peru",[231] and the opposite, "the great tyrant of Peru",[232] and more recently, "the first applied anthropologist of the modern period".[233] An analysis of this expedition to the southeast borders of Charcas through the political culture of the time brings a completely different image of Toledo, one of a viceroy forced to seek consensus, accommodate and concede, whilst still at the centre of the stage as the King's alter-ego. It also shows the difficulties that the ambitious viceroy encountered in consolidating royal jurisdiction and implementing a programme to establish the monarchy in an area with a weak tradition of regal authority and largely run by regional elites. This thesis departs from the early twentieth century historiography on Toledo's rule that, in a search for the origins of the 'nation-state', scrutinised his long period at the helm of Peru, looking for clues about the foundations of a stable and long-lasting 'colonial state'. It also marks a radical shift from recent scholarship that, in line with those same concerns, explored the consolidation of a 'modern state' and the strengthening of royal sovereignty during the Toledan years.[234] This may also well explain why the expedition to the Chiriguanaes, an event that quickly moved from epic to tragedy, only fills limited space in many accounts of Toledo's government and has not been given the scholarly attention that it deserves.

Based on an approach that explores the political culture of the time and its theatrical representations, challenging the traditional view of a top-to-bottom organised 'colonial state', this chapter describes the painstaking process involved in organising an *entrada*, with a focus on the Catholic Monarchy's decentralisation and polycentrism. It shows a viceroy with strong views on the implementation of a number

[230] Levillier, *Don Francisco de Toledo. Supremo organizador del Perú. Su vida, su obra. (1515-1582)*
[231] Arthur Franklin Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo*, 7.
[232] Luis E Valcárcel, *El virrey Toledo, gran tirano del Perú: una revisión histórica* (Lima: Universidad Garcilaso de la Vega, 2015).
[233] Antonino Colajanni, "El virrey Toledo como 'primer antropólogo aplicado' de la Edad Moderna. Conocimiento social y planes de transformación del mundo indígena peruano en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI," in *El silencio protagonista. El primer siglo jesuita en el virreynato Del Perú. 1567-1667* (Quito: Abya-Yala, 2004), 51–95.
[234] Javier Tantaleán Arbulú, *El virrey Francisco de Toledo y su tiempo: Proyecto de gobernabilidad, el Imperio Hispano, la plata peruana en la economía-mundo y el mercado colonial*, 2 vols. (Lima, Perú: Universidad de San Martín de Porres, Fondo Editorial, 2011); Merluzzi, *Politica e governo nel nuovo mondo*.

of reforms largely focused on Potosí and on how the Catholic Monarchy should be present in Peru, who was only able to travel to the Andean slopes, not after many setbacks, with his close entourage and a few encomenderos at the King's expenses, as local elites were reluctant to join and/or finance the dangerous journey and only participated after royal funding had been secured and certain conditions met. Nonetheless, as Jesuit priest José de Acosta (ca 1539-1600) commented, Toledo took with him "la flor del Perú",[235] "the best of Peru", and positioned himself at the centre of the theatrical stage mounted to travel to the eastern slopes. As 'the King's living image' in Peru, Toledo summoned the 'mystic body' made of all the different parts of Catholic Monarchy's local society, who under his command would help him to exercise the most important duty of political government at the time: the delivery of justice. In this context this meant the punishment, settlement, and evangelisation of indigenous groups either by persuasion, by force, or a combination of both. Toledo's expedition was not only a 'costly stage'; it was also the viceroy's final demise. The last image that sources written after the event portray, include one propagated by mestizo chronicler and writer Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, of an ill and delirious man carried out of the mosquito infested lowlands in a basket/litter chased by laughing indigenous peoples referring to Toledo as "that old woman", demanding that the Spanish release the viceroy and let them eat 'her'.[236] In the expedition's aftermath, Toledo handed mercedes to his loyal few just before sailing back to Spain, while leaving many others craving for rewards, rushing to draft their own probanzas with the hope that what the viceroy had not delivered, the King would. The expedition also left behind a stronger Audiencia de Charcas and an empowered local elite now aware that any further expeditions had to involve captains and soldiers with knowledge of the border area. This would eventually clear the way to more formal arrangements to extend Spanish Crown influence over the most conflictive areas of the southeast Charcas borders between the Audiencia de Charcas and groups headed by Spanish Captains which included poor Spaniards, mestizos and even Chiriguanaes. Bows and arrows and a hostile environment seem to have been enough to bring down the strategist and lawmaker.

[235] Acosta, *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*, 590.
[236] El Inca Garcilaso de la Vega, *Primera parte de los commentarios reales.* (Lisbon: Oficina de Pedro Crasbeeck, 1609), 184.

2. The Initial Plan

In its search to find the origins of nation and state building of nineteenth century Latin America, early twentieth century historiography on the government of don Francisco de Toledo as Peru's fifth viceroy is largely focused on his personal qualities as political strategist and lawmaker, seeing his character and position, in the context of a more centralised administration with a well organised and structured bureaucracy characteristic of a nation-state. This focus prioritises those aspects of Toledo's government that highlight organisation and control such as the arrangement of the drafts of native labour for mercury and silver extraction in Huancavelica and Potosí, respectively; the resettlement of indigenous peoples across the Andes; and the dense corpus of legislation produced during his twelve years at the helm of the viceroyalty.[237] The historiography of the second half of the twentieth century does not change such focus but explores in depth these same issues concerned about the impact of Toledo's 'reforms' on 'subalterns', more specifically, indigenous peoples.[238] More recent research revisits Toledo's time in Peru from the perspective of governability and institutionalisation and the expansion of royal sovereignty. It also explores his multiple roles as a juridical reformist, as a traveller in search for vital information to understand Peru's indigenous peoples, and behind the 'Great Resettlement of Indigenous Populations', or the *reducciones toledanas*, through which the viceroy supposedly reimagined himself as a heir to the Incas.[239]

Toledo's expedition to the Chiriguanaes in 1574 occupies only a small part of scholarly production on the viceroy and his government, if it is mentioned at all.[240]

---

[237] Levillier, *Don Francisco de Toledo. Supremo organizador del Perú. Su vida, su obra. (1515-1582)*; Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo. Fifth Viceroy of Peru. 1569-1581*.

[238] Peter Bakewell, *Miners of the Red Mountain: Indian Labor in Potosí, 1545-1650*, (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1984); Jeffrey A. Cole, *The Potosí Mita, 1573-1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes* (Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1985); Jeremy Ravi Mumford, *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012).

[239] Tantaleán Arbulú, *El virrey Francisco de Toledo y su tiempo*; Merluzzi, *Politica e governo nel nuovo mondo*; Antonino Colajanni, *El virrey y los indios del Perú: Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581), La política indígena y las reformas sociales*, (Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, 2018).; Mumford, *Vertical Empire*, 7.

[240] Surprisingly in Tantaleán Arbulú's large opus on the viceroy, which covers over 800 pages in two volumes, there is not one mention of the expedition. The subject is not discussed either in Colajanni's work, even when the monograph is centred on Toledo and Peru's indigenous peoples.

The event is, for instance, only superficially described in few pages of the chapter in Arthur Zimmerman's biography of Toledo, dedicated to the viceroy's work in Charcas.[241] A more recent monograph by Italian historian Manfredi Merluzzi also addresses the topic only briefly, within the wider context of the efforts made to reaffirm the Catholic Monarchy's sovereignty over Peru.[242] One of the reasons for this silence might be the expedition's outcome. Toledo left the mountains inhabited by the Chiriguanaes, ill and defeated. This is an image that does not fit with the strategist and lawmaker or the heir to the Incas. Neither it is particularly well suited for a 'royal bureaucrat' or a 'colonial reformer'.

An interpretation of this entrada in the context of the political culture and representations of the period brings a different picture; one of a viceroy forced to negotiate, regularly review his plans, and adapt to the challenging conditions in Charcas, where the elites, although loyal to the monarch, had become accustomed to largely run the land on their own terms with tacit or explicit support from royal officials. Toledo's determination to govern Peru overseeing every aspect of reality with zeal and obsession copied Philip II's own approach to governmental matters. It would clash with cabildos and vecinos with their own agendas and reluctant to accept orders without consensus. Inevitably, the pragmatism of the region's elites would succeed, and the Viceroy's entrada would also be the grave for his ambitions.

Toledo, a member of the Oropesa noble house of Spain, arrived in Peru at the end of his career and in the autumn of his life. The fifty-three-year-old royal officer had served Emperor Charles V in Italy for many years.[243] His time in Peru was expected to be the culmination of a long time in the Crown's service and one that he hoped would be brief. As viceroy, Toledo was, in effect, the King's alter-ego, supposed to mirror his image and being accorded the same ceremonial treatment. However, he was also the monarch's servant and minister, someone who served someone else and society in general was aware of this ambiguity.[244] As recent historiography shows, the

[241] Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo. Fifth Viceroy of Peru. 1569-1581*, 196-200.
[242] Merluzzi, *Politica e governo nel nuovo mondo*, 170-173.
[243] Ambassador to the Council of Trent from 1546 and prior to that involved with different duties of the Alcantara knightly order in Rome. León Gómez Rivas, *El virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo*, (Toledo: Instituto Provincial de Investigaciones y Estudios Toledanos, Diputación Provincial, 1994).
[244] Cañeque, *The King's Living Image*, 28.

administration and delivery of justice was at the core of government in the Early Modern period, and in an area like Peru this could be summarised as keeping the land 'trouble-free' or '*quieta*', using the vocabulary of the time.[245] Toledo had clear royal instructions that offered him advice on how to run the challenging viceroyalty. The instructions should not be interpreted as orders and were largely for guidance. They reflected both the spirit of the *Junta Magna* of 1568 -a meeting of papal and Spanish delegates to discuss future global Catholic Monarchy policy- and key advice from those already in Peru. Such advice came from characters like Audiencia de Charcas judge Juan de Matienzo, the author of *"Gobierno del Perú",* a political treatise intended to bring the knowledge of Peru and its peoples to the Spanish court and the *Consejo de Indias*, the body of royal ministers responsible for the Spanish Indies, published only a year before the Junta Magna.[246]

Because of the importance of silver mining in Potosí, Charcas and the routes to carry that silver to Spain occupied a central place in the monarchy's global policy. However, the Chiriguanaes, who refused evangelisation and permanent settlement, what the Spanish referred to as 'policía', and who by the late 1560s were occupying a crescent-shape area between Guapay or Grande and Pilcomayo rivers, stood in the way of a new route to funnel Potosí's riches to Seville through the Atlantic. Furthermore, by the early 1570s the Chiriguanaes had reached their westernmost point, pushing other populations westwards, making farming in areas near the southeast Charcas border a hazardous task.[247] The royal advice given to Toledo in 1568 recommended the creation of a network of *presidios* or fortified villages, towns, and settlements along the border with the purpose of trading and contacting the indigenous population hostile to Spanish presence as an alternative to punitive expeditions.[248] The cédula real that the viceroy received, stressed that

[245] Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho,* 62; Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia," 2.
[246] Gómez Rivas, *El virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo*, Chapter VI; Merluzzi, *Politica e governo nel nuovo mondo*, 46-67; Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*; Morong Reyes, *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial. Los indios en el gobierno del Perú de Juan de Matienzo (1567).*
[247] France Marie Renard-Casevitz et al., *Al este de los Andes: relaciones entre las sociedades amazónicas y andinas entre los siglos XV y XVII* (Quito: Abya-Yala, 1988), 168, 176.
[248] Cédula dirigida al Virrey del Perú, cerca de la orden que ha de tener y guardar en los nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones que diere, assi por mar como por tierra, 1568, in Alfonso García-Gallo and Diego de Encinas, *Cedulario indiano o cedulario de Encinas*, Vol IV, (Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2018 [1596]), 229-232.

> having exhausted all the human means to bring these Indians to the service of our Lord, they be unwilling to cooperate, you may wage war against them, until they are brought to one place and settled (*reducidos*), and we grant you license to do this with all the consequences that such action might entail.[249]

The instructions could not be clearer in indicating that war against the Chiriguanaes should be the last resort.

Academics are divided about the Viceroy's intentions. On the one hand, some scholars argue that Toledo's initial plan for the southeast Charcas border suggests that the Viceroy was determined to gather sufficient evidence to justify war against these indigenous populations. Such views emphasise how, based on pre-conceptions and the demonisation of these peoples, using the trope of cannibalism among other labels, Toledo organised the evidence in a manner that eventually gave him reasons to attack the Chiriguanaes.[250] On the other hand, other scholars put forward a different argument, one that is explored in this chapter, that stresses that the viceroy was open to find a peaceful solution, only coming to the conclusion that an expedition was needed, after negotiations failed.[251] Toledo, a minister with hopes to receive recognition for his long career and therefore with his eyes on the court in Madrid, planned to follow royal advice as much as possible. He therefore arranged to found new towns as a way to establish a stronger presence along the Charcas border, and pushed for small scale punitive expeditions headed by his political allies. Such entradas would be funded by encomenderos with peoples exposed to attacks from the Chiriguanaes, as part of their duty to protect those they had received in encomiendas.

---

[249] "Y aviendo vos usado de todos los medios humanos para reducir estos yndios al servicio de Dios y nuestro y no lo queriendo ellos hacer, les podays hacer guerra, hasta reducirlos, que para ello os damos poder cumplido con todas sus incidencias y dependencias". BNE, Ms. 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al Gobierno de Indias, Real Cédula, Madrid, 19 diciembre 1568, ff. 309-310.

[250] Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 161; Julien, "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)," 20-22; Lia Guillermina Oliveto, "Chiriguanos: la construcción de un estereotipo en la política colonizadora del sur andino.," *Memoria Americana* 18, no. 1 (June 2010): 61.

[251] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 270; García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 95; Manfredi Merluzzi, *Gobernando los Andes: Francisco de Toledo virrey del Perú (1569 - 1581)*, trans. Patricia Unzain (Lima: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014), 229.

In a political culture which brought together patrons and their clients through a system of rewards and mutual and quasi-legal obligations, characterised by Spanish jurist and historian Bartolomé Clavero as "antidora", Toledo could add to his own clients, who would join expeditions expecting to receive rewards for their services and merits, any encomenderos that would be enlisted.[252] The military obligation would fall upon the few encomenderos who had natives in farms along the border area. Such move was also the least expensive alternative to a financially exhausted Catholic Monarchy, only a few years away from defaulting on its debts, that was reluctant to finance expeditions unless it was extremely necessary.[253] Only the fear of losing Potosí could prompt such drastic intervention and as much as news from Charcas was concerning, the information was far from alarming as Toledo was about to find out.

3. Toledo on tour. The viceroy inspects the land and encounters Charcas

In 1570, months after his arrival in Peru, don Francisco de Toledo did something no other viceroy had ever done before, and no other viceroy would do after him: he embarked on a *'Visita General'*, a general inspection of Peru, that would last a total of five years. As recent historiography shows, visitas were more than simply bureaucratic tasks as they were also an effective way to make the monarch present in remote and sometimes inaccessible parts of his realm. They were means of staging jurisdiction. Beyond the 'propaganda' effect, visitas were a form of bringing the 'mystic body' of society together, either through coercive or peaceful means, sometimes combined, in a political ritual that demonstrated the 'government in action' through the gathering of information via meetings with notables and locals, through the publication and enactment of decrees and laws, and most importantly, through the delivery of justice, putting wrong to right.[254] As the King's 'living image', Toledo was hoping to bring the monarch and his vassals close together, narrowing the long distance between Madrid and Peru in what would be, for many of the King's vassals, one, if

[252] Clavero, *Antidora*.
[253] A first default took place in 1575. Elliott, *Imperial Spain*, 269.
[254] Armando Guevara-Gil and Frank Salomon, "A 'Personal Visit': Colonial Political Ritual and the Making of the Indians in the Andes," *CLAHR* 3, no. 1–2 (1994): 3–36; Tamar Herzog, *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)* (Madrid: Fundación Ignacio Larramendi, 2000).

not the only opportunity, to be in presence of his 'physical representation'. Because of their symbolic importance, the theatrical stage of visitas was one conducted with great pomp and ceremony, and was accompanied by many officials, including notaries and translators. The long 'procession' also involved priests, physicians, relatives, *criados*, and political clients who accompanied the Viceroy across the long path that separates Lima and Charcas to keep him constantly informed, amused, and provide advice on different urgent matters. Replicating the regular journeys of his old and by then deceased patron, Emperor Charles V, the 'court in motion' that Toledo arranged for his 'visita general' would stop at key locations along the route to meet cabildo representatives, local elites, and indigenous leaders. The inspection had as its main objectives the resettlement of indigenous population and the reorganisation of labour drafts to boost mineral production in Potosí and mercury extraction in Huancavelica. It would also give the Viceroy first-hand knowledge of a large section of Peru and its peoples and the opportunity to 'act like the monarch' overseeing the implementation of rules and execution of orders.

With Charcas, and more importantly Potosí, at the core of Toledo's visita, the Catholic Monarchy was not only preoccupied about silver and mercury production, but also about the logistics involved in carrying silver to Spain. Traditionally, silver left Charcas via Lima and Panama, yet the Atlantic route was a desirable alternative and one that had been under threat because of the Chiriguanaes for some time. With the information on these indigenous peoples at his disposal, Toledo, aware of the reluctance to find volunteers to fight, was still pondering on different options just before leaving Lima, and in a letter in June 1570 he stated that he "did not want to burden those who already had to go to fight in Chile [against the Araucanos] so unwillingly" by forcing an expedition to another conflictive border.[255]

Toledo knew that in 1564 the Chiriguanaes had destroyed, causing great consternation, two Spanish border towns situated not far from Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja, also known as Condorillo, and La Barranca, as described in Chapter Two. The avenge of these attacks fell at the time upon Pedro de

[255] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, Lima 10 de junio de 1570, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, Vol. 3, 436.

Castro, husband of doña Inés de Aguiar, a wealthy mestiza who had inherited half an encomienda with indigenous peoples exposed to the Chiriguanaes.[256] Disguised as being part of his encomendero military duties, Castro's entrada had an ulterior and more lucrative motive which was the capture of lowland natives, largely Chanés, which the Chiriguanaes normally took as captives themselves to exchange them for goods with farmers along the border.[257] The growing need of native labour in Charcas was indeed a driving force behind such expeditions, one that the authorities eventually had to accommodate, and one that was met either through expeditions or the direct trade in captive natives with the Chiriguanaes themselves. This illegal trade was also disguised as an act of mercy designed to rescue indigenous populations, who otherwise were supposedly at risk to be eaten by the cannibal Chiriguanaes. However, and unfortunately for Castro and his men, the Chiriguanaes saw the task of taking Chané and other neighbouring native captives as their monopoly and as true lords of their lands they were not prepared to accept competition over the Chané or other lowland natives from any other groups, not even the Spaniards. Castro and most of his men did not return to La Plata alive being murdered by the Chiriguanaes.

Castro's request for an expedition was processed and approved by the Audiencia de Charcas, as at the time Peru did not have a viceroy at its helm and the Audiencia took on, not without controversy, such responsibilities. With Toledo in Peru, military matters were under the viceroy's jurisdiction and the Audiencia de Charcas only provided advice. Throughout the whole duration of Toledo's time in Peru, the Audiencia de Charcas would act largely as witness to such matters, accompanying Toledo with his decisions, offering suggestions, which gave its judges the right to criticise the viceroy's role, post-expedition. With Toledo in Peru, and aware of this side-lined role and in line with the Viceroy's initial plan for small punitive expeditions, one of his criados, Hernando Díaz, secured his permission for an entrada to the Chiriguanaes to avenge their attacks and the murder of Castro. With Toledo's authorisation, the Audiencia de Charcas approved powder and lead, for ammunitions for Díaz's safety, yet it also insisted that he was not supposed to wage war against

[256] Ana María Presta, "Portraits of Four Women: Traditional Female Roles and Transgressions in Colonial Elite Families in Charcas, 1550-1600," *Colonial Latin American Review* 9, no. 2 (2000): 237–62.
[257] Carta de Juan de Matienzo a SM, 1 de diciembre de 1567, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, 241.

these indigenous peoples.[258] Díaz did not follow the advice and travelling with fifty men, he set two Chiriguanaes settlements on fire, returning to La Plata, with numerous captive natives.[259] This brief event illustrates Toledo's refusal to support large-scale expeditions, at least at this stage, and his preference for low-profile entradas involving his criados and encomenderos, which would not cost the monarchy dearly. [260] Toledo would reward Díaz with a permanent post, in the *Compañía de Lanzas*, later.[261]

This entrada gave the Audiencia de Charcas a taste of what was to come. It was clear that the Viceroy wanted a more direct approach to the district's border policy, one that would try to avoid consultation with local authorities and tight scrutiny, and one that was widely supported by his own household, which saw it as an opportunity to fight indigenous peoples, secure cheap captive labour, and accrue merits for future rewards. It would also save the monarchy's coffers the expense. While this worked well for Díaz, it was completely different for larger expeditions that required ground support, ammunition, and materials, as well as plenty of men, and hence needed the involvement and cooperation of local authorities. If this was going to be the solution to settle the southeast border, then sooner or later Toledo would be forced to negotiate and agree compromises with local elites.

With the Chiriguanaes punished for the murder of Castro and his men, Toledo began listening to different members of the body politics to collect and process the information available about the Chiriguanaes and the southeast Charcas border area in

[258] López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1569 – 1575)*, Vol. 2, 19 de junio y 6 de julio de 1570, 96, 101.
[259] Información de los daños causados por los chiriguanos mandada practicar por el Virrey Francisco de Toledo, los testigos declaran que dieron muerte a un religioso de la merced. Yucay, Octubre de 1571, in: Victor Barriga, *Mercedarios ilustres en el Perú. El padre fray Diego de Porres, Misionero insigne en el Perú y en Santa Cruz de La Sierra.*, vol. II (Arequipa: Establecimientos Graficos La Colmena SA, 1949), 40; Ricardo Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay. Exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los rios Pilcomayo y Paraguay, presentada por el doctor Ricardo Mujía, enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Paraguay. Anexos.*, vol. II (La Paz: Empresa Editora "El Tiempo," 1914), 503.
[260] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, Cuzco, 1 de marzo de 1572, in Roberto Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 4 (Madrid: Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1924), 292-298.
[261] This is an elite group of soldiers that were following the viceroy and were frequently based in Lima. Guillermo Lohmann Villena, "Las compañías de gentilhombres de lanzas y arcabuces de la guarda del virreinato del Perú," *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, no. 13 (1956): 141–215; AGI, Patronato, 190, R23, 1577, Representación de Diego de Porras sobre el origen y estado de las compañías de lanzas y arcabuceros en Perú. Acompaña una relación de lo que han supuesto los tributos en Perú, destinados al pago de dichas lanzas y arcabuces, (image 12).

search of a more permanent solution that would involve the settlement and evangelisation of these indigenous peoples. In March 1571 the Viceroy met the attorney -*procurador*- of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Cristóbal de Saavedra, in Cusco, one of the stops in his visita general, to discuss the issue.[262] In his role as procurador, Saavedra represented the cabildo of Santa Cruz de la Sierra and through it, its vecinos. Cities had a prominent place in the political edifice of the Catholic Monarchy and Saavedra was asked to give an assessment of the situation, on behalf of Santa Cruz de la Sierra.[263] At this time, Toledo still thought the situation to be under control as silver mining in Potosí was deemed safe.[264] As noted in Chapter Two, unless the monarchy perceived a serious risk, it would try to avoid outright confrontation. Following this initial meeting, in September 1571 Saavedra travelled back to Cuzco to see Toledo again, but this time, in company of the governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra don Diego de Mendoza's brother, Francisco de Mendoza, who was probably trying to meet the Viceroy officially and gather information about his intentions in relation to the Chiriguanaes and Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

Because of its proximity to Chiriguanaes settlements, Santa Cruz de la Sierra was always going to occupy a key role in any move against these indigenous peoples. Securing support from the district's vecinos was of tantamount importance. This was however not an easy task. Santa Cruz de la Sierra had grown largely as an autonomous outpost between Asunción and Charcas and its vecinos had a strong tradition of self-reliance. Even the Chiriguanaes were perceived in a different manner in Santa Cruz de la Sierra where they were considered more similar to the Guaraní in Asunción, than the rest of Charcas. Any expedition would have to rely on the district's singular elite who by then were focused on other unconquered indigenous peoples, those of Mojos, and the potential minerals that might be found in nearby Itatín.

[262] Catherine J. Julien, *Desde el Oriente: Documentos para la historia del oriente Boliviano y Santa Cruz La Vieja, 1542-1597,* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Fondo Editorial Municipal, 2008), 212-217.
[263] Alejandro Agüero, "Ciudad y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen. La tradición castellana.," in *El derecho local en la periferia de la Monarquía Hispana. Río de La Plata, Tucumán y Cuyo. Siglos XVI-XVIII* (Buenos Aires: Editorial Dunken, 2013).
[264] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, Cusco, 25 de marzo de 1571, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI,* Vol 3, 452.

After meeting both men, from the ancient resting place of the Incas, Yucay valley, surrounded by his courtiers, Toledo asked for a wider enquiry into the situation along the southeast Charcas border.[265] Because of the more open and general characteristics of this process, vecinos from La Plata and Santa Cruz de la Sierra travelled to Cusco and went through a series of interviews, kickstarting the enquiry, between 24 and 29 October 1571. Through the interviews Toledo confirmed his suspicions that there was growing disquiet about the administration of don Diego de Mendoza in Santa Cruz de la Sierra. With this information, the Viceroy began considering replacing don Diego with one of his own allies, Juan Pérez de Zurita, a veteran of the *Jornada de Argel*, an expedition in 1541 against the Ottoman Empire stronghold of Algiers that ended in disaster for the Spanish, in which a much younger Toledo participated.[266] As mentioned in Chapter Two, Zurita had also been governor of Tucumán, and was therefore familiarised with the hardships and rebellious indigenous peoples. At this point, Toledo had a much better idea of the situation along the southeast Charcas border, yet he would wait to enter Charcas to move forward with the enquiry and have a more accurate assessment in the district.[267]

With the 'success', in Toledo's eyes, achieved by Díaz's expedition in mind, the Viceroy decided that small entradas were the best way to tackle the Chiriguanaes' threat. He therefore hoped to ask the governors of Tucumán, an area that also bordered with these peoples, and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, to organise separate expeditions, which would be financed by vecinos in those jurisdictions, with some royal support in terms of supplies and ammunitions.[268] This choice for smaller entradas meant that Toledo was planning to rely on the duties these vecinos had as loyal royal vassals to enlist and

[265] Julien, *Desde el Oriente*, 218-221. AGI, Patronato, 235, R1, 24 de octubre de 1571, Chiriguanaes. Ynformacion que se hizo por mandado del excelentisimo señor visorrey del Peru sobre la cordillera de los chiriguanaes por su persona que su excelencia ymbio y lo que piden los dichos yndios que se haga con ellos para salir de paz.

[266] AGI, Patronato, 127, N1, R12, Información de los méritos y servicios de Juan Pérez de Zorita en la conquista y pacificación de Perú y persecución de Francisco Hernández Girón, habiendo servido también en las guerras de Italia, Argel, y Tremecén, f. 1r; Gómez Rivas, *El virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo*, 53-54.

[267] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 1572, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 4, 401; Comisión a don Gerónimo de Cabrera, gobernador de Tucumán, para poblar en dichas provincias los pueblos de españoles que le pareciere, 1571, in Levillier, *Gobernación del Tucumán. Papeles de gobernardores en el siglo XVI*, 401-403.

[268] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, Cusco, 1 de marzo de 1572, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 4, 98, 312.

join such expeditions.[269] It would have potentially given them access to land and resources, mainly native labour for farming activities and domestic service. However, because those local elites were supposed to bear the cost of such expeditions, they wanted clear benefits from such hazardous enterprises and without that it was hard for governors and viceroys to organise entradas. Despite being aware of all this, Toledo was not prepared to let expedition members who seized Chiriguanaes as prisoners to trade them and limited these prisoners' captivity to the duration of their captors' lives, which made it impossible for them to pass these indigenous populations as they would do with encomiendas. The Viceroy still sought clarification from the King on such matters, as the following text indicates

> Until now, as I have written to Your Majesty, I have not allowed the governors of Tucumán and Santa Cruz that as part of their war against the Chiriguanaes to make use of prisoners for nothing more than the duration of their own lives, banning trade in these prisoners […] I beg Your Majesty to send me clear indication because of the confusion that this seems to be causing. [270]

4. A drastic change. Toledo revisits his plan

As the Visita General moved on, having decided that a large expedition was not an option for the time being because of the expense involved, Toledo reached his next destination, La Plata, in 1573.[271] Following the obligatory festivities that accompanied his arrival, Toledo met the Audiencia de Charcas judges, and discussed the situation along the southeast border.[272] Unlike the viceroy, the monarch's living

[269] This choice is present in García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 97. It is missing in Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire."

[270] "Hasta agora, como escreví a V.M. yo no e permitido a los Governadores de Tucumán y Sancta Cruz que en la guerra de los Chiriguanaes puedan hazer mas que servirse de estos prisiones [sic] por sus dias que le tomare, sin que los puedan bender y trocar. […] Ymporta mandar V.M. embiar con dicicion y claridad estas dudas, porque cada día se padece en la confusion y contradición que causa no estar rresueltos". Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 20 de marzo de 1573, in Maurtua, *Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia. Prueba peruana presentada al gobierno de la República Argentina*, Vol 1, 88-89.

[271] The viceroy stopped first in Potosí where he stayed for three to four months. Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 1572, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 4, 401; Reginaldo de Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, vol. 2, 111-112.

[272] Toledo had not even entered the village and there were disagreements with the Audiencia judges already. The issue was over the seats that would be used during Toledo's entrance ceremony. The viceroy wanted simpler seats for the judges, and they wanted more luxurious seats. To make a further

image, an Audiencia was the actual monarch in presence in any jurisdiction subject to that court. Vecinos would write to the Audiencia in the same manner they would write to their King.[273] The coexistence of both authorities, and both 'presences', in a same jurisdiction was always cause for problems and tensions given the similarities of their functions and representations in a theatre in which royal officers and tasks overlapped on a complicated and elaborated stage. This was more pronounced given Toledo's own personality, his approach to the viceregal role, and his interpretation of the Catholic Monarchy's government of Peru. In May 1573 and following the established protocol, Toledo consulted the Audiencia de Charcas judges on three subjects: the legality of war against the Chiriguanaes, the obligatoriness for encomenderos to contribute to any war efforts in the jurisdictions where they exercised vecindad, and the fate of those Chiriguanaes who might be taken captive.[274] Toledo was therefore still seeking advice about more limited strikes against the border indigenous groups. The Audiencia judges were in an advantageous position as they could not decide on military matters with a viceroy at the helm of Peru, yet they could provide guidance knowing that the political cost would eventually fall on Toledo. Sheltered from the consequences of problematic entradas, the judges gave their full endorsement to the Viceroy's plans.

Continuing with Toledo's plan, Juan Pérez de Zurita was effectively appointed governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, and asked, as part of his instructions, to launch an expedition on the Chiriguanaes border from there.[275] Zurita was going to replace don Diego de Mendoza, whose brother had met Toledo in Cusco, and who had only taken up his post in 1568.[276] Zurita was given further instructions about the running of Santa Cruz de la Sierra, including the implementation of tighter controls over the local elite,

---

point over his authority, whereas Toledo entered Lima without a canopy [*palio*], he walked into La Plata under one. Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, vol. 2, 112.

[273] Garriga, "Concepción y aparatos de justicia", 218; Cañeque, *The King's Living Image*, 59.

[274] AGI, Patronato, 235, R2, 1573/1574, Parecer del presidente y oidores de las Audiencias de los charcas y La Plata, sobre el modo de hacer la guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y castigo que debía imponérseles.

[275] Título e instrucciones al Capitán Juan Pérez de Zurita, para la gobernación de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, 1571, in Maurtua, *Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia. Prueba peruana presentada al gobierno de la República Argentina. Mojos.*, vol. 9, 44, 52-53; Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay. Exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los rios Pilcomayo y Paraguay, presentada por el doctor Ricardo Mujía, enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Paraguay. Anexos*, 42-45; 50-52.

[276] Don Diego de Mendoza had been elected by the Cabildo of Santa Cruz de la Sierra when he was only 28 years old as governor of the district, succeeding Ñuflo de Chaves. He was son-in-law of both Chaves and Hernando de Salazar. He had been part of the group of Spaniards who founded Santa Cruz de la Sierra. Hernando Sanabria, *Cronica sumaria de los gobernadores de Santa Cruz (1560-1810)* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Publicaciones de la Universidad Boliviana Gabriel René Moreno, 1975), 12.

a complete ban on the sale of captive natives -somewhat an impossible task-, and the postponement of any plans for an expedition to nearby Mojos and Itatin. These two sites had only recently been explored by Spaniards, in search of indigenous peoples who could be taken captive and potential mineral deposits. Instead, Santa Cruz de la Sierra vecinos were going to be asked to contribute to a small entrada to the Chiriguanaes, following the Viceroy's wishes. As expected, such plans encountered strong opposition among the local elite which was reluctant to abandon the chances of finding mineral and plenty of native labour in exchange for promises of honour and glory that could come from their participation in an expedition to the Chiriguanaes. Zurita was overthrown through a revolt that had don Diego de Mendoza as its leader, frustrating Toledo's project for a small-scale expedition from Santa Cruz de la Sierra.[277] Personal relations between former authorities, prominent vecinos and alliances with the Chiriguanaes were all behind Zurita's and Toledo's defeat and show how challenging it was to insert the King and his monarchy in a territory ruled by private interest and where recognition of royal authority was weak. In a sense, Toledo and his policy to govern the land in the name of the Catholic Monarchy were against the interest of Santa Cruz de la Sierra's elite that felt intruded upon by a viceroy who, with Zurita's appointment and plans, was challenging the status quo. Their resistance was such that Mendoza even made an agreement with a Chiriguanaes faction to fight the Viceroy if needed.[278] The whole situation, a turning point, was a serious blow to the Viceroy's plans, and it is something that has been largely ignored in historiography on the expeditions to the Chiriguanaes. Because of the distance between Santa Cruz de la Sierra and La Plata, and the fact that the Chiriguanaes were in between, it would take Toledo a further two years to bring don Diego to justice.[279]

With his initial plans for expeditions from Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Tucumán in disarray, Toledo was now faced with the impossible task of having to negotiate a large-scale expedition with the involvement of local elites who were shying away from their responsibilities and were reluctant to go along with a costly event without any immediate rewards. The task was difficult since these elites were loyal to the King but,

[277] García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 476-477.
[278] Martín del Barco Centenera, *Argentina y conquista del Rio de la Plata, Con otros acaecimientos de los reynos del Peru, Tucuman, y Estado del Brasil.* (Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeek, 1602), f. 120.
[279] Carta del Licenciado Pedro Ramírez de Quiñones a SM, 6 de mayo de 1575, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579.* Vol 1, 327-329.

until Toledo, they had not felt the real presence of the monarch, his justice, and law. They were used to royal officials running Charcas in the name of the monarch, but a viceroy was, in effect, the nearest person to the King himself, and his presence and demands were a novelty for the local elite in Charcas. The Viceroy was also constrained by royal policy as he could not be seen endorsing the permanent enslavement and trade of natives hostile to Spanish presence. Unable to move forward, Toledo decided on a new plan. With the aid of envoys, he would establish direct contact with Chiriguanaes leaders and bring them to La Plata for discussions, potentially holding them as hostages there. This was not a new strategy as it had been used in other war scenarios since the Spanish arrived in the New World. It was part of the Early Modern war culture that in Europe involved a period of negotiations, diplomatic exchanges, and display, before any military event took place, perceiving the whole process as a theatrical stage. In this case, it would buy extra time in case a large expedition was eventually needed or, even better for Toledo, it would lead to a compromise with these indigenous peoples clearing the way for their acceptance of the Catholic faith and settlement. The ultimate goal -the establishment of two new border towns- as the conclusions of the Junta Magna and Juan de Matienzo's treaty suggested, still remained intact.

5. Hostage hunting in the borders

From La Plata, the journey to the border was perilous and long. It went across valleys, following rivers that swelled during the rainy season and narrowed when the dry weather finally set in. The last Spanish district before the Chiriguanaes settlements, travelling south from La Plata, was the province of Chichas, and it was home to the eponymous indigenous group analysed in Chapter Two. Toledo sent a veteran of the war against the Araucanos in Chile, Captain Agustín de Ahumada, as his envoy to the border, with ten to twelve men, to gather information and contact the Chiriguanaes.[280] The Viceroy was fond of war veterans and old conquistadors and like many of his contemporaries he thought of Chile -the 'Flanders of the Indies'- as the type of border area where armed men would improve their military skills and accumulate experience

[280] Ahumada's journey coincided with his role to organise the settlement of the Chichas in their Toledan towns. Palomeque, "Los chicha y las visitas toledanas," 124.

they could use in other Catholic Monarchy's conflictive borders. Ahumada's presence was received with hostility and after some skirmishes, three Chiriguanaes leaders, not the most important ones, agreed to travel to La Plata to meet Toledo.[281] A further eight to ten Chiriguanaes followed in their footsteps, arriving in the city to pay respect to the Viceroy and quieten down the situation. Still without the main Chiriguanaes leaders in La Plata, Toledo reluctantly decided to resort to someone from the actual border area who had the knowledge and skills to approach these peoples and the task was entrusted to Captain García Mosquera.

Born in 1538, García Mosquera was the mestizo son of captain Ruy García Mosquera, and a Chiriguanaes/Guaraní woman. His language skills would certainly help with any enquiry organised by Toledo. Furthermore, through his marriage to Teresa Zavala, daughter of Captain Pedro de Segura Zavala, García Mosquera was also a vecino in the border and part of a network of poor Spaniards, other mestizos and, more importantly, Chiriguanaes, who were all based in Tomina and who could offer the Spanish support for any expedition, in exchange for concessions. García Mosquera and his relatives expected rewards in the form of posts that would give official recognition to their status in the border area and expand their fortunes.[282] However, the captain was caught between two different loyalties. On the one hand, he responded to his own Chiriguanaes allies and factions, who also had their own enemies among other Chiriguanaes factions, border Spaniards, and mestizos. On the other hand, García Mosquera was also close to Spaniards who regularly endured attacks by indigenous groups along the border, a cause he understood very well having been a captive of these indigenous peoples in the past.[283] Although his background made him a firm candidate to help the Viceroy, this ambiguity and his mestizo origin placed García Mosquera in a position of distrust in Toledo's eyes.

[281] AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Información de Luis de Fuentes y Vargas -statement by Juan Fernández de Castro -image 102-; Carta del Virrey Toledo a SM, La Plata, 30 de noviembre de 1573, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 4, 198.

[282] BNE, Ms 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al Gobierno de Indias, ff. 315-316, http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000023047&page=1

[283] One witness to a report commissioned by viceroy Toledo in 1571 mentions him as one of many the natives were "fattening up to eat them". Luckily, they all managed to escape. AGI, Patronato, 235, R1, 1571, Informaciones hechas de orden del virrey del Perú, Francisco de Toledo, sobre la conducta y malos procedimientos de los indios llamados Chiriguanaes, (images 46-47).

Back in La Plata, Toledo had set up court waiting for the arrival of García Mosquera with more information and, potentially, new Chiriguanaes. Following his military experience at the service under Charles V, the Viceroy was waiting for the right opportunity to expand the realm and bring the monarch's presence to the eastern slopes of the Andes. In a reminder of the Spanish strategies in European wars, this was a negotiating time, that involved pomp and sometimes retreats, as well as regular contact with the enemy and frequent embassies or delegations. Those Chiriguanaes already there were asked to stay to guarantee the safe return of the mestizo captain. The list of Toledo's 'special' guests included don Francisquillo, a young native, who possibly changed his name to pay honour to the viceroy, and who Toledo grew fond of because of his irreverent manners, becoming some type of court buffoon.[284]

In the political theatre that Toledo assembled, his Chiriguanaes guests were dressed in Spanish clothes and received gifts suitable for a royal court, while being expected to adopt manners and behave accordingly, in an example of performativity.[285] They had to copy pomp and ceremony and behave like emissaries of rulers of noble origin, employing what was seen as an appropriate language and manners. In a political culture that privileged performance, the Chiriguanaes guests were expected to play their role on the viceregal stage. The gifts they received -a donation- were, in a context that appreciated values such as reciprocity, friendship and loyalty -exactly those that fuelled connections between patrons and clients- a way of incorporating the Chiriguanaes into the political sphere of Toledo, meaning that the viceroy would expect some retribution from these natives afterwards.[286] Taking into account their own traditions and the experience with the Andean indigenous peoples, for the Spanish, the lack of reciprocity was frequently perceived as betrayal and they regularly said that the Chiriguanaes rarely returned such favours and gifts and were therefore

[284] Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, vol. 2, 116-117. Saignes mentions that Francisquillo was son of Chiriguanaes cacique Condorillo. Toledo adopted him and Francisquillo travelled with the viceroy on Toledo's return journey to Spain. In the stop in Panama, Francisquillo decided to return to Potosi and once there he befriended Corregidor Pedro Ozores de Ulloa. After returning to the southeast Charcas borders, travelling as part of trade caravan to the Chiriguanaes land, Francisquillo murdered the guards and took all the goods becoming an enemy of the Spaniards. Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 217.

[285] "Performativity is a description of how bodies and selves are controlled and compelled to conform to social standards: Performativity is thus not a singular "act," for it is always a reiteration of a norm or a set of norms, and to the extent that it acquires an act-like status in the present, it conceals or dissimulates the conventions of which it is a repetition". Egginton, *How the World Became a Stage*, 16.

[286] Clavero, *Antidora*, 100.

untrustworthy and unreliable, reinforcing their stereotype that also involved their cannibalism and lack of 'policía'. After some time, García Mosquera returned to La Plata with a delegation of thirty Chiriguanaes; including two main leaders, Marucare and Condorillo, and accompanied by Baltasarillo, a Chicha native who had been living with the Chiriguanaes for some time and would act as an interpreter.[287]

Hosting Marucare and Condorillo in his comfortable and luxurious court in La Plata, Toledo slowly turned the Chiriguanaes guests into prisoners. Spanish security around the indigenous peoples tightened, making them feel uneasy, something they probably communicated to those who were waiting for them in settlements in their land. The rumours and the lack of return of their leaders, eventually prompted the arrival of more natives, who in the manner of a religious procession were carrying Christian crosses, showing their willingness to embrace the Catholic faith, begging to see "Apo Toledo".[288] The Chiriguanaes had already performed as 'loyal royal vassals' being hosted by Toledo in La Plata, now their new performance indicated their alleged willingness to adopt Christianity. They displayed their potential Christian credentials calling for "Apo Toledo" as the means to achieve that. They met the Viceroy and told him about the presence of Santiago, a young preacher who had changed their old habits and lifestyle who, sent by Jesus Christ, had appeared in one of their settlements, Saypurú, two years before, asking them to stop eating human flesh, making war, and having more than one wife. The presence of religious orders in the area was scarce at the time and the story seemed very convenient to show to the Spanish the Chiriguanaes' willingness to adopt Christian traditions. They had come to La Plata to ask for Catholic priests to baptise and instruct them in religious matters.[289] It seems that the Chiriguanaes were aware of the stereotypes about them that circulated among

[287] AGI, Patronato, 235, R4, Relacion de lo que se hizo en la jornada que el excelentisimo señor virrey del piru don Francisco de Toledo hizo por su persona entrando a hazer Guerra a los chiriguanaes de las fronteras y cordilleras desta provincial en el año de setenta y quatro, f. 3r; Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 117.

[288] In Quechua, Apo: "Great lord or superior judge, or main curaca, capay apu, king". Diego Gonçalez Holguin, *Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Peru llamada lengua Qquichua, o del inca* (Ciudad de Los Reyes (Lima): Francisco del Canto, 1607), 23. Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 120.

[289] AGI, Patronato, 235, R3, 1573, Información hecha en la Audiencia de La Plata, de orden del virrey del Perú, Francisco de Toledo, sobre averiguar la aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol, enviado por Jesús para predicarles y convertirlos a la religión católica; Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 120; Carta del Virrey Toledo a SM, 30 de noviembre de 1573, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 5, 201; Carta del Licenciado Pedro Ramírez de Quiñones a SM, 6 de mayo de 1575, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas.* vol. 1, 326.

the Spanish and were prepared to take advantage of this to delay any move by Toledo. Although religious authorities in La Plata questioned the whole story, and in effect it seems highly questionable, Toledo still pinned his hopes on the possibility of these natives accepting the Catholic faith and eventually settling and he therefore decided to commission a new journey of García Mosquera to the border area to re-assess the situation, something he did between September and December 1573.[290]

García Mosquera had his own agenda, and it is probable that he used the journey to pass information to the Chiriguanaes about Toledo's intentions. He was trying to position himself in the theatre of war that was slowly mounting. After trying to marry him into their own groups, probably to secure an ally in Toledo's quarters and guarantee certain protection as a result, the Chiriguanaes leaders he met made it clear to him that they were prepared to become the monarch's vassals and accept the Catholic faith, but only under certain conditions. They would not allow any Spanish towns or villages near their settlements and neither work for Spaniards on farms or undertake domestic chores they saw as "only fit for women", as they perceived themselves to be warriors.[291] This removed the main incentives for solders to join any expedition, which were to gain access to extra land and native labour, making Toledo's task impossible.

Meanwhile in La Plata, following the arrival of García Mosquera from the southeast Charcas border in December 1573 with the results of his enquiry and top Chiriguanaes leaders, Toledo realised that he could keep them under arrest and kickstart the original plan to establish new border towns.[292] In effect, a month after García Mosquera arrived in La Plata, on 22 January 1574 Toledo and Captain Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, a former corregidor in the border province of Chichas, and who therefore had the knowledge and support required for the task, signed a capitulación for the foundation of San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija on the Chiriguanaes lands,

[290] Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay. Exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los rios Pilcomayo y Paraguay, presentada por el doctor Ricardo Mujía, enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Paraguay. Anexos.*, vol. II, 108-129.
[291] Idem., 128.
[292] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 20 de diciembre de 1573, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 5, 304.

clearly against the will of these natives as they had expressed it to García Mosquera.[293] With his hostages in La Plata and the first border town foundation underway, Toledo could briefly taste victory thinking how all this would potentially expand the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction, strengthening the monarch's presence in Charcas and along its borders in the process.

However, in an unpredictable turn to this political opera, a powerful storm hit La Plata in February 1574 washing away the Viceroy's plan. Toledo's hostages took advantage of the confusion and escaped during the downpour, in what was a final blow to the Viceroy's brief success. Without the Chiriguanaes leaders who might have been able to force evangelisation and settlement, and the foundation of San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija already underway, Toledo had to re-think his plan and a decision to wage war against the border indigenous populations was made in a matter of days.[294]

6. Negotiating an expedition

As one political and theatrical stage had fallen, another one was quickly set up. The organisation of a large-scale expedition required great skills. Toledo had to consult notables, religious orders, cabildos, and the Audiencia de Charcas, again, before he could proceed. There were a few obstacles to overcome. As has been mentioned already, an uncooperative encomenderos elite who were not prepared to abide by their duties to protect their indigenous peoples presented a first challenge. They would only participate if they could obtain native labour they could trade and/or use from the entrada. Toledo expressed his frustration in a letter to the King in the following terms

> To draft only one vecino from this city as leader of these peoples [for the expedition], even promising the governorship of Condorillo that Manso had [in relation to Andrés Manso's post as governor of the destroyed town of

[293] Thierry Saignes, "Andaluces en el poblamiento del oriente Boliviano. En torno a unas figuras controvertidas., el fundador de Tarija y sus herederos.," in *Actas de las II jornadas de Andalucía y América. Universidad Santa María de La Rábida. Marzo 1982.*, vol. 2, 1983, 177; Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 166.
[294] Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 134.

> Condorillo and its jurisdiction], they would ask for more concessions than the French king asked from Your Majesty for the peace treaty [of Cateau-Cambrésis in 1559]. They wanted a grant of Indians for three lives. I tried to remind many of these of their duty [to come forward and fight] as encomenderos, yet I decided to allocate men from my own household [*casa*] as I did when I set up the companies [*compañías*] that went to wage war against the Incas [Vilcabamba] and that took reinforcements to Chile because of the unwillingness [to help] that I found in this land. [295]

A second obstacle was the Catholic Monarchy's reluctance to let expedition members trade and enslave those natives they could capture. There were clear royal instructions and cédulas reales that set out guidelines on how to proceed with expeditions and they banned the trade of captive natives as well as their enslavement.[296] Faced with such restrictions, Toledo would circumvent them by putting the matter to consultation, in a clear example of "localisation of laws", a mechanism that played a significant role in helping the monarchy keep the loyalty of local elites on its side.[297] Grounded in the tradition of 'I obey, but do not execute' or 'Obedezco, pero no cumplo', laws such as those instructions and cédulas reales were just for guidance and could be put aside if local circumstances must and there was general consensus for it.[298] Although Toledo never received confirmation from the

[295] "que para sacar un vezino de aqui por caudillo con esta gente y dándoles la governacion de condorillo que tuvo manso ni estava pidiendo mas capitulaciones que pudiera pedir el rey de Francia a vuestra magestad para hacer una paz y que le diesse un rrepartimiento de yndios en los de acá por tres vidas yo pensava dezir lo que la obligación que tenian como feudatarios ellos y los demás que la tuviesen se la haria cumplir y quando no oviese entre ellos quien quisiese encargarse de la jornada para servir a dios y a vuestra magestad y mostrar que avia persona entre ellos para ser caveza que yo ponia de mi cassa quien lo fuesse como lo avia hecho en las compañías que avia mandado hazer para la guerra de los yngas y socorro del reyno de chyle por la poca voluntad que avia hallado en los de la tierra." Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 3 de junio de 1573, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 5, 137. By peace with the French king, Toledo is referring here to the 1559 Peace of Cateau-Cambrésis between the Catholic Monarchy and France which brought a 65-year struggle over the control of Italy to an end. The Catholic Monarchy was left as the dominant power in the Italian peninsula.

[296] Instrucciones para hacer nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones, Valladolid, 13 de mayo de 1556, in Richard Konetzke, *Colección de documentos para la historia social de la formación de Hispanoamérica. 1493-1810.*, vol. Vol 1 (1493-1592) (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1953), 335-339; Cédulas Reales of 1526, 1530, 1532, 1540, 1542, and 1543, in *Recopilación de leyes de los reynos de las Indias*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Julian Paredes, 1681), Libro VI, Título II, De la libertad de los Indios, 194.

[297] Agüero, "Local Law and Localization of Law"; Ross and Stern, "Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism," 112.

[298] Cervantes attributes this approach to how the term "obedecer" was understood at the time, meaning that was much closer to the Latin root of the word -*obedire*, which comes from *ob audire* or to listen-. This meant that obedience was not primarily an act of the will but of the intelligence. Rather than

monarch about this issue, he would follow the advice from locals and let expedition members keep captive natives for limited time, insisting that the trade in such peoples was something not to be tolerated.

A third obstacle was the expedition's potentially astronomical cost. In theory, each encomendero would have to go along in company of those they could recruit and their own clients and relatives, at their expense. Although access to captive natives would provide an incentive, for an expedition the type that Toledo was trying to assemble with all the display and excess as possible, with only the few vecinos and encomenderos who were prepared to fight, it was not enough. Toledo would also take his own clients and criados on the entrada, but they had to be rewarded accordingly, in line with their status. Such rewards had to come from the royal coffers, something the Viceroy had been trying to avoid up to this point. With silver mining in Potosí booming again, because of the introduction of the amalgamation of silver, Toledo received a windfall income from the quintos real, the tax of one fifth of all the silver extracted that was due to the Crown that he could use to cover the initial costs of the expedition.[299]

Aware that he was circumventing royal instructions and cédulas reales, and because his doubts about policy in this regard were never answered by the monarch, Toledo decided to cover his own back by collecting evidence in a *"Quaderno de la Verdad de los Hechos de esta Tierra"* or "Book of the Truth about the Events of this Land", a suggestive title for a file -illustration 2 below- that was going to gather all the proof needed to justify the expedition. The first dossier to be part of this now largely lost file was a substantial report written by La Plata encomendero and jurist Licenciado Polo Ondegardo in May/June 1574, which tied the expedition to a strategic narrative in which the cannibal trope, among other stereotypes about the Chiriguanaes, suddenly and conveniently reappeared.[300] Polo was an authority on Charcas and his opinions

submitting to a command regardless of what one thought, therefore, the principle of "I obey but do not execute" allowed for an understanding of obedience as primarily a learning process, a matter of practical intelligence, where those in command and those who obeyed had come to share a common mind. Cervantes, *Conquistadores*, 194.

[299] Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 114.

[300] AGI, Patronato, 235, R1, Ynformacion del excelentisimo señor visorrey del Peru sobre la cordillera de los chiriguanaes, (images 52 to 61); Polo Ondegardo, Gonzalo Lamana, ed, *Pensamiento colonial crítico: Textos y actos de Polo Ondegardo*, (Lima, Perú: Cuzco: IFEA-CBC, 2012).

were held in high regard at the King's court in Spain, just what Toledo needed. He raised the subject about the fate of those indigenous peoples taken captive in case of war, suggesting that their enslavement might be an option.



Illustration 2. "Quaderno de la Verdad de los Hechos desta Tierra". AGI Patronato 235. R1, Ynformacion del Excelentisimo señor Visorrey del Peru sobre la cordillera de los chiriguanaes, Parecer del Licenciado Polo, f. 5r.

Toledo had already consulted the Audiencia de Charcas in May 1573 when he first arrived in La Plata and its judges had agreed to an eventual war with participation from local encomenderos and the possibility of the enslavement of captive Chiriguanaes. One of the firm supporters was Toledo's main ally in the Audiencia, judge Juan de Matienzo, who had expressed his views on the subject previously in his political treatise.[301]Because the circumstances had changed dramatically in one year, due to the rebellion of don Diego de Mendoza in Santa Cruz de la Sierra which in effect created a new conflict in Charcas, the Viceroy asked for the Audiencia's judges' guidance again, successfully securing their whole support.[302]

One missing aspect in this theatre so far was the Catholic church. Toledo had to consult the religious orders and church authorities on these matters. Because of their jurisdiction over ecclesiastical matters in Charcas, the Dean of Charcas Doctor Don

[301] Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 257.
[302] AGI, Patronato, 235, R2, 1573/1574, Parecer del presidente y oidores de las Audiencias de los charcas y La Plata, sobre el modo de hacer la guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y castigo que debía imponérseles.

Francisco Urquiso was involved in the consultation, as well as members of religious orders settled in Charcas such as the Dominicans, Augustinians, Franciscans, and more importantly, the Mercedarians, an order largely associated with the rescue of captives which would play a substantial role in the southeast Charcas border for many years after this entrada. One order was missing, the Jesuits, who had a difficult relationship with Toledo who wanted them to play a more active role in the evangelisation effort by living among indigenous peoples, something that at that point they were reluctant to do.[303] With the exception of the absent Jesuits, all Catholic church members who were consulted endorsed Toledo's latest plans, agreeing that war against the Chiriguanaes was 'just' and that they could be taken captive by those who went along with the expedition.[304]

On 10 April 1574, Toledo wrote to the King that he was going to wage war against the Chiriguanaes acting as the head of an expedition that would penetrate the dense slopes inhabited by these natives, a dangerous and unknown theatre in which the expeditions members had much to lose. As much as this alarmed the Audiencia because of the risks involved, the viceroy insisted that the situation with the Chiriguanaes and the rebellion by don Diego de Mendoza had brought the monarchy in some disrepute. Toledo viewed his quintessential role to be the King's alter-ego and take his presence to every corner of Peru, including the remote border, to confirm the crown's sovereignty and jurisdiction.[305] He would travel now, at the helm of the body politics of Charcas at the centre of the stage, in a true courtly procession, to the Andean slopes.

7. Toledo's journey to the Chiriguanaes in company of "la flor del Perú"

[303] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 1 de marzo de 1572, in Antonio de Egaña, ed, *Monumenta peruana. (1565-1575)*, vol. I (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1954), 453-454.
[304] AGI, Patronato, 235, R5, 1574, Acuerdo que celebró el virrey con algunos prelados de religiones de la ciudad de La Plata, sobre si convendría hacer guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y declararlos por esclavos; BNE, Ms, 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al Gobierno de Indias, ffs. 302-303.
[305] Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 10 de abril de 1574, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*, vol. 5, 426-427.

Due to García Mosquera's knowledge of the land, Toledo appointed him the entrada's guide. Yet, the Viceroy and his entourage would face a long journey to the Chiriguanaes, one that suspiciously avoided Tomina and one that could have been significantly shorter. Toledo mistrusted García Mosquera and not without reason as this new route kept his Tomina network of Chiriguanaes allies safe.[306]



Map 11. Toledo's journey into the Chiriguanaes. View from the Andes toward the southeast. Google Maps.

The plan was for two separate forces, one commanded by Toledo and the other by La Plata encomendero don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa, whose encomienda peoples were settled along the northeast border of Charcas, an area exposed to Chiriguanaes raids. Born in Plasencia, Extremadura, don Gabriel had built a vast fortune that relied heavily on his encomienda indigenous peoples in Pojo and that was based, at the time, on agriculture and the production of cheap textiles.[307] He was one of only three

[306] Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 195.
[307] Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 104-105.

Spaniards who went on the expedition who had the title of "don", apart from Toledo and don Antonio de Meneses, Toledo's nephew, which reflected his position as the expedition's captain. Don Gabriel was asked to leave early to find the Chiriguanaes leader Vitapué following the road to Santa Cruz de la Sierra.[308]

The third 'don' was Toledo's distant relative and close ally, don Luis de Toledo Pimentel, who was appointed by Toledo Maese de Campo of the expedition. He was grandson of don Fernando Alvarez de Toledo and great-grandson of the duke of Alba, don Fadrique Segundo, whose father had been third cousin of Emperor Charles V.[309] Due to his participation in this entrada, Don Luis was rewarded with a new post, *Castellano de la Fortaleza de Sacsahuamán,* in Cusco, created by Toledo to honour him and please his relatives in Spain. This post was designed to oversee the protection of the "city of the Incas" and came with a salary that would be raised from assets seized from Carlos Inca, a descendent of the rulers of Tahuantinsuyu, and his family, who were victims of Toledo's campaign to eradicate any memory of the Incas.[310]

Apart from the *hidalgos* and nobles, corporate bodies such as cities, towns and villages were also represented in large events and this entrada commanded by the most powerful man in the land was not different. Giving it the character of a quasi-religious procession, the vecinos of La Plata and Potosí would be able to march in all their gallantry with their own captains as their leaders. Toledo appointed, again a political ally and someone close, Pedro de Zárate, as Captain of the vecinos of La Plata who participated in the expedition. This Basque conquistador had been active during the Hernández Girón rebellion (1553-1554) and had a high social and economic status more from the product of mining and agriculture than as a result of his marriage to doña Petronila de Castro, who enjoyed the encomienda of Omaguaca.[311] His marriage

[308] Two other Spaniards with the titles of "don", don Juan de Mendoza and don Francisco de Valenzuela, helped with Toledo's withdrawal from the mountains but were not present during the expedition. Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 138; AGI, Patronato, 144, R1, 1608, Información de don Luis de Mendoza.

[309] Roberto Levillier, *Biografías de conquistadores de la Argentina. Siglo XVI* (Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1928), 225-228; Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 134.

[310] Guillermo Lohmann Villena, and María Justina Sarabia Viejo, *Francisco de Toledo: Disposiciones gubernativas para el virreinato del Perú. 1575-1581*, vol. II (Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1986), 63-71; Hemming, *The Conquest of the Incas*, 434.

[311] See Chapter Two in this thesis. Zanolli, *Tierra, encomienda e identidad*, 112-116; Presta, *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial*, 243.

to an encomendera gave Zárate local prestige that also came with encomendero duties, which included responding to a call to arms by Toledo. Charcas' other main urban settlement, the Imperial Village of Potosí, the Crown's jewel, was also represented in the entrada. Toledo named his criado Juan Ortíz de Zárate, as the captain of the town's vecinos. One of the Viceroy's numerous courtiers and not the Charcas encomendero mentioned in Chapter Two, he had arrived in Peru in the same fleet that brought Toledo. His role at the helm of Potosí's vecinos might reflect some involvement with silver mining, an activity that thanks to the Viceroy's efforts was booming with the construction of mills and large-scale use of mercury.[312]

Toledo's expedition stage was the perfect set for the display of liberality and magnanimity, two courtly values that underpinned the ties between patrons and clients that cemented honour and prestige.[313] It was a 'court on the move', where encomenderos were expected to fight as knights, following the values of nobility. The example was Philip II's court in Madrid and the set was expected to replicate such a court on the Andean slopes. No expense was spared in this 'big joust' in the Chiriguanaes border.[314] Two years after the event, the president of the Audiencia de Charcas, Lope Diez de Armendáriz, in a long letter to the King, revisiting Toledo's time in Peru, wrote

> the war that the viceroy waged against the Chiriguanaes Indians, as soon as it was agreed, it was organised gathering so many people, wearing clothes and carrying ornaments that were not appropriate for that type of enterprise that

[312] Luis Romera Iruela and María del Carmen Galbís Diez, *Catalogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII*, vol. 1 (Sevilla: AGI, 1980), 287; Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 138-139. AGI, Charcas, 85, N10, 1607, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Fernando de Irarrazábal y Andía, capitán. Información contenida de 1607. Con parecer de la Audiencia. Hay otra información de 1607 de sus méritos y servicios, y los de su padre Francisco de Irarrazábal y Andía, con una petición y un decreto al final de la misma de 1610, (image 47).

[313] Quondam and Torres Corominas, *El discurso cortesano*.

[314] Figures range from 200,000 pesos or 275,000 ducados to 500,000 pesos. This last figure was the equivalent to 1,000 town homes in La Plata at the time. For 200,000 ducados: AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Información del capitán Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, f. 2r; For half a million pesos: López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1569 – 1575)*, vol. 2, 25 de noviembre de 1574, 472; For 300,000 pesos: Carta del fraile franciscano Juan de Almagro a Pedro de Segura, 23 de octubre de 1583, in Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay. Exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los rios Pilcomayo y Paraguay, presentada por el doctor Ricardo Mujía, enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Paraguay. Anexos.*, vol. II, 504.

> consisted of conquering savage Indians in such a harsh land, and for that journey it was not necessary to carry the viceroy in his litter and other embarrassing things that happened all done at the expense of Your Majesty and the Spanish and Indians, putting everyone at risk because of a lack of supplies, and to punish those barbarians would only have been necessary captains with expertise in such matters and not feathers, silks and trappings as it is done in cowardice wars, thus this war was of little benefit to Spaniards and Indians, and made the Chiriguanaes more courageous.[315]

And indeed, there were plenty of feathers, silk, and trappings, that dressed not only the 300 to 400 Spaniards that accompanied the viceroy in his journey, "la flor del Perú", but also those who went along with them, including numerous African slaves, a number of Catholic priests, and around 2,000 horses, and 1,500-3,000 auxiliary natives, and their Andean caciques who, all lined up, would march into the Chiriguanaes mountains in a formation that stretched several miles.[316] Banners, flags, and religious images would complete the colourful image. The noise of men and animals on the move would be accompanied by drums and Andean musical

[315] "la guerra que hizo el virrey a los yndios chiriguanaes no fue bien acordada de emprenderse por la horden que se hizo con tanto aparato de gente tan atauiada de vestidos y ornatos que no erán decentes ni de efeto para semejante enpresa de conquistar vnos saluages en tierra tan fragosa y aspera y para aquella jornada no auía para que fuese el uirrey en persona especial auiendo de lleuar como lleuo literas y otras cosas de grande enbaraco y haziendo tan ecesiua costa a vuestra magestad y a los españoles y naturales y poniendose a si y a todos en tan gran peligro por la falta que forsosamente auia de tener de mantenimientos y para el castigo de aquellos barbaros bastaua enbiar a algunos capitanes de los mas praticos de esta tierra que fueran con menos gente escogida y exercitada en estas entradas y con el aparejo y horden que se suele tener lo vuieran hecho como se requeria y lo pedia la disposición de la tierra y no· con plumas y sedas y arreos que acostunbran traerse en las guerras de cobardia y asi esta guerra· füe sin prouecho alguno y tan costosa y de tanto daño para españoles y para los yndios que estauan de paz que a sido grande lastima ver lo que an padecido todos en esta prouincia y fue enriquecer y dar animo a los chiriguanaes de mas de la autoridad". Carta de Lope Diez de Armendariz a SM, 25 de setiembre de 1576, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, vol. 1, 371.

[316] Toledo made the journey with between 300/400 men and 1,500/3,000 auxiliary natives see: Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, *Relación de la entrada a los chiriguanos* (Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Fundación Cultural "Ramón Darío Gutierrez," 1979 [1515]), 75; AGI, Patronato, 131, N1, R3, 1587, Información de los méritos y servicios de Hernando de Cazorla, maese de campo general, hechos en la conquista de Perú, sirviendo particularmente contra Gonzalo Pizarro y en varias batallas contra indios levantados, 10v; AGI, Patronato, 133, R5, 1591, Información de los méritos y servicios de Francisco de Guzmán y Juan de Rivamartín, que sirvieron en Nueva España y después pasaron a Perú hacia 1537 y se hallaron en la conquista de aquel reino y de los indios chiriguanaes, (image 194); AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Información del capitán Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, f. 2r; López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1569 – 1575)*, vol. 2, 25 de noviembre de 1574, 472; Barco Centenera, *Argentina y conquista del Rio de la Plata*, f. 126. For an approximate list of those who went with Almendras to the Chichas, and Toledo and Lozano Machuca to the Chiriguanaes, see the annex to this thesis.

instruments that brought sound to the animated yet still solemn crowd. As part of the set, Toledo was going to be carried in his own litter, surrounded by men in whom he had extreme confidence, and who were known among the other expedition members as "lions" probably reflecting both the animals present in the shield of Castile and these men's alleged ferocity in action. Close to them would be the Viceroy's "Paje de Guión" carrying the viceroy's coat of arms, a privilege only conceded to monarchs and their 'living images'.[317] As unreasonable as it sounded to Armendáriz, and he probably only echoed many others who shared his thoughts at the time, Toledo, the loyal royal official who had been involved in so many military engagements in Europe, would be carried in great fashion and display, emulating the battlefields of Flanders and Naples, to the Andean slopes where his expedition would encounter an exuberant environment and fierce indigenous peoples.

The expedition assembled, over a period of two weeks, in the valley of Yotala, not far from La Plata, from where it began marching on 2 June 1574 in a formation that could be seen from afar. It stopped first in a farm in the valley of Pocopoco to rebuild supplies, thereafter following the course of the Pilcomayo River. Although correctly timed, as it reached the river during the dry season, the expedition was still slowed down by a voluminous river that had not narrowed sufficiently to let men and animals cross safely, a reminder to Toledo that he was about to penetrate a geography totally alien to the Spanish.[318] It took the expedition a whole month to reach the intersection of Pilcomayo and Pilaya rivers, from where in July 1574 Toledo finally entered Chiriguanaes territories.[319] At that point, the Viceroy was increasingly frustrated with García Mosquera because of the time and effort involved to reach the border. García Mosquera was guiding the expedition with support from 'friendly'

[317] AGI, Lima, 213, N4, 1600, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Alvaro Ruíz de Navamuel, secretario de la gobernación del Perú y secretario de la Audiencia de Lima. Consta también la información de Sebastián Sánchez de Merlo, vecino de Lima, secretario de la Audiencia de Panamá, que marchó al Perú con Cristóbal Vaca de Castro, (image 138). -statement by Friar Gerónimo de Salcedo-; AGI, Lima, 212, N19, 1599, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Juan de Reinoso, paje del virrey Francisco de Toledo, vecino de Lima, pacificador de los chiriguanas en Charcas, luchó contra los ingleses en Panamá. Información y parecer de la Audiencia de Lima.

[318] AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, ff. 64r-64v. -statement by Augustinian friar Alonso de Torrejon-; AGI, Patronato, 235, R4, 1574, Relación de lo que se hizo en la jornada que el excelentisimo virrey del Piru Don Francisco de Toledo, (images 5-6); Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 163.

[319] Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 179.

Chiriguanaes.[320] Although they were key to any entrada, the participation of Chiriguanaes factions in such events has been largely overlooked, yet it is a reminder of how politically fractured the Chiriguanaes were and how the Spanish exploited their divisions to their own advantages and, how different Chiriguanaes groups manipulated the Spanish to attack rival factions.

At this point, Toledo became aware that perhaps the route followed on advice from García Mosquera was not the best choice and decided to dismiss him, sending him to Potosí, where he was kept under arrest.[321] García Mosquera's plan to avoid Tomina as the main route to reach and punish the Chiriguanaes had paid off and his allies at home were safe which was more than what the Viceroy could say about himself and his men. Toledo was in an insect-infested environment that was home not only to indigenous people who were hostile and elusive, but also to dangerous fauna and poisonous flora. Now solely relying on the experience and knowledge of the Chiriguanaes who had accompanied the viceroy, the expedition set up camp either at a site known as Chimbuy or in company of a Chiriguanaes leader of that name, as the sources are not clear in this regard.[322] The Viceroy's next mission would be to bring to the camp those Chiriguanaes leaders that had escaped La Plata, or any other with status among them, to force their submission to royal authority repeating political rituals that traditionally royal armies had followed elsewhere across the territories of the Catholic Monarchy.

In the meantime, don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa had left his encomienda base in Pojo with a group of 120 men, following the road to Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In contrast to Toledo's formation, don Gabriel carried with him well experienced men, including two leading Captains: Hernando de Cazorla and Melchor de Rodas. Veterans

[320] Pifarré mentions, without quoting any source, that Chiriguanaes were also guides. Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo*, vol. 2, 57.

[321] BNE, Ms 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al Gobierno de Indias, http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000023047&page=1, García Mosquera was eventually freed by the Audiencia de Charcas. AGI, Patronato, 235, R4, f. 8; Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 192.

[322] Roberto Levillier, *Gobernación de Tucumán. Probanzas de méritos y servicios de los conquistadores. Documentos del Archivo de Indias. (1583-1600)*, vol. 2 (Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1920), 569; AGI, Contaduria, 1805, 1575, Gastos de la guerra de los chiriguanaes. -Pliego 291-.

of the Peruvian Civil Wars, both had interests in the border area.[323] Don Gabriel's journey was not easy and there were a few skirmishes, but guidance and possible support from some Chiriguanaes factions, made the whole adventure less troubled. Still, he and his men never accomplished the task of taking any important prisoners for Toledo.

Although Toledo and his close allies were better sheltered from the harshness of the experience than others, life in the Viceroy's camp was a world away from the comforts of La Plata and the court of the King in Madrid. Large tents were erected, banners displayed, and an army of servants was constantly on the move, trying to turn a geography perceived by the Spanish as "aspera" and "fragosa" or rough, into something more agreeable. Daily routines were only interrupted for the occasional mass or other religious celebration hosted by one of the Franciscan or Augustinian priests that accompanied the Viceroy. Toledo decided to send Captain Juan Ortíz de Zárate and Maese de Campo don Luis de Toledo Pimentel to find the elusive Chiriguanaes leaders in their settlements and bring them 'to justice'. Both were, to the Viceroy's frustration, unsuccessful.[324] In preparation for the arrival of the Spanish, the Chiriguanaes had largely abandoned their settlements seeking refuge in the dense and impenetrable forests. They were also playing tricks with their visitors, leaving cauldrons with human remains behind, reminding the Spanish of their alleged cannibal credentials, or burning down their settlements, making it impossible for the Spanish to feed themselves and their animals.[325]

The expedition was connected to La Plata through a network of messengers and posts. Regular caravans of llamas brought the provisions that the viceregal camp constantly needed. The supply network depended on a small fortress that Captain Pedro de Zárate set up in the intersection of Pilaya and Paspaya Rivers, and the Chiriguanaes were aware of this. They began sporadic attacks on the fortress and

[323] AGI, Patronato, 131, N1, R3, 1587, Información de Hernando de Cazorla; ABNB, EC 1618. 1674, Probanza de Melchor de Rodas; Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 138.
[324] AGI, Patronato, 126, R18, 1582, Información de los méritos y servicios de Roque de Cuéllar y de su hijo Pedro, en la conquista y pacificación de Perú con el licenciado Gasca, persiguiendo además a los tiranos de aquel reino, (image 30) Statement by Francisco de Saavedra Ulloa; AGI, Patronato. 235. R 4, f. 5v.
[325] Lizárraga, *Descripción colonial*, libro segundo, 145.

managed to even put it under siege. At risk of losing such precious connection, Toledo was forced to send a small group of men to support Zárate and lift the pressure.[326] Without any hostages to take back for justice, and unable to even fight the Chiriguanaes, at this point it had become obvious that Toledo's large display in the Andean slopes had moved from epic to tragedy in a matter of months. Overwhelmed by food and water shortages, with auxiliary natives deserting the camp in growing numbers, morale hit a new low. To complicate matters, Toledo had contracted an illness and suffering from a high temperature, was almost delirious. [327]

Alarmed about the circumstances, the Audiencia de Charcas quickly assembled a rescue effort to bring Toledo and the expedition members back, this time using the shorter route through Tomina. A total of 2,000 llamas carrying food supplies accompanied with reinforcements were sent to provide the expedition with some relief. Still at the centre of the stage, Toledo was placed in his litter, and in company of his starving and gaunt men started his journey back from the Andean slopes, leaving behind a trail of bodies, dead horses and llamas, and numerous natives auxiliaries in captive in the hands of the Chiriguanaes.[328] Peru's most powerful man was a mere reflection of his pre-expedition self. Toledo went to the eastern slopes to defeat 'the cannibals', yet he left with these same indigenous peoples chasing him. As the curtain of the expedition's stage closed, the viceroy finally reached Tomina where he had to convalesce for many months before he could be back in operation and ready to deal with the legacy of his short jungle adventure, while what was left of the "flor del Perú" tried to regain strength after its shocking experience. It did very little for the reputation of those involved and for the image of the monarchy.

---

[326] AGI, Patronato, 124, R 11, 1580, Información de los méritos y servicios de don Fernando de Zárate en la conquista del reino de Perú, castigo y persecución de los indios chiriguanaes con don Francisco de Toledo. Son dos informaciones. Statement by Pedro de Zárate; Levillier, *Gobernación de Tucumán. Probanzas de méritos y servicios de los conquistadores. Documentos del Archivo de Indias. (1583-1600)*, vol. 2, -statement by Gutierre Velazquez de Ovando-, 568-569.

[327] An early seventeenth century chronicle refers to an ambush by the Chiriguanaes in which many Spaniards and over 500 auxiliary natives lost their lives as the final blow to the expedition. This is not mentioned anywhere else but might have prompted the end of the expedition. Ruy Díaz de Guzmán, *Relación de la entrada a los chiriguanos,* 74.

[328] Relación de la ciudad de Santa Cruz de la Sierra por su gobernador don Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa [1586] in Espada, *Relaciones geográficas de Indias: Perú*, vol. II, 166; AGI, Patronato, 237, R7, 1582, Información hecha por la justicia de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera, en virtud de Real Provisión, sobre la conducta y trato que observaban los indios chiriguanaes. -Statement by Miguel Martín-, f. 56v; Barco Centenera, *Argentina y conquista del Rio de la Plata*, f. 127.

8. The legacy of defeat

At the close of his long Visita General, Toledo was preparing his return to Spain and paid a visit to his physician Doctor Sánchez de Renedo in Lima. The years on the move had taken their toll on the viceroy who looked ill. Sánchez de Renedo stressed, as part of a wider enquiry into Toledo's health, "when his excellency arrived in this city [Lima] from the highland provinces this witness could not recognise him".[329] The King's living image had lost its lustre. As much as Audiencia de Charcas president Licenciado Pedro Ramírez de Quiñones tried to justify the expedition, explaining that it had helped to set free natives that the Chiriguanaes held captive and improved the knowledge the Spanish had of the area, the effort and expense involved plus the loss of unaccounted lives, were certainly worth more than a small group of captive natives who could have been traded with the Spanish and set free from the Chiriguanaes that way, and some limited geographical knowledge of settlements that were occasionally moved.[330] Although the viceroy had travelled into the Chiriguanaes with hopes of restoring confidence in the monarchy, he left with his own reputation and that of the monarchy temporarily in tatters.

While still in Peru, Toledo started hearing public criticism about his actions. This came from an unexpected quarter, in fact from a religious order that under clear instructions from its superiors did not take part in the expedition: the Jesuits.[331] As part of a large case that involved the Inquisition, papers with derogatory comments about Toledo's viceregal rule were found among the possessions of Jesuit Luis de López during his arrest over charges of raping the sister of Jesuit brother Martín Pizarro. In relation to the expedition, López accused Toledo of waging an unjust war that involved

[329] AGI, Patronato, 190, R25, 1578, Información recibida a petición del virrey de Perú, don Francisco de Toledo, sobre las enfermedades que padecía en aquel reino, y edad que tenía cuando fue a él. - statement by Sánchez de Renedo-, (image 4).
[330] Carta del Licenciado Pedro Ramírez de Quiñones a SM, 6 de mayo de 1575, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, vol. 1, 328.
[331] Jesuit father Joseph de Acosta went in effect only up to Pilcomayo River which was a form of limit that separated land seen as "land of indigenous peoples at war" "*Tierra de Indios de Guerra*" from the land of those who had been settled by the Spanish. León Lopetegui, *El Padre José de Acosta S.I. y las misiones* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 1942), 132.

great loss of life among the Spanish, Chiriguanaes and loyal indigenous peoples. Through such papers, López was voicing what many others were already thinking and commenting behind Toledo's back. The Viceroy penned his answer stressing how the expedition had a favourable outcome with the establishment of two new border towns -San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija and Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina- and the cessation of regular raids and attacks along the border by the Chiriguanaes, though this latter statement was a world away from reality.[332]

Many of the Viceroy's criados and clients -la flor del Perú- had gone on the entrada on the understanding that the merit of being there would result in some form of remuneration. As the King's alter-ego, Toledo shared royal authority with both Audiencias, that of Lima and Charcas, over the distribution and management of privileges and rewards.[333] Before leaving for his final journey to Spain, the Viceroy left clear instructions in a document over which rewards should be distributed among those loyal to the Catholic Monarchy during his period of office, and who should receive them. Although wrongly catalogued, the document dates from 1579, when Toledo still had two years left as viceroy, and includes a list of recipients who had accompanied him to the rough land of the Chiriguanaes. The rewards range from significant privileges such as the post of Corregidor of Cusco, given to don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa, to smaller ones such as permanent posts as members of companies of soldiers such as *Lanzas* or *Arcabuces*, or shares of revenues from vacant encomiendas. Privileges like those conceded by Toledo always reflected not only the recent history of merits of the beneficiaries but also their social status and ancestry.[334] As Juan de Matienzo said of such mercedes, "because such rewards are like water, that makes things grow; and although it is true that subjects and vassals are obliged to be loyal, serve and defend their prince and their land, they are also deserving of remuneration and rewards if, in order to defend land and prince, they fought and worked [hard]".[335] Many of these men would stay on in Charcas and Peru long after

[332] The document with Lopez's comments can be found in José Sancho Rayon and Francisco de Zabalburu, *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*, vol. XCIV (Madrid: M Ginesta y Hermanos, 1889), 479, 494; Sabine Hyland, *The Jesuit and the Incas: The Extraordinary Life of Padre Blas Valera, S.J*, (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003), 86.
[333] Clavero, "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia," 10.
[334] AGI, Patronato, 189, R26, 1569 [sic], 1579, Relaciones de las mercedes hechas por Francisco de Toledo, virrey de Perú, a los sujetos que se expresan en dichas relaciones.
[335] "porque este premio es como el agua, que hace crecer todas las cosas; y aunque sea verdad que los súbditos y vasallos son obligados a ser fieles, y servir y defender a su príncipe, y a su tierra, pero todavía

Toledo left, yet the rewards took a long time to materialise, if they did at all. In many cases the only record left is that of a few small paragraphs in a report of merits and services drafted by the relatives and descendants of these men years after the expedition.

Toledo continued to defend his record in the Chiriguanaes border mentioning how the monarchy's policy had been followed with the establishment of new towns. In effect, San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija had been founded, only to be moved to a new location after a brief period, one that was far enough from Chiriguanaes settlements to avoid regular raids. Sheltered by García Mosquera and his network, Tomina fared better. The town founded there, Santiago de la Frontera, had a more positive start, yet still faced the odd conflict with neighbouring Chiriguanaes factions. In fact, what Toledo's expedition demonstrated was that if the Catholic Monarchy was to extend, implement and consolidate its jurisdiction on the Charcas southeast border it had to rely on local knowledge, from Captains like Garcia Mosquera and his father-in-law Pedro de Segura Zavala who were part of larger groups that combined mestizos, poor Spaniards and even Chiriguanaes. They had the skills and tools to broker agreements in the politically fractured world of these natives.

9. The endless possibilities of a polycentric monarchy and the limits of its viceroy

The present chapter has tried to challenge an image of don Francisco de Toledo, built in the twentieth century, of a lawmaker, strategist, and state-builder, by rescuing from the past, a largely overseen chapter of his administration, that of his expedition to the Chiriguanaes in 1574. Through an approach that has prioritised the political culture of the time, which was largely imbued with theatrical representations and performativity, the chapter has aimed to portray a different image of Toledo, re-dimensioning the Viceroy's role, which presents an invitation to revise the

son más dignos de remuneración y que se les haga Mercedes sí, por defensión de la tierra e por su príncipe, hobieren peleado y trabaxado". Matienzo, *Gobierno del Perú*, 324.

historiographical treatment of his time as viceroy of Peru. In doing so, this chapter has exposed the limitations Toledo faced, proposing a revision of scholarly views that see Catholic Monarchy rule in a top-down manner, with a monarchy and a legion of unchallenged royal officials dictating and implementing legislation, suggesting the value of a more bottom-up localised approach. Toledo had to adapt his plans as he faced new obstacles and was forced to debate and seek consensus for a costly large-scale entrada against the backdrop of unwilling encomenderos, Audiencia de Charcas judges who stood on the side watching the tragedy unfold, a mestizo Captain with his own agenda, and Chiriguanaes groups who, despite being taken hostage, always remained in control of the whole situation. Toledo had to negotiate the monarch's presence in Charcas and was forced to make adjustments in line with the needs and aspirations of local elites. In this political environment, as the King's living image approached the humid and dense Eastern slopes, the outcome of the poorly conceived expedition was predictable. Madness was the moment of truth for the delirious viceroy. Toledo was lucky to escape the Chiriguanaes alive.

His defeat was not only a personal blow but was also the last occasion a Peruvian viceroy ventured into Charcas. The monarchy would find other ways of making itself present in these remote borders, without having to tacitly, or explicitly, give its consent to the exposure of the King's alter-ego to dangerous conditions, playing an out-of-date role of conquistador or adelantado. With the expansion of villages and towns along the border, the land would become 'politically equipped' with cabildos, captains, lieutenants, and corregidores and the King would expand his jurisdiction. This was a process that because of the polycentric and flexible character of the monarchy and its laws, indirectly and surprisingly, involved the Chiriguanaes who continued to resist and oppose Spanish jurisdiction with their inter-factional conflicts and the trade in captive lowland natives, often with the endorsement and even involvement of Catholic Monarchy agents along the border. The monarchy accepted that the border was a land of warrying indigenous peoples, 'tierra de indios de guerra', and politically incorporated that reality in policies that constantly shifted from violence through minor expeditions, to attempts to evangelise these indigenous groups. As elusive and hostile as they were, in the King's eyes, the Chiriguanaes were still indigenous peoples and in exercise of the arrangements between the monarchy and the

Catholic church, it was understood that he had a right to punish and bring Catholic instruction to those indigenous groups.

Toledo's defeat was seen a personal failure and not a structural problem of a global monarchy that always struggled to integrate politically fractured groups such as the Chiriguanaes, who inhabited an environment that apart from farming only offered little else than a life of discomfort for Spaniards and mestizos prepared to live there. Toledo had been commissioned the task of running Peru as the King's living image and a long residencia or review process would wait for him in Spain. It would hopefully give those involved in the expedition the chance to vent their grievances. It would also save the monarchy name and reputation allowing for the body politic to separate a minister from the actual monarchy, to separate bad or good government from the political fiction of the monarch as just and loving that it tried so hard to keep going. It would, finally, foster the illusion that while royal officials could be good or bad and came and went, the Catholic Monarchy would never cease to exist and always had the best interest of its vassals at heart, securing its endurance and resilience for many centuries to come.[336]

Toledo had been preparing his return to Spain from the moment he landed in Peru in 1569. To please his master, King Philip II, he had sent not only manuscripts, but paintings or *paños* depicting the rulers of Tahuantinsuyu, bezoar stones, ceramic bowls, and golden idols.[337] As much as Toledo pursued a meeting with Philip II, this never happened. The former Viceroy of Peru who was once the most powerful man in the troubled viceroyalty, the strategist and organiser, was kept in Lisbon, as far from the Madrid court as possible, until a short time before his death in Escalona on 21 April 1582. His residencia process continued for years.[338]

[336] Herzog, *Ritos de control*, 51.
[337] Catherine Julien, "History and Art in Translation: The Paños and Other Objects Collected by Francisco de Toledo," *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (1999): 61–89.
[338] Zimmerman, *Francisco de Toledo. Fifth Viceroy of Peru. 1569-1581*, 274-275.

Chapter Four

‘Miniature politics’: The Audiencia de Charcas and Juan Lozano Machuca’s expedition in 1584-1585

“quien fue para ganar la tierra, también será para gobernarla, tan bien como otros y aún mejor, por el mejor derecho, práctica y obligación que para ello tienen”.

“those who went to conquer the land, could also rule it, as well or even better than others, because of their use of law, practice and duty that they have for it”.

Don Bernardo Vargas Machuca. 1599.[1]

“y sabe este testigo que en las cosas de la guerra de yndios [Pedro Segura Zavala] es hombre platico [sic] y que les trata muy bien porque este testigo a venido en su compania por tierra de guerra”

“and this witness knows that in matters of warring Indians [Pedro Segura Zavala] is a practical man as he treats them very well, because this witness has travelled in his company across land at war”.

Captain Gaspar de Rojas. 1581.[2]

1. Introduction

In this chapter, the thesis moves from a viceroy’s embellished journey to the Chiriguanaes, to an expedition undertaken by one of that same viceroy’s many criados; and from Toledo’s ‘travelling court’ to the permanent stage that was the court around the Audiencia de Charcas. It also shifts from the vast geography that Toledo covered

[1] Don Bernardo Vargas Machuca, *Milicia y descripción de las Indias*, vol. 1, 2 vols. (Madrid: Libreria de Victoriano Suárez, 1892 [1599]), 48.
[2] AGI, Patronato, 125. R4, 1582, Probanza de Pedro de Segura. -Statement by witness Gaspar de Rojas- (image 31).

in his Visita General, to the space strictly under the jurisdiction of the Audiencia de Charcas. This chapter offers a more localised study of the political dynamics of post-Toledan Charcas, challenging views developed in the nineteenth century that see the Catholic Monarchy at the time as a centralising and centralised authority.[3] It further questions this view that contrasts political centres versus peripheries, as it is being inappropriate given the dynamics of the period that clearly emphasise the monarchy's polycentric character. In effect in this composite monarchy the King was monarch of each political entity individually and had a special connection with each of his possessions and the populations living in them.[4] In this regard it could be suggested, as this thesis shows so far, that there were as many centres as agents, and that laws and authority were negotiated at a local level. Through the process of confirmation, settlement and expansion of jurisdiction already described in chapters above, the Catholic Monarchy downscaled the political space, handing its agents a high degree of independence, which also sheltered its reputation and image from any criticism that might result from their actions. Any wrongdoing found through a residencia process, or a trial, would be the result of 'bad government', '*mal gobierno*', and would have little to do with the monarchy itself that would avoid any bad judgement.[5] Authority was therefore not negotiated between the centre and periphery, but within any of the multiple centres that were part of this global entity, through localising laws and regulations, and adapting them to diverse circumstances. The concept of miniature politics encapsulates this process and was behind the Catholic Monarchy's adaptability and endurance. This chapter explores in detail the different tensions and multiple agendas behind the groups involved in the discussions and organisation of a new large-scale war effort against the Chiriguanes at a critical time for Peru in general, and Charcas in particular.

The death of the successor of don Francisco de Toledo as Peru's viceroy, don Martín Enríquez de Almanza y Ulloa, in 1583, left the Catholic Monarchy's wealthiest and most challenging viceroyalty, without a head, replicating the situation that prevailed in the mid-1560s. In Peru, the two Audiencias of Lima and Charcas would

[3] On the discussion over centralisation as a critical feature of the 'state' see António Manuel Hespanha, *Vísperas del Leviatán. Instituciones y poder político. (Portugal, siglo XVII).* Trans. Fernando Jesús Bouza Alvarez (Madrid: Taurus, 1989), Introducción; Ruiz Ibáñez, *Las dos caras de Jano,* 360.
[4] Javier Barrientos Grandón, *El gobierno de las Indias*, 100.
[5] Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho,* 100, 105; MacLachlan, *Spain's Empire in the New World*, 125.

quarrel over their jurisdictions as they had done two decades earlier. However, during those two decades the Audiencia de Charcas had consolidated its position and by the early 1580s and in the absence of a viceroy would have an excellent opportunity to demonstrate this. Because of growing attacks and raids by the Chiriguanaes, partly blamed on Toledo's expedition's defeat, the Audiencia immediately took control of some viceregal matters, including the organisation of an expedition to the border lands with three separate forces. Two of the forces would be headed by persons mentioned in Chapter Three: the governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra at the time, Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa, and the founder and Corregidor of Tarija, Luis de Fuentes y Vargas. Because of their official positions, they had jurisdiction over two different sections of the border, the first along the east of the Chiriguanaes border for Santa Cruz de la Sierra and the second south of the border for Tarija where they both had the duty to protect indigenous peoples and Spaniards from the Chiriguanaes. A third force would be headed by someone without any Charcas border experience, one of Toledo's criados, Juan Lozano Machuca. His participation in this punitive campaign has been given a low profile by historiography of the period, yet Lozano Machuca played a key role in supplying the funding that was needed to bring the Audiencia's campaign into fruition.[6] Ambitious and lettered, Lozano Machuca was the perfect viceregal courtier, yet he was certainly not someone suitable for a border expedition. A royal official based in Potosí, with access to royal funds, Lozano Machuca saw in an entrada an opportunity to gain wealth and status and was a good candidate for providing the necessary support.

The chapter shows how at a challenging time the Audiencia de Charcas temporarily moved from the largely consultive and subordinated role under Viceroy Toledo to a more executive one as it had done not long after its establishment two decades earlier. The previous chapter has shown how the Audiencia de Charcas judges were consulted and largely endorsed the Toledo's decisions, with the knowledge that they would be sheltered from any political repercussions. As much as the Audiencia de Charcas judges and its president cherished the opportunities offered by the absence of a viceroy, this chapter shows them in the spotlight, again, as it had happened in the 1560s. However, in the 1560s the Audiencia de Charcas had only begun to settle its

[6] Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo*, 79; Saignes and Combès, *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*, 56; García Recio, *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera*, 103.

jurisdiction and was able to rely on the local encomendero group, something that was impossible in the 1580s. By then encomiendas had ceased to be a major source of wealth, being replaced by a diversified pool of economic activities that included farming and mining, while many encomiendas had returned to the Crown, after the enjoyment of two lives of their initial recipients had expired. Although the Audiencia struggled with similar issues as Toledo faced in organising his expedition, without a wealthy and ambitious encomendero class to rely upon, it had to cope with more modest support. Toledo was, for instance, able to use the windfall of quintos reales from Potosí's silver boom to finance his expedition. The Audiencia would have to resort to a smaller source of revenue: the *caja de granos* of Potosí, a coffer that gathered the contributions made by Indigenous miners to cover various administrative expenses in the Imperial Village. Lozano Machuca would hand the keys to that coffer in exchange for his participation in an entrada which he probably believed would give him fame and glory. Constant delays mired Lozano Machuca's expedition from the start. Poor preparation and a hostile environment ended Lozano Machuca's role at the helm of the entrada in the end. It seems that the southeast border of Charcas did not need any more wars of 'feathers, silks, and trappings'. Instead, it needed "practical men", as one contemporary said, with a more down-to-earth approach, who were ready to negotiate and, if necessary, fight.[7] Their political journey would transform these 'soldiers' into 'vecinos', and eventually into royal agents, settling them in remote parts of Charcas.[8]

2. A body without its head

News of the appointment of New Spain viceroy don Martín Enriquez de Almanza y Ulloa as the sixth viceroy of Peru on 26 May 1580 was probably what a homesick and ill don Francisco de Toledo had been waiting to hear for a long time. Toledo would be able to retire and start a new period of his life, dedicated to meditation and rest in Spain, after twelve long years at the helm of the Catholic Monarchy's most

[7] AGI, Patronato, 125, R4, Pedro de Segura. (1582) -statement by witness Gaspar de Rojas- (image 31).
[8] This analysis excludes Paraguay that was run by an adelantado between 1540 and 1593, who was appointed directly by the monarch and over who the Audiencia de Charcas and the viceroy of Perú had very little influence. This created a distinctive political culture in the district. Dario G Barriera, *Abrir puertas a la tierra: microanálisis de la construcción de un espacio político: Santa Fe, 1573-1640* (Santa Fe (Argentina): Museo Histórico Provincial Brigadier Estanislao López, 2017), 110, 113.

troublesome and wealthiest viceroyalty. Enriquez being 72 years old, unwell, and tired, was extremely disappointed as he had been longing for a quieter life at home in Valladolid. Toledo could not wait and left Peru three days before Enriquez's arrival, perhaps fearing that his replacement might never arrive.[9]

Don Martín Enriquez de Almanza was brother of the Marqués de Alqueñizes, descendant of don Francisco Enrique de Amanza who had been given the title of Marqués under the Emperor Charles V, and had years of experience in a viceregal post when he arrived in Peru.[10] His time at the helm of Peru would be brief and as a result he only managed to review some of the measures taken by his predecessor and was mainly focused on what he saw as a priority, trying to overcome the rift that Toledo had created with the Jesuits.[11] The instructions from the monarch to Enriquez do not mention the Chiriguanaes border.[12] However, a cédula real from just before Toledo's 1574 expedition, only acknowledged by Enriquez's predecessor four years later in 1578, confirmed the use of peaceful means to settle and evangelise indigenous group hostile to Spanish presence, insisting that entradas should be seen as 'pacification efforts'.[13] How such pacification efforts would be conducted remains unclear, yet cédulas reales were only for guidance and open to interpretation, although in this case because of its late acknowledgement, it was probably set aside as another example of 'I obey, but do not execute'.

In New Spain Enriquez had overseen the continuation of the implementation of the royal policy known as '*presidio system'* along the border with the Chichimeca, a group of indigenous peoples the Spanish regularly compared with the Chiriguanaes. The system, begun by New Spain's second viceroy, don Luis de Velasco (1550-1564), consisted of fortifying strategically located villages and towns. It reached its peak

[9] Philip Wayne Powell, "Portrait of an American Viceroy: Martín Enríquez, 1568-1583," *The Americas* 14, no. 1 (July 1957): 22.
[10] Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI. El virrey Martin Enriquez 1581-1583,* vol. 9, XIII.
[11] See Chapter Three, page 122 in this thesis.
[12] Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI. El virrey Martin Enriquez 1581-1583,* vol. 9, 10-33.
[13] Provisión en que se declara la orden que se ha de tener en las Indias, en nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones que en ellas se hizieren [1573] in García-Gallo and Encinas, *Cedulario indiano o cedulario de Encinas*, Vol IV, 232-246; Carta del virrey Toledo a SM, 18 de abril de 1578, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI. El Virrey Francisco de Toledo. 1577-1580*, vol. 6, 66-67.

during Enriquez's period, most likely due to the viceroy's decision to follow the advice in the conclusions of the Junta Magna, discussed in the previous chapter, that recommended the use of fortifications as opposed to outright confrontation, in order to keep the 'land in peace' or 'quieta'.[14] It seems reasonable to suggest that Enriquez's approach to the Chiriguanaes border might have been the same, trying to build on Toledo's limited success with the establishment of two towns: San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija and Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina. However, neither Enriquez's policy in New Spain, nor Toledo's two new towns seemed to have placated Chichimecas and Chiriguanaes and both regions were about to experience a period of violence such as they had never seen before.[15]

3. The southeast borders engulfed in jurisdictional conflicts

San Bernardo de Tarija was originally planned to be founded in March 1574. One month after that date, as settlers were trying to erect their new homes, the first attack by the Chiriguanaes took place, forcing the town's founder, Captain Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, who had arranged the foundation with viceroy Toledo, to move the settlement to a new site, largely in line with these natives' wishes. This was 75kms from the nearest Chiriguanaes settlement, and between 25 and 30kms from the area they saw as their border with the Spanish.[16] Life in the new settlement that looked more like a fortress -a presidio- was tough and half of its residents fled only a few months after the town was moved. This prompted a series of regulations by Tarija

[14] Antonio F. García-Abásolo, *Martín Enríquez y la reforma de 1568 en Nueva España*, (Sevilla: Excelentísima. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1983), Chapter XIII; Philip W. Powell, "Presidios and Towns on the Silver Frontier of New Spain. 1550-1580," *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (1944): 181, 187; Cédula dirigida al Virrey del Perú, cerca de la orden que ha de tener y guardar en los nuevos descubrimientos y poblaciones que diere, assi por mar como por tierra, 1568, in García-Gallo and Encinas, *Cedulario indiano o cedulario de Encinas*, Vol IV, 229-232.

[15] Carlos Lázaro Avila, *Las fronteras de América y los "Flandes Indianos,"* (Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, Departamento de Historia de América, 1997), 61.

[16] Fray Antonio Comajuncosa and Fray Alejandro Corrado, *El colegio franciscano de Tarija y sus misiones. Noticias históricas recogidas por dos misioneros del mismo colegio.* (Quaracchi: Tipografía del Colegio de San Buenaventura, 1884), 9; AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, 1598, Información de del capitán Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, (images 71 and 193); Saignes, "Andaluces en el poblamiento del oriente Boliviano, 182; BNE, Ordenanzas y comisiones para el reino de Granada y obispado de Quito, Ms 3,043, 176; Carta del oidor de la Audiencia de Charcas Juan de Matienzo a SM, 4 de enero de 1579, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, vol. 1, 483; Oliveto, "Ocupación territorial," 190.

corregidor Luis de Fuentes y Vargas that banned any vecinos from staying away from Tarija for more than fifty days, or otherwise face the loss of ownership of their land. With the town now outside Chiriguanaes territory, a delegation of them visited the Spanish settlement opening up a period that constantly shifted between peaceful coexistence and trade, and hostility and war.[17]

The situation in Toledo's northern border town, Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina, was no different. Established by the civil wars veteran Captain Melchor de Rodas, the new settlement's founding date remains a mystery, yet knowing that the area was Toledo's initial resting point after his own expedition to the Chiriguanaes, it seems likely to have been established in July 1574.[18] Rodas was a controversial character with frequent problems with the law and a defiant attitude, and his approach to the Chiriguanaes was different from Fuentes y Vargas, and for some time it paid off.[19] Chiriguanaes delegations would come and stay, sometimes for days, engaging in business that would involve the exchange of gifts and goods. Honey, rhea eggs, and fish were swapped for knives, scissors, clothing, and seashells, although a more lucrative trade took place too, as native captives of the Chiriguanaes, were also exchanged. Despite such exchanges, Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina did not escape the same fate as San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija and would alternate between times of relative peace and moments of pronounced hostility.[20]

Through the establishment of such towns, extending, and sharing jurisdiction with characters like Fuentes y Vargas and Rodas, the Catholic Monarchy was in effect acknowledging a 'de facto' situation as some captains already had a presence in the

[17] San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija was finally established on 4 July 1574. Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, *Historia de Tarija. Corpus documental,* xx.

[18] A document dating 27 July 1574 of the sale of a farm in La Plata to Polo Ondegardo refers to Melchor de Rodas as Corregidor of Santiago de la Frontera. ABNB, EP19, Venta de huerta que hace Melchor de Rodas a Polo Ondegardo, ff. 322v-323v; Weaver Olson gives 1575 as a date. Weaver Olson, "A Republic of Lost Peoples," 321.

[19] Rodas had various long-standing legal cases with other characters including one with Garci de Orellana. This original case is missing, yet from the Audiencia de Charcas' 'Libro de Acuerdos' it can be guessed that involved a partnership over a mine. López Villalva, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1569 – 1575),* vol. 2, 30 de octubre de 1570, 143. Another document sheds light on this case putting a location to the mine, called Chumbe, in Berenguela. ABNB, EP16, Convenio para trueque de mina, 8 de octubre de 1572, 195v-197v.

[20] ABNB, EC 1618, 1674, Probanza de Melchor de Rodas, f. 2v; AGI, Patronato, 235, R7, 1582, Información hecha por la justicia de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera, en virtud de Real Provisión, sobre la conducta y trato que observaban los indios chiriguanaes, ff, 12v, 12r, 44v.

border region where they had their own political allies, including Spaniards, mestizos, and more importantly, factions of the Chiriguanaes. This exposed the towns and their vecinos to the constant infighting within the Chiriguanaes, a politically fragmented indigenous group. These internal conflicts were imported into the border Spanish settlements, which, as a result, remained precarious and fragile. Because posts such as those handed to these captains were understood as commissions, and not as bureaucratic jobs as they became centuries later, they were only subject to vague and open-to-interpretation guidelines that were stipulated in their jobs' titles, and as far as the monarchy was concerned it was down to their holders to find the best way to keep the borders at peace. This meant that if anything went wrong, as it did many times, these captains could be removed or reprimanded on grounds of poor administration leaving the monarchy's reputation intact. These border captains were nonetheless aware that to keep their jurisdictions trouble-free and survive in the border they had to be involved in the conflictive political life of the Chiriguanaes and their inter-faction wars. Conversely, this allowed these indigenous groups to manipulate border captains against one another and drag them into their own conflicts. This approach to the border transformed the area into a permanent war zone where Spanish presence was only limited to the strength of such captains and their alliances and only along some discontinued and sometimes overlapping zones that matched their jurisdictions thereby creating 'miniature political spaces' that did not have clear boundaries.[21]

Some scholarly views attribute the wave of hostilities along the Chiriguanaes border in the early 1580s to a ban by the Audiencia de Charcas on trade of captive indigenous peoples and an alleged lack of understanding by the Spanish of the dynamics of inter-faction Chiriguanaes relations that impeded the Spanish to exploit the politically fragmented indigenous peoples to their advantage.[22] This thesis shows that bans never worked and the Spanish along the border were more than aware of the inter-faction dynamics of the Chiriguanaes, with many married to mestizas seen as their distant relatives. It is suggested here that tensions in the period were in fact high due to two factors. One was the lack of labour for farms that were appearing in fertile valleys along the southeast Charcas borders. These estates had mushroomed in the

[21] Hespanha, *La gracia del derecho*, 100, 102.
[22] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 315-316, 322-323.

valleys of Cochabamba, Mizque, Tomina, Oroncota and Tarija from the 1560s.[23] The other issue was the regular raids by Chiriguanaes that were an impediment to the cultivation and exploitation of land that could be used for agriculture production. The period saw the emergence of a new economy in the Andes, one centred around the expansion of silver mining in Potosí, thanks to the introduction of the amalgamation process by Toledo.[24] This booming mining economy created a demand for valuable resources found in the borders, largely timber and maize.[25] Valleys within reach of La Plata and Potosí were good for grazing of animals, cereal production, and timber logging, yet they also lacked sustainable agriculture and labour.[26] A vecino in the area probably summarises this better stressing that by then the southeast border was home to

> A large number of cattle farms from where meat is supplied and its pastures are for llamas to graze, those that carry mineral from Cerro Rico in Potosí to the *Yungas*, and from the border also come large volumes of timber and charcoal needed for the smelters that melt down His Majesty's *quintos* and for other metal works, and the border's farms provide large quantities of corn, wheat, wine, honey, among other supplies and large amounts of fish.[27]

As hazardous as farming had become, the Spanish needed labour, land, and resources and were prepared to find a solution to gain access to them. However, this also boosted tensions with the Chiriguanaes who were reluctant to accept Spanish settlements near their lands and were certainly not prepared to be subject to farm work. They could, nonetheless, supply labour by exchanging captive lowland natives with

---

[23] Weaver Olson, "A Republic of Lost Peoples," 62.
[24] Carlos Sempat Assadourian, *El sistema de la economía colonial. Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico* (Lima: IEP, 1982), 297.
[25] Jane E. Mangan, *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí*, Latin America Otherwise (Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2005), 30.
[26] A document from the late sixteenth century states the types of trees species that were regularly exploited: *Tipuana tipu* or *Tipa*; *Soto* or *Schinopsis brasiliensis*; and *Cedros* or cedar trees. AGI, Patronato, 136, N1, R4, 1596, Información de Méritos y Servicios de Juan Ladrón de Leyba, f. 70r.
[27] "con gran seguridad gran cantidad de estancias de ganado maior y menor donde se bastece de carne y en los pastos de la dicha frontera pastan la mayor cantidad de carneros de la tierra que bajan el metal del cerro rrico de la villa de potossi a los yungas y de la dicha frontera se proveen de gran cantidad de madera y de carbon para las fundiciones de los reales quintos y demas herrerias y ansimismo se proveen de las chacaras de la dicha frontera de gran cantidad de maiz ttrigo vino miel y otros bastimentos y pescado en gran cantidad" in Biblioteque Nacionale de France (hereafter BNF), MS Espagnol 175, Carta del Capitán Juan Ladrón de Leyba, Without date but possibly from early in the 1590s, f. 90r.

the Spanish, yet this was limited by their own willingness to do this. Toledo's significant defeat only confirmed that they were the truly owners of the border area, as the Spanish were about to learn.

The intensification of the raids by Chiriguanaes groups took place in two phases. Initially, the attacks were centred on travellers on the precarious paths that connected Santa Cruz de la Sierra and La Plata. They would do the journey accompanied by an armed escort and carried plenty of supplies, aware of the risks involved. Religious orders became more active in the area in late 1570s, largely a result of Toledo's insistence on a stronger presence of priests among indigenous peoples. One key religious order with a long tradition of work along borders of the Catholic Monarchy were the Mercedarians, who in Europe were involved in the release of Christians from their Muslim captors. Their presence in the southeast Charcas border area, where they worked closely with Spanish settlers, probably related to the fact that indigenous peoples were regularly being kept as captives by the Chiriguanaes. This poses the question as to how their presence was perceived by the Chiriguanaes and how it could alter the fragile border environment where tensions over labour and captive indigenous peoples were always high. Priests frequently contributed to the establishment of indigenous peoples in permanent settlements, something the Chiriguanaes fiercely opposed, and they were probably perceived as intruders in the world of Chiriguanaes-Spanish settler relations. Religious orders normally travelled in small groups, which made them more vulnerable to attack. This was exactly what happened to the Mercedarian friar Cristóbal de Albarrán who in 1581 was murdered along those who were accompanying him on a journey back to La Plata.[28] The picture below, painted over a century later, depicts that event and the martyrdom of the other Mercedarian priests.[29]

[28] Albarrán's presence in Charcas had been limited to the area of Asunción and Santa Cruz de la Sierra where he had been focused on the evangelisation of the Guaraní/Chiriguanaes. Fray Pedro Nolasco Pérez, *Religiosos de la merced*, 298-299.

[29] The painting in the Mercedarian convent in Cusco -see below- depicts Albarrán's martyrdom, as the event was re-interpreted in the following centuries, based on a new perception of Spanish America's borders that Alejandro Cañeque has called "the wild paganism martyrdom borders". Documents from the time of Albarrán's death suggest that he was murdered whilst on a journey, the actual circumstances, whether it happened when he was preaching among indigenous peoples in the area at the time or simply passing by, are less clear. The painting is now in Cusco because it was the provincial hub of the religious order from where their activities between Cusco and Tucumán were overseen. AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos y diligencias hechas por la Audiencia de La Plata, sobre los daños, muertes y robos que los indios chiriguanaes cometían en aquellas fronteras, y guerra que contra ellos se ha pregonado. Contienen

Illustration 3. Anonymous painting representing the martyrdom of Albarrán and other Mercedarian priests. Probably dating from the eighteenth century. La Merced convent of Cusco. With compliments to Mercedarian Friar Elthon Pacheco and Carlos Piccone Camere.

A second recorded attack took place on a caravan headed by Captain Hernando de Salazar and thirty men who were travelling from La Plata to Santa Cruz de la Sierra. They were escorting doña Elvira Manrique de Lara and her mother, doña María de Angulo, the former being the widow of Captain Ñuflo de Chaves, conquistador and founder of Santa Cruz de la Sierra. During the attack María de Angulo lost her life.[30] Elvira and María had been kept away from Santa Cruz de la Sierra where, as described in Chapter Three, don Diego de Mendoza, who was a relative, had rebelled in Toledo's

estos autos las capitulaciones y asiento que se tomó con el capitán Miguel Martínez [sic], sobre la población de la villa de San Miguel de la Laguna y lo que en ella sucedió, ff. 1v, 37v, 43v, 49r; British Library (hereafter BL), Ms 13,977, Memoria de las casas y conventos y doctrinas que tiene la horden de Nuestra Señora de Nuestra Merced en las Yndias del Peru, [undated, probably from early in the seventeenth century], f. 99; Alejandro Cañeque, *Un imperio de mártires: Religión y poder en las fronteras de la Monarquía Hispánica*, (Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2020), 22.

[30] On Chaves see Chapter 2, pages 71-72 in this thesis. Hernando de Salazar was married to one daughter of Francisco de Mendoza (1515-1547), deputy-governor of Paraguay. The other daughter who married Captain Ñuflo de Chaves was doña Elvira Manrique de Lara. This explains his presence escorting the caravan. On Salazar: AGI, Charcas, 94, N19, 1589, Probanza de Hernando de Salazar, ff. 236v-296v.

time. Now with don Diego executed and Toledo back to Spain, the Audiencia de Charcas allowed their passage to Santa Cruz de la Sierra. In the fatal attack, the Chiriguanaes also took 300 horses, and goods worth over 25,000 pesos, an enormous sum at the time.[31] The horses and other goods seized were more than enough to make this group an attractive target for the Chiriguanaes who probably knew who was travelling as part of the caravan and what was being transported. The attack certainly magnified the threat that the Chiriguanaes posed to the Spanish residents along the border sending a clear message about who was in control of the area. This was a heavy blow to the high local elite as the family in question was one of the most respected and well known across Charcas. In this case, it prompted not a painting, but a poem. Written by Extremadura-born cleric and traveller Martín del Barco Centenera in the early seventeenth century, it describes this event and how it was perceived by contemporaries

> In that sad hour the direct loss of all
>
> Was Doña María Angulo whose corpse,
>
> Struck by a hundred shafts and lances fell
>
> In the main's thick; living, this lovely lady
>
> Was cause of intrigues and rebellions,
>
> By passions caused; too fond of power was she,
>
> In manner overbearing, so that all
>
> She had dissensions with, or enmities[32]

[31] AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos, ff. 36v, 43v, 47v, 50v.

[32] Martín del Barco Centenera, *The Argentine and the Conquest of the River Plate* (Buenos Aires: Instituto Cultural Water Owen, 1965), Canto XXV, 432.

"Fenece aqui la triste su triste hora,

Cubierta de mil flechas y harpones,

Doña Maria de Angulo causadora

De motines, rebueltas, y pasiones,

Amiga de mandar, y tan señora,

Que con todos tramava dissensiones".

With the Chiriguanaes clearly in control of the paths between La Plata and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, from 1582 onwards a new phase of attacks, this time raids targeting farms along the Andean piedmont valleys, followed. One of such incident gives a glimpse of the world of 'miniature politics' showing the involvement of Spanish captains with Chiriguanaes factions and how feuds between different captains, mainly over jurisdiction, frequently created more conflict.

Captain Melchor de Rodas was succeeded as corregidor of Tomina early in the 1580s by Captain Pedro de Segura Zavala, who was father-in-law of Captain García Mosquera, who has already been discussed in Chapter Three as Toledo's guide in his entrada to the Chiriguanaes in 1574. Segura Zavala and García Mosquera were therefore part of a same family group settled in Tomina, the area where Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina had been established by Rodas a few years earlier. Both Segura Zavala and García Mosquera had family links with the Guarani/Chiriguanaes. Segura Zavala was married to Jinebra Martínez de Irala, mestiza daughter of Captain Domingo Martínez de Irala, who had been governor of the Rio de la Plata. García Mosquera was mestizo himself as his mother had been Chiriguanaes/Guaraní. Segura Zavala and García Mosquera were after consolidating their authority over the border, using their Chiriguanaes connections, which Rodas, who was a favourite of Toledo, until then opposed.

Rodas was succeeded as Corregidor of Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina by Segura Zavala possibly after Toledo's departure from Peru. This political change in Tomina proved challenging for both the Spanish as well as their Chiriguanaes allies. Following a raid, and unable to find those responsible, Segura Zavala decided to wait for the Chiriguanaes to visit Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina hoping to arrest them threatening to keep them hostage until those who have robbed and pillaged farms in the area returned the captives and goods they had taken. Segura Zavala was clearly under pressure from Spanish farmers who wanted their looted possessions back.

Barco Centenera, *Argentina y conquista del Rio de La Plata,* f. 210r.

However, it was not his Chiriguanaes allies who were arrested but other Chiriguanaes who were visiting Rodas. In the documentary record those arrested are presented using stereotypical views that the Spanish constructed around the Chiriguanaes, yet nothing is said about Segura Zavala's own allies and relatives who are kept hidden in the narrative. The whole incident is very revealing of the types of political dynamics that characterised border areas which were not based on identity, as all captains, including Rodas, had allies among Chiriguanaes factions, but on political agency. The boundaries were also blurred. Segura Zavala spoke the language of Chiriguanaes fluently and his loyalties were mixed as were those of Rodas. This was not just a conflict between Chiriguanaes and Spaniards, but one over jurisdiction, involving on the one hand Segura Zavala and his network, and Rodas and his allies, on the other hand. They were fighting over who was the most powerful leader to effectively expand the jurisdiction of the Catholic Monarchy jurisdiction along the border. Disputes over jurisdiction included different Chiriguanaes factions who were probably aware of the political dynamics. Fearing an escalation of the conflict, the Audiencia de Charcas finally stepped in, just to keep the land 'quieta', and commissioned an official enquiry into the matter.[33] As had happened with Toledo's hostages in the decade before, the imprisoned Chiriguanaes eventually escaped.

In a report on his merits and services in later years, Melchor de Rodas referred to this event as an example of how to make a bad situation worse accusing Segura Zavala of wrongly imprisoning Chiriguanaes. Rodas was obviously referring to his own allies. Reading beyond the Chiriguanaes-Spaniards divide, the episode offers a glimpse into the problems caused by often juxtaposed jurisdictions. In effect, although not Corregidor of Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina at the time, Rodas was still someone of importance as the village's founder and in his view the arrest of his Chiriguanaes allies was an affront to him and added tension to a situation that was already complicated because of the raids. Aware of this, the Audiencia realised that it had to step in, not only to contain the Chiriguanaes, but also to ease the tension between different Spaniards, each with their claim to jurisdiction over the border because of either, their status as founder of Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina (Rodas), or because of their seniority in the area and family ties (Segura Zavala).

[33] AGI, Patronato, 235, R7, 1582, Información; ABNB, EC 1618, 1674, Probanza de Melchor de Rodas, f. 2a.

Concerned about the deteriorating situation along the southeast Charcas border, in December 1582, the President of the Audiencia de Charcas, Licenciado Cepeda wrote to viceroy Enriquez. Clearly preparing for some form of punitive action, Cepeda suggested that the Chiriguanaes should be given status of natives 'subject to servitude', *sujetos a servidumbre*, based on what he saw of their actions along the border. This would transform them into enemies of the Catholic Monarchy and Christianity, and justify entradas against them, at no cost to the monarch. The new status of these Indians would create an incentive for Spaniards to launch attacks, seize captives, and secure extra farm labour.[34] His advice, as the one provided by the Audiencia judges during the Toledo administration a decade early, was only for guidance. Unfortunately, Enriquez's answer is missing from the records, but the viceroy passed away shortly afterwards, leaving it to Audiencia de Charcas to handle the issue, as it had happened two decades earlier. Without the constraints that viceroys faced because of their concerns over how their decisions would be perceived among their patrons and the court in Madrid, Audiencia members were in effect less politically exposed in relation to any measure they could take. On the other hand, they were more politically compromised at home, where many of their loyalties lay. Without Enriquez, it would be down to the Audiencia to tackle the Chiriguanaes in its own manner and organise an expedition that would try to avoid a repeat of Toledo's tragic 1574 entrada.

4. The Audiencia de Charcas faces the Chiriguanaes

In 1583 Chiriguanaes raids against farms intensified. They reached Presto and Tarabuco and as close as 50kms from La Plata. Despite knowing how concerned the Chiriguanaes were about new Spanish villages along the border, but probably aware that these urban settlements would break up the jurisdiction further among captains in the area and ease tensions among them, the Audiencia de Charcas decided to press ahead with the Junta Magna instructions, which had suggested the establishment of fortified towns and cities to contain the Chiriguanaes. It therefore proposed to enter

[34] Carta del Presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas Licenciado Cepeda a SM, 27 de diciembre de 1582, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia entre presidentes y oidores. 1580-1589*, vol. 2, 37.

into negotiations with Segura Zavala's son-in-law Captain García Mosquera and Miguel Martín, a vecino of Tomina and close ally of Melchor de Rodas for the foundation of two new towns to be called Rio de los Sauces and San Miguel de la Frontera or San Miguel de La Laguna -present day Padilla in Bolivia-. Negotiations with both characters ensued. García Mosquera asked for men, weapons, cattle, and supplies. Martín was more ambitious. He claimed the existence of silver deposits in the future jurisdiction of San Miguel de la Laguna or Frontera and secured the concession for the village's vecinos to trade their maize in Potosí tax-free. Maize was a crop of vast importance in border areas because of its connection to the prosperous chicha producing market in Potosí.[35] Despite García Mosquera's best intentions, and the hopes of his extended family, the negotiations for his village failed.[36] In contrast, Martín managed to succeed, in what was a blow to Segura Zavala and his network. However, many prominent La Plata vecinos reacted to the news protesting that Martín's new village would pose a risk to the already established town of Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina, due to the overlapping of jurisdictions. Those who had not had the time and resources to occupy and establish their farms in this region would lose their properties altogether. Furthermore, the new town would take indigenous labour away from Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina.[37] Despite these complaints and emphasising its role as mediator, the Audiencia de Charcas decided to press ahead and approve Martín's settlement, in order to secure a balance of power between the networks headed by Segura Zavala and Rodas along that section of the border and contain the Chiriguanaes. On the ground, with vecinos in La Plata with land in the area and the Chiriguanaes, both against the new town, the Audiencia's decision would prove disastrous.

As had happened a decade earlier with Toledo, an enquiry, and the subsequent establishment of new urban settlements, eventually set the ground for war against the Chiriguanaes. In charge, the Audiencia de Charcas quickly summoned the body politic of Charcas for consultation about how to move forward. The list of those consulted includes individuals already discussed in this thesis such as the then former Santa Cruz

[35] AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos y diligencias, ff. 80v-81r, 85r-87v, 91r.
[36] In a letter by the Audiencia official Juan de Liano is mentioned, without disclosing the identity of those involved, that three people were clearly opposing García Mosquera's plans. It begs the question whether one of them was Melchor de Rodas. AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos y diligencias, f. 82.
[37] Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay. Vol II*, 576.

de la Sierra governor Juan de Zurita; the governor of Santa Cruz de la Sierra at the time, Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa; and the prominent vecino and encomendero don Gabriel de Paniagua de Loaysa. Aware of Toledo's disastrous entrada, those involved in the consultations recommended that any attack against the Chiriguanaes should be undertaken via multiple fronts. It was also indicated that any indigenous person seized should be taken captive and kept as '*yanacona perpetuo'*,[38] and that any campaign should be done in the summer period.[39]

As far as war matters were concerned, the Audiencia was trying to distinguish its approach in being more pragmatic than Toledo. It was prepared to listen to the advice of those who knew the border very well and act accordingly. By doing so, it was able to demonstrate that it made the King present in Charcas in a manner that was less obtrusive compared with the King's living image. Toledo's presence in Charcas had at times clearly overwhelmed the local elite who perceived his style of government as far too centred around his figure. During his time in the district, the city of La Plata had, in effect, two courts, that of the Audiencia and that of the viceroy. The Audiencia in contrast had deep roots in its district and was much better positioned to engage and involve different political groups without antagonising them. In this battle over the best way to make the monarchy present in the district, the Audiencia would win. From Toledo onwards, Peru's viceroys would largely stay in Lima.

As Toledo had reluctantly done ten years before, when he approached the Chiriguanaes by sending García Mosquera to their settlements, the Audiencia de Charcas reached the indigenous peoples by inviting their leaders to come to La Plata. Two leaders travelled all the way from the border to express their views as part of the wider enquiry over a potential expedition. Any entrada would be conceived as punitive. It would be retribution for the regular raids on Spanish farms, the captivity of other natives, the murder of Catholic priests and Spaniards, the destruction of property, as well as their alleged refusal to accept the Catholic faith and work in the Spanish farms. Those Chiriguanaes that turned up for discussions in October 1583 expressed the same views as their predecessors when interviewed by García Mosquera

[38] This was an ambiguous status as yanaconas were free and perpetual seems to indicate some long-lasting captivity which would have placed them under the permanent guardianship of the Spanish.
[39] AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583.

in their lands and by Toledo in La Plata. They were reluctant to accept the presence of the Spanish near their own settlements or to work for them as they were free and had their interests of their own. They were particularly interrogated over the presence of Catholic church ornaments and other religious items among them and whether they had been engaged in conflict with the Chané, probably to find confirmation for the stereotypes constructed around them which depicted them as apostates and cannibals. Whereas for the Audiencia such discussions were, as they had been for Toledo a decade earlier, part of the war process that involved missions, negotiations, and exchanges, it was for the Chiriguanaes an opportunity to assess the situation and delay any punitive expedition. They would also receive gifts and obtain information on any potential plans which they could use to prepare for armed confrontation which at the point was inevitable.[40]

To continue with the assessment and using similar guidelines as those followed by Toledo a decade earlier, the Audiencia de Charcas met encomenderos with grants located near the border that had been attacked by the Chiriguanaes. The raids were regularly targeting farms, some of them belonging to the Toledan *reducciones* of San Lucas, Caiza, and Puna. Their caciques were also asked to take part in the enquiry. At the time they were also concerned over the growing number of indigenous peoples who, after leaving their reducciones, were residing in border areas regularly helping the Chiriguanaes. They hoped to be able to incorporate those natives who had fled into their reducciones.[41] It was also in their interest to contain the raids and bring peace to the area as much as it was in the interest of other border residents. It is also reasonable to suggest that they would probably be asked to contribute and participate in any entrada against the Chiriguanaes accordingly. Through their answers, the Audiencia learned about a new development. The Chiriguanaes had managed to co-opt the Laxaca peoples who were now participating in their raids. This was alarming news and

[40] These were ornaments and materials probably taken from the expedition of Francisco Ortíz de Vergara from the Rio de la Plata to Peru. Relación hecha al Consejo de Indias por Francisco Ortíz de Vergara, del viaje que hizo del Rio de la Plata al Perú (1565) in Luis Torres de Mendoza, *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía sacados de los archivos del reino y muy especialmente del de Indias*, vol. 4 (Madrid: Imprenta de Frias y Cia, 1865), 388; AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos y diligencias, ff. 17v-18v.

[41] AGI, Patronato, 136, N1, R4, Título de Caudillo a Juan Ladrón de Leyba, La Plata, 18 de marzo de 1584, ff. 4v-5r.

prompted immediate action by the Audiencia that on 8 December 1583 declared war against the Chiriguanaes.[42]

Throughout this process, the Audiencia de Charcas largely replicated the same protocol previously followed by Toledo, sharing responsibility for the entrada with those who had been consulted and perhaps would participate in the event. This would reduce any political risk that could come from a negative outcome. Furthermore, demonstrating its decision to stick to royal guidance, the Audiencia de Charcas also used the same cédula real that was handed to Toledo in 1568 to declare war against the Chiriguanaes, showing that the laws and legal provisions in this period were far from orders and were simply matters of advice, always to be acknowledged, but to be executed if and when needed and to be adapted to the circumstances, in accordance with all members of the body politic.

The agreement in the end was for a large-scale campaign organised along three fronts. Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, Corregidor of Tarija, would lead the entrada from his jurisdiction. Lorenzo Suárez de Figueroa would do the same from Santa Cruz de la Sierra, due to his responsibilities over Spaniards and indigenous peoples living near the Santa Cruz de la Sierra border. Finally, royal official Juan Lozano Machuca would head an entrada coming from Potosí, through Tomina, all the way to the border area. Additionally, the Audiencia de Charcas arranged the establishment of further towns to strengthen Spanish presence along the border: in the old Tahuantinsuyu fortress of Samaypata, and a new settlement called San Juan de la Frontera de Paspaya.[43] Located close to Santa Cruz de la Sierra, Samaypata was a fortress built by the Incas to contain the Chiriguanaes (see Chapter One). The town in Paspaya, to be situated between San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija and Santa Cruz de la Sierra, would play the same

[42] The Lacaxa peoples were part of a larger indigenous group, the Moyos-Moyos, and were settled in the southeast Charcas border area at least from the time of the encomienda grants handed by La Gasca in the 1540s. The fact that they were handed in encomienda might mean that they were settled and could be worked for the benefit of their encomenderos. It seems that by the 1580s they were not under control of their encomenderos but under the influence of the Chiriguanaes. Presta and Río, "Un estudio etnohistórico en los corregimientos de Tomina Yamparaes: Casos de multietnicidad," 212-213; Oliveto, "De mitmaqkuna incaicos en Tarija a reducidos en La Plata. Tras las huellas de los moyos moyos y su derrotero colonial," 18; AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, 1583, Autos y diligencias, ff. 52v-75v.

[43] AGI, Patronato, 235, R10, 1586, Testimonio de los autos formados en la Audiencia de La Plata, sobre la guerra que debía hacerse a los indios chiriguanaes. Acompaña la descripción de aquella tierra y de la provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra, ff. 12v, 8v-9v.

role as it was not far from the entrance of the Andean slopes. Because these new towns were negotiated after the Audiencia de Charcas had declared war against the Chiriguanaes, their residents would be allowed to carry out regular raids against Chiriguanaes settlements and take captives they could use as labour on their farms and for work in their villages.[44] The presence of Juan Lozano Machuca, an official of the royal exchequer and former criado of Viceroy don Francisco de Toledo, seems to be out of place here, yet his privileged access to funding, built through a career that by the early 1580s spanned well over a decade, provides some clues to the role that he played in this campaign.[45]



Map 12. Villages and towns mentioned in this chapter. Looking eastwards from the Andes. Google Earth.

5. Juan Lozano Machuca and the world of viceregal criados

[44] AGI, Patronato, 136, N1, R4, 1584, Capitulaciones de Juan Ladrón de Leyba, ff. 9r-17r.

[45] Lozano Machuca was aware of the challenging situation along the border as official in the Cajas Reales in Potosi, going by a letter these officials received from the Audiencia de Charcas asking for a loan of 8,000 pesos to cover the costs of any campaign against the Chiriguanaes. The loan was approved on 12 July 1583. Archivo Historico de Potosi (hereafter AHP), Cajas Reales 7, ff. 79v-81v in Julien, Angelis, and Bass Werner de Ruiz, *Historia de Tarija. Corpus documental*, 231-234.

Born in Ciudad Real, in Castilla-La Mancha, in or around 1539, son of Juan Lozano Machuca and Quiteria Gómez, Juan Lozano Machuca grew up as part of a noble household, that of the Duque de Béjar, Francisco de Zuñiga y Sotomayor (1523-1591), to whom he was his secretary too. Zuñiga y Sotomayor was the uncle of the Duque de Medinasidonia, Alonso Pérez de Guzmán y Sotomayor (1550-1615), the commander or Admiral of the Seas of the Spanish Armada of 1588.[46] With such connections and experience, Lozano Machuca secured a post as Chanciller in the Audiencia de San Francisco de Quito on 15 June 1567.[47] In preparation for this job, the Consejo de Indias reviewed the paperwork on Lozano Machuca's background and experience and on 9 July 1567 he received the title of Notario de Indias.[48] The post secured Lozano Machuca, his two single sisters Petronila Gómez Machuca and Estefanía Lozana, plus two criados, Alonso Gómez and Isabel García, passage on board of the same fleet that took viceroy Toledo to Peru in 1569.[49] A man of letters who grew up in the shadow of the patronage of wealthy nobility, Lozano Machuca could only expect a prosperous life ahead in the Viceroyalty of Peru as a member of a viceregal court centred around the Peru's fifth viceroy.

Lozano Machuca's post in the Audiencia de San Francisco de Quito did not probably offer substantial social and economic benefits for an ambitious character as he was, given the fact that the Audiencia, established on 29 August 1563, had limited resources.[50] The perfect opportunity to move on came from a visita and residencia of

[46] AGI, Patronato, 122, R2, N9, 1578, Informaciones de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Lozano Machuca, que fue nombrado en comisión para levantar gente en Valladolid, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, Medina del Campo, Toledo, y otras partes, con cuya gente pasó al socorro de Chile y ayudó a su conquista, y estando allí fue nombrado sucesor del general Juan Lozada tras su Muerte, statement by Juan de Vega-, (Image 59); Diego Rosales, *Historia general de el reyno de Chile. Flandes Indiano*, vol. II (Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio, 1878 [1674]), 198; Robert Hutchinson, *The Spanish Armada* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014), 276.

[47] The job of Chanciller involved the safekeeping and use of the Royal Seal, which gave official approval to documents meaning that what was contained in them had royal endorsement. The person in charge was also responsible for the filing of royal provisions and other Audiencia records. AGI, Quito, 35, N24, 1567-1571, Expediente de confirmación del oficio de canciller de la audiencia a Juan Lozano Machuca; Julio Alberto Ramírez Barrios, "En defensa de la autoridad real: Oficiales de la pluma de la Real Audiencia de Lima durante la rebelión de Gonzalo Pizarro (1544-1548).," *Revista de Historia del Derecho* 63 (June 2022): 65-67.

[48] AGI, Indiferente, 425, L 24, 1567, Real provisión de notaría de las Indias para Juan Lozano Machuca, 345v.

[49] Romera Iruela and Galbís Diez, *Catalogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII*. vol. V 1 (Sevilla: AGI, 1980), 272-273.

[50] The post of Chanciller was more important in terms of honour than its economic benefits. Julio Alberto Ramírez Barrios, *El sello real en el Perú Colonial: poder y representación en la distancia*, (Lima, Sevilla: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú, Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2020), 327.

the Audiencia de Charcas commissioned to Lope García de Castro by the Consejo de Indias which resulted in the suspension of the *factor* and *veedor* of Charcas, Juan de Anguciaga and the temporary appointment of Lorenzo de Cantoral in his place. With the experience of being notary of the visita, Lozano Machuca returned to Spain and in 1573 he was rewarded with the permanent post of factor and veedor of Charcas. [51]

This job gave Lozano Machuca the opportunity to build wealth and connections. It was nonetheless a post that required a guarantee or *fianza* that took Lozano Machuca three years to gather. The necessary funds came from several Charcas officers, encomenderos and miners, some close to Viceroy Toledo, which is evidence of the extended social network he had managed to build through his background and status.[52] Responsible for royal accounts and the associated paperwork, Lozano Machuca was typical of the lettered elite that existed in the major cities across the Catholic Monarchy. He was part of a growing elite of royal officials who although they were appointed to different posts and jurisdictions, maintained social networks that brought geographically distant places such as Potosí, Lima, Quito, Panamá, Seville, and Madrid close. They were mainly courtiers and as such tried to combine 'the quill' and 'the sword' following the image of the virtuous noble, someone who

[51] AGI, Contratación, 5792, L. 1, 1573, Nombramiento de Juan Lozano Machuca como factor y veedor de Charcas, ff. 170-171v; AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, 1590, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Núñez Maldonado. Traslado de 1600 de una información de 1590. Con parecer de la Audiencia de 1599, f. 3r; AGI, Charcas, 418, L1. Título de factor y veedor de la provincia de los Charcas, en lugar de Juan de Anguciana, suspendido a raíz de la visita que a él, y demás oficiales reales, tomó el licenciado Castro, del Consejo de Indias, ff. 257r-259r; Carta del presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas don Lope Diez de Armendáriz a SM, 25 de setiembre de 1576, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579*, vol. 1, 359.

[52] The job entailed the tasks to "assist with the melting and rescue [of metal], exchanging or selling goods they received for gold, silver, pearls, and emeralds, and selling things that Indians paid as tribute, this with the agreement of the governor and other royal officials" in Francisco Lopez de Caravantes, *Noticia General del Perú*, vol. 6, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles (Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1989, [1630-1631]), 46; Juan Lozano Machuca's guarantors were Melchor Juárez de Valer and his father Pedro Juárez de Valer, who was Secretary of the Audiencia de Charcas and legal overseer of unclaimed or litigious assets, a role known as *depositario*; prominent and wealthy miner Carlos Corzo and through him Corzo's brother in Seville, Juan Antonio Corzo, who would hold assets on behalf of Lozano Machuca in Spain; Alonso Barriales; encomendero Gaspar de Solis; and Juan Pérez. AGI, Indiferente, 2086, N83, 1573, Expediente de concesión de licencia para pasar a Nueva Toledo, a favor de Juan Lozano Machuca, escribano, factor y veedor de la Real Hacienda de Nueva Toledo (Charcas), con tres criados, uno de ellos casado, y tres esclavos, (image 7); ABNB, Cédulas Reales, Cédula 105, 12 de enero de 1574, Para que Juan Lozano Machuca, que va por factor y veedor de la provincia de Los Charcas, pueda dar las fianzas que se le ha mandado que de para el uso de su oficio en las ciudades de La Plata, Cusco y La Paz, y en Potosi; y cumpla con ello no embargante que esta mandado las de en la ciudad de Los Reyes in Pacheco, Joaquin, and Francisco de Cárdenas in José Enciso Contreras, *Cedulario de la Audiencia de La Plata de Charcas (Siglo XVI)* (Sucre: ABNB, 2005), 320; Carta del presidente de la Audiencia de Charcas, Licenciado Cepeda, a SM, 28 de febrero de 1585, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1580-1589*, vol. 2, 204.

was prepared to fight, yet who was also exemplary in upholding knightly values such as honour and prudence and promoted Christian virtues.[53]

However, in Lozano Machuca's case, even when as *hidalgo* he had received training in the art of war, his record of involvement in military tasks was far from positive. His first experience transporting reinforcements for the war against the Araucanos in Chile ended in mutiny. This *Socorro*, or back-up/rescue as such expeditions were called, carried one hundred and twenty men from various locations in the interior of Spain to Seville, first, and from there to Panamá, Peru, and Chile.[54] Panamá Audiencia judge Alonso Criado de Castilla who saw the mutiny unfold said that Lozano Machuca "was perceived as someone without any experience with military discipline, because of his experience in the world of quill".[55] Lozano Machuca in effect found it difficult to bring both worlds together. A new commission he received afterwards showed the difficulties he found in venturing away from urban centres into a different world along borders or even *tierras de indios*, lands inhabited by indigenous peoples-. Lozano Machuca is known for a report he allegedly wrote about the Lipes and their eponymous region which is today in Potosí. He was commissioned to conduct a visita to their land but knowing that Potosí miner Pedro Sande was a frequent visitor to the region, the factor and veedor decided to delegate the task to Sande, only writing the final report.[56] Lozano Machuca, resident of one of the world's largest populated centres at the time, Potosí, found life beyond that type of urban spaces inhospitable and dangerous. It was certainly a world away from his earlier life in the Spanish peninsula.

---

[53] Angel Rama and John Charles Chasteen, *The Lettered City*, Post-Contemporary Interventions (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996); Quondam and Torres Corominas, *El discurso cortesano*, 37.

[54] AGI, Patronato, 122, N2, R9, 1578, Informaciones de Juan Lozano Machuca. On Socorros see: Ruiz Ibáñez, *Las dos caras de Jano*, 84-99.

[55] Notaries as well as other jobs that required high literacy skills as well as a good knowledge of paperwork and bureaucracy were seen as 'jobs of the quill' –'oficios de pluma' in Spanish-. Víctor Gayol, "'Por todos los dias de nuestra vida...' oficios de pluma, sociedad local y gobierno de la monarquía.," in *Los oficios en las sociedades indianas.* (México, D. F: UNAM, 2020), 301–329; AGI, Panama, 13, R16, N70, 1577, Carta del Doctor Alonso Criado de Castilla, oidor de la Audiencia de Panamá, f. 6.

[56] The report is in AGI, Charcas 35 and was published by José María Casassas, "Carta del factor de Potosí Juan Lozano Machuca (al virrey del Perú don Martín Enríquez) en que da cuenta de cosas de aquella villa y de las minas de los Lipes (Año 1581)," *Estudios Atacameños. Arqueología y Antropología Surandinas.*, no. 10 (1992): 30–34; José Luis Martínez Cereceda, *Gente de la tierra de guerra: Los lipes en las tradiciones andinas y el imaginario colonial*, (Lima, Perú: Santiago, Chile: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos de Chile, 2011), 46.

At the peak of his career, in the late 1570s, the pleasant faced, tall, and thin official who wore a prominent tinged-red beard and was recognisable due to a scar across one hand, as he is described in a document, asked to travel back to Spain, with plans to return back to Potosí after some time.[57] There was opposition to this move from Licenciado Diego López de Zuñiga who was carrying out a visita to the Audiencia de Charcas at the time, and insisted that someone like Lozano Machuca, because of his knowledge of royal accounts and laws, should continue in Potosí.[58] The Audiencia de Charcas disagreed, probably due to Lozano Machuca's connections with Toledo, and accepted the factor's request to let him travel, approving a temporary replacement as a result.[59] However, Lozano Machuca, then embarked upon a campaign to the border of the Chiriguanaes and would never see his homeland again.[60]

6. An Audiencia de Charcas expedition in the making

As preparations for a campaign were underway, in January 1584 news arrived in La Plata of the destruction of Miguel Martín's town, San Miguel de la Frontera or La Laguna. Martín's settlement had an auspicious start receiving support in terms of labour from Chiriguanaes groups who helped to build the new site. As it had happened with San Bernando de la Frontera de Tarija and Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina, following an initial period of peaceful relations and exchanges, violence ensued. Scholars have different views on this, with some arguing that too much trust placed on the Chiriguanaes, and others suggesting that the vecinos of the new town expanded

[57]AGI, Indiferente, 2086, N83, 1573, Expediente de Juan Lozano Machuca; AGI, Charcas 35, Carta de Juan Lozano Machuca a SM, 12 de febrero de 1578, ff. 166r-166v.

[58] Carta de don Diego López de Zuñiga a SM, in Levillier, *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI. El virrey Martin Enriquez 1581-1583*, vol. 9, 98.

[59] The Audiencia in La Plata agreed to him leaving between January and February 1584. His replacement was going to be Ventura Gutiérrez, a royal accountant who was based in Costa Rica. López Villalva, director, *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1576 – 1587)*. Vol. 3, 21 de noviembre 1583, 398; AGI, Charcas, 16, R22, N96, Carta de Juan Lozano Machuca. Factor. 8 de enero de 1583.

[60] In a letter by the Audiencia de Lima judge Licenciado Estebán Marañón, it is mentioned the possibility that Machuca could decide to stay in Charcas. Whether Marañón knew the actual reasons for this and preferred not to disclose them in this letter it is not clear. Marañón had Machuca's potential successor as factor as his guest in Lima. Carta del Licenciado Esteban Marañón, Lima, 16 de agosto de 1581 in Enrique Otte and Guadalupe Albi Romero, eds., *Cartas privadas de emigrantes a Indias, 1540-1616* (Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, Junta de Andalucía: Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de Sevilla, 1988), 400.

into land where they were not supposed to be.[61] Both seem valid reasons. However, in the past both Martín and García Mosquera had been involved in dealing with the Spanish side of the trade in captive indigenous peoples by handling weapons to the Chiriguanaes in the area, and probably as supplies of such weapons and gifts dwindled, so did their support for a town in land so close to their settlements.[62] The attack was devastating and was the worst incident since the destruction of Santo Domingo de la Nueva Rioja or Condorillo and La Barranca, the settlements established by Captains Andrés Manso and Ñuflo de Chaves, two decades earlier.[63] The Audiencia put preparations for the expedition on hold only briefly and decided to press ahead with the policy for new towns along the border. It pushed to rebuild San Miguel de la Frontera or La Laguna, a task arranged with Segura Zavala's rival, Melchor de Rodas, in an attempt to keep the area's political balance in check, given that Martín had been an ally of Rodas. The Audiencia was also aware that it needed someone like Rodas on board for its war effort against the Chiriguanaes.[64]

There was now more urgency to launch the campaign. Going back to its preparations, whilst Toledo had been able to fund the initial cost of his expedition from a windfall of extra quintos reales, the Audiencia de Charcas did not have access to similar resources, neither did it want to be seen as organising another entrada of 'feathers, silks, and trappings'. Juan Lozano Machuca saw this as an opportunity and made a capitulación and asiento with the Audiencia in June 1584 for an expedition that would contribute to the encirclement and punishment of the Chiriguanaes.[65] Lozano Machuca was committed to raise a force of 250 men with all the necessary supplies, spending the enormous sum of 50,000 pesos. The factor and veedor would resort to borrowing from his network of contacts, as he had done when he raised funds to guarantee his post. The Audiencia promised him the titles of *gobernador*, *justicia*

[61] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 358; Pifarré, *Historia de un pueblo*, vol. 2, 77.
[62] Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 339; Weaver Olson, "A Republic of Lost Peoples," 322.
[63] See Chapter two.
[64] In effect, at the time of the destruction of San Miguel de La Frontera or La Laguna, Rodas donated some land to Martín supporting his ally's strength. ABNB, EP3, 447r-447v; Mujía, *Bolivia-Paraguay*, vol. II, 615.
[65] The original documents would have been kept with the Audiencia with copies issued to Juan Lozano Machuca and sent to the Consejo de Indias. The copies sent to Spain should be in the AGI and should be with the other papers of Lozano Machuca in AGI, Charcas 35. However, there is only a reference to the documents there but not the actual documents. AGI, Charcas 35, Carta de Juan Lozano Machuca a SM, 28 de febrero de 1584, ff. 313v-314r. Only a small section of such Capitulaciones and Asientos has survived part of the report of merits and services drafted for Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha. AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, ff. 73r-75v.

mayor and captain with rights over the distribution of land, native labour, and all other jurisdictional matters. More importantly, it also arranged for the founding of a new town to be called Concepción y Río de los Sauces, which would provide Lozano Machuca prestige and status. [66]

Within the Audiencia's jurisdiction, the Cajas Reales were based in Potosí and because of his official position Lozano Machuca could provide the Audiencia with a unique opportunity to request funds and have such a request granted. Lozano Machuca agreed to hand the Audiencia de Charcas the initial funds required for the entrada which came from the Caja de Granos in Potosí. These were funds raised from indigenous miners who contributed with half a real per day to pay the wages of their *Protector de Indios* (royal official responsible to represent indigenous peoples in trials); *Capitanes de Mita* (Andean chiefs in charge of meeting the draft of indigenous miners needed in Potosí); and mine inspectors or *veedores* (responsible for overseeing mining activities in the same village). The contribution from the Caja de Granos would account for almost half of the total royal funds assigned to this campaign.[67] Lozano Machuca also handed 1,200 pesos from the royal coffers to complete the funds needed to start preparations.[68] Owing to this and to Juan Lozano Machuca's prestige and connections, the Audiencia de Charcas felt obliged to endorse his expedition and plan for a new border town.

However, aware of Lozano Machuca's military record, the Audiencia de Charcas pushed for him to agree that any decision in relation to the entrada would be carried out in close consultation with his *Teniente* and *Maese de Campo*, Captains Francisco Arias de Herrera and Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha, respectively.[69] Both hombres pláticos [sic] were a world away from the background and life of Lozano Machuca. Arias de Herrera had begun his military career in Spanish wars against the

[66] AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, 1599, Informaciones de Núñez Maldonado, f. 1v.
[67] Additional funding would come from half of an encomienda grant -Huaqui- held Alonso Ramirez de Sosa, a vecino in La Paz; and the salary of a military post of Captain Fernando Diez. Both had passed and the funds were available at the time. Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM, in Levillier, *Audiencia de Charcas*, Vol 2, 181.
[68] BNE, Ms 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al Gobierno de Indias, http://bdh-rd.bne.es/viewer.vm?id=0000023047&page=1; Luis Capoche, *Relación general de la villa imperial de Potosí*, vol. CXXII, Biblioteca de Autores Españoles (Madrid: Atlas, 1958 [1585]), 145-146.
[69] AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, ff. 73v-75v.

Ottomans, first during the attack of Velez de la Gomera in 1564, and after that in the siege of Malta in 1565 and Lepanto in 1571, all victories for the monarchy. After battling the Ottomans, he was commissioned to travel to China, to secure the release of a Spanish vessel that had been captured, and from there to New Spain where, at the request from Viceroy Enriquez, he was engaged in fighting the Chichimecas along New Spain's northern borders. An experienced warrior and someone used to border life, Arias de Herrera arrived in Peru as part of Enriquez's entourage. Following the Viceroy's passing, he unsuccessfully requested commissions from the Audiencia de Charcas and in the end moved to Potosí looking for opportunities in this prosperous mining town. Whilst in Potosi, and almost ready to travel back to Spain, via Tucumán and Brazil, Arias de Herrera received a letter asking him to join Lozano Machuca's expedition as Teniente.[70] The other Captain, Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha, was more familiar with the southeast Charcas border since he had been Corregidor in Tomina. Cuellar Torremocha was someone close to Pedro Segura Zavala and García Mosquera and all three were part of a network of respected captains and their allies who were interested in the expansion of the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction over the eastern borders of Charcas and who saw themselves as the best people to achieve this task.[71] The Audiencia was thus hoping that the trio would combine military skills (Arias de Herrera) and local knowledge (Cuellar Torremocha), with Lozano Machuca's financial and administrative support, thereby avoiding a repeat of Toledo's 1574 expedition, while providing a back-up plan in case Lozano Machuca's leadership faltered.

7. Lozano Machuca's last journey

Lozano Machuca's expedition was supposed to leave on 15 June 1584, yet by September it was still being prepared. The departure had been coordinated with the other entradas from Santa Cruz de la Sierra and Tarija, so that the Chiriguanaes would be encircled from three separate fronts, and any delays would therefore put the whole

[70] AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, 1584, Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Francisco Arias de Herrera, que sirvió en la conquista y pacificación de Perú y particularmente en el sosiego de los indios chichimecas, también en la toma del Peñón, batalla de Lepanto, habiendo ido dos veces a la China y con socorros a las islas Filipinas, (images 23, 31).
[71] AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, ff. 73v-75v.

strategy at risk. The Audiencia de Charcas' reputation hung in balance. As a consequence, the Audiencia judges called Captains Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha and Francisco Arias de Herrera for meetings demanding explanations. They both stated that Lozano Machuca had "gone cold" on the expedition, waiting for the arrival of a new viceroy.[72] This was not the type of news the Audiencia was hoping to hear, and a decision was made to put Lozano Machuca under pressure to start marching immediately.

The expedition eventually left for the site of the future village of Concepción y Río de los Sauces via Tomina, jurisdiction of Segura Zavala -see map 13-, who, due to his connections with local Chiriguanaes factions probably secured its safe passage.[73] As with previous entradas, the force involved a large contingent of indigenous Andeans, including Yampara peoples who had been assigned by the Audiencia to do various jobs in La Plata, and peoples supplied by the Capitanes de Mita, all headed by the leading Capitan de Mita at the time.[74] They took with them 1,200 llamas. Along with the indigenous leaders, the Mercedarians were also present in this event, through friar Diego de Reynoso, confirming their connection with borders and captive natives.[75] Although the identity of who guided the expedition is unknown, the presence of García Mosquera, the same initial guide used by Toledo a decade earlier, speaks for itself. The Chiriguanaes, who were close allies of this guide and his extended family, were likely involved in the entrada. García Mosquera, who enjoyed seniority both in the area and the task, had his own agenda and at this stage his participation probably reflected his own ambitions and those of his network to improve their status and potentially secure new land in another corner of the area.

[72] ABNB, ALP, CACh-38, Auto de la Audiencia de La Plata y declaración del capitán Arias de Herrera, teniente general, sobre su sentir de la pretendida entrada y guerra a la Cordillera del general Juan Lozano Machuca contra los indios chiriguanaes, f. 2v.
[73] AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, 1600, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, capitán. Traslado de 1600 [SUP] de una información de 1598, (image 32); AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, 1600, Informaciones de Núñez Maldonado, f. 18r. -statement by Gonzalo Santos vecino in La Plata- 31 de enero de 1590.
[74] Capoche, *Relación general de la villa imperial de Potosí*, 134, 142-143.
[75] Reynoso was in Chile before moving to Charcas. Mercedarians travelled through different borders carrying with them their valuable knowledge and experience. AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, 1600, Informaciones de Mendoza Quesada, (image 32); Fray Policarpo Gazulla, *Los primeros mercedarios en Chile. 1535-1600.* (Santiago de Chile: Imprenta La Ilustración, 1918), 155.

Apart from the initial delay, up to that point, things were running smoothly. However, once the expedition forces arrived at the site, the argument about Lozano Machuca's lack of military skills resurfaced, and the royal official faced his second mutiny. Growing dissatisfaction over the way the entrada was managed was at the core of the claims of those who decided to rebel against the expedition leader.[76] Other sources claim there were other problems caused by the initial delays, meaning that when the men began marching, the dry season was over and intense rain stalled the expedition's progress.[77] As it happened with Toledo, the Spanish were encountering a different and hostile environment as they made the journey into the border. There were other problems too. Lozano Machuca had not abided by his side of the arrangements by taking half of the 250 men he had promised. [78] Alerted, the Audiencia de Charcas called him back to La Plata to provide explanations. Once there, the official was put in prison.[79] In October 1584, and to prevent further problems following claims that the disillusioned men of Lozano Machuca's expedition were planning to move on and travel to Tucumán where they would demand rewards from the authorities there, the Audiencia appointed the more pragmatic and experienced Captain Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha as temporary leader of the expedition. Cuellar Torremocha assumed his new role in a ceremony at the old Inca fortress of Cuscotoro with García Mosquera as one of the witnesses. Soon after, a new town was founded, but under a different name than the one planned by Lozano Machuca. To honour Cuellar Torremocha's birthplace, Torremocha, Concepción Torremocha de los Sauces was established. The new settlement only lasted a few months being abandoned because of constant attacks by the Chiriguanaes and its unsuitability for farming.[80]

[76] AGI, Lima, 212, N8, 1598, Informaciones de oficio y parte: Cristóbal de Baranda, capitán, alguacil mayor de Charcas y Potosí, pacificador de los chiriguanas y pacificador en Chile como alférez de la compañía del capitán Fernando de Córdoba y Figueroa. Información y parecer de la Audiencia de Lima, (image 3).
[77] Capoche, *Relación general de la villa imperial de Potosí*, 134.
[78] AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, f. 51v.
[79] AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, 1600, Informaciones de Núñez Maldonado, f. 1v.
[80] AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, 1582, Información Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, f. 72r.



Map 13. Expedition route based on AGI, MP. Buenos Aires 12. 18 febrero 1588. Enviado por el Licenciado Cepeda con carta. View from the Andes toward the east. Google Earth.

In the meantime, Lozano Machuca had been released under the condition that he made up for the men he had not taken to his entrada. As he was travelling back to the entrada site, aiming to resume his post as the expedition's leader, he fell ill of "dolor de costado" or pleurisy[81] and after three days of agony passed away in the town of Chaqui. He was only 46 years old and was buried in La Plata.[82]

The courtier, the man of the quill, Lozano Machuca, was only behind this expedition because of his connections and the financial arrangements he could secure for the Audiencia de Charcas so that he could turn an event that would normally be expensive, as Chapter Three has shown, into one that would not be at great cost to the monarchy. The Audiencia also took extra precautions, demanding consensus between Lozano Machuca, Cuellar Torremocha, and Arias de Herrera on any decisions in

[81] Dolor de Costado has been variously translated as "chest pain", or "pain in the side", but perhaps the most appropriate definition is "pain in the rib cage". The term reflects upper respiratory discomfort, as with severe infections involving the lungs and chest cavity, when pain is that difficult to locate exactly pierces one when the thorax expands and contracts as the lungs inhale and exhale. The pain might be reported in the back, the chest, the side, the ribs. The English used the world pleurisy to describe the same affliction". Noble David Cook, *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650*, New Approaches to the Americas (Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 104.

[82] Lozano Machuca passed away on 23 February 1585. AGI, Charcas, 35, Carta de los oficiales de la Real Hacienda a SM, 23 de febrero de 1585, f. 332r; Carta de la Audiencia de Charcas a SM, 26 de febrero de 1585, in Levillier, *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia entre presidentes y oidores. 1580-1589*, vol. 2, 200. Scholl mentions that Machuca was murdered by the Chiriguanaes; Scholl, "At the Limits of Empire," 374. AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, 1600, Informaciones de Núñez Maldonado, f. 11r.

relation to the expedition, thereby reducing Lozano Machuca's authority, in a manner that possibly also undermined him. Lozano Machuca had his own agenda and knowing about the forthcoming arrival of a new viceroy in Peru, someone who would engage with him differently, possibly handing him new posts and rewards, all based on his merits and connections, may have decided to procrastinate, and delay the entrada for as long as he could. In fact, Peru's next viceroy, don Fernando de Torres y Portugal (1585-1592) was already in Panamá about to embark on his trip to Lima.

Lozano Machuca's defeat was Cuellar Torremocha's triumph as he seized control of the expedition he only marginally helped to organise. It was also a victory for Segura Zavala and García Mosquera, two veterans and settlers with good connections with both the Audiencia de Charcas and the Chiriguanaes, who now were able to add yet another border town to the jurisdiction of the Corregimiento of Tomina. Finally, it was also a success for the Audiencia de Charcas, as it managed to step in and take on executive functions, normally the jurisdiction of a viceroy, in a manner that compared favourably to Toledo's expedition, and which demonstrated that the tribunal was well equipped, both legally and politically, to handle political challenges. It also highlights the more practical approach the Audiencia de Charcas took to the complexities and reality of the southeast borders that increasingly preferred to leave the running of such remote spaces in hands of captains with the know-how. This was, in the Audiencia's view, a more secure way of extending the Catholic Monarchy's jurisdiction over the Charcas borders.

8. Epilogue: Miniature politics as the basis of the monarchy's adaptability and endurance

Both Toledo and his criado, Juan Lozano Machuca, were blamed for their expeditions' failure. Toledo returned to Spain and had to stay away from Madrid almost until the end of his life. Lozano Machuca was accused, put in prison, and forced to abide by the arrangements made. The Audiencia de Charcas, however, was able to move on totally unscathed, demonstrating that it was well equipped and prepared to handle emergencies and was in control of how it exercised jurisdiction. The Audiencia

was the focus of local political activity. Its judges knew everyone's affairs and had learnt from the viceroy's mistakes and how to manipulate different groups and agendas, thereby saving the monarchy's reputation and finances in the process. They were in a much better position than a viceroy to do 'miniature politics'.

By agreeing commissions or jobs with key individuals in line with their merits and background, the Catholic Monarchy was able to geographically expand, without having to compromise its own reputation. This approach guaranteed the endurance and resilience of the monarchy across its vast geography. It was not centralism, in fact the opposite, decentralisation, and the distribution of authority, that made each vassal feel part of a larger entity that encompassed a wide diversity of peoples under its monarch and the Catholic faith. In this polycentric polity, negotiation thus did not take place between a core or centre and the periphery, but within each of these centres, between monarchy agents and vassals, involving the localisation of laws and regulations, adapting them to the particular circumstances of place and time. This element provided the whole system of government with immense flexibility.

'Miniature politics' required the monarchy to provide its agents a great degree of independence as well as significant trust, understood as obedience and allegiance.[83] Independence, knowing that they would do the right thing to keep the land 'quieta', trouble-free. Obedience, as the basis of patronage, through the recognition of authority and political obligation. Perceived by their contemporaries as "practical men" or "hombres platicos [sic]", with solid knowledge of border life and strong connections with the Chiriguanaes, the likes of Segura Zavala, García Mosquera, Martín, Cuellar Torremocha, and Rodas, were entrusted the running of their towns and jurisdictions as loyal vassals. Their success or failure would not be the monarchy's responsibility, it would be theirs as independent agents. This level of miniaturization of politics also resulted in a miniaturization of conflicts that were largely local in origin and resolution. This made a large-scale revolution, at least in this period, impossible.[84] This situation was also mirrored among the Chiriguanaes, who were a politically fragmented group, with different allegiances to monarchy agents, which inevitably put them in conflict

[83] Alicia Esteban Estríngana, ed., *Servir al rey en la monarquía de los Austrias: Medios, fines y logros del servicio al soberano en los siglos XVI y XVII*, (Madrid: Sílex, 2012).
[84] António Manuel Hespanha, *Caleidoscópio do antigo regime* (São Paulo: Alameda, 2012), 44.

with other factions. Inadvertently, border Spanish towns imported these conflicts which made their own existence unstable and precarious. The fact that Santo Domingo de La Nueva Rioja or Condorillo, La Barranca, San Miguel de la Frontera or La Laguna, and even Concepción Torremocha de los Sauces, are today absent from present-day Bolivia's maps, is testament to this.



Map 14. Torremocha had been abandoned. AGI, MP. Buenos Aires 12. 18 febrero 1588. Enviado por el Licenciado Cepeda con carta.

Conclusion

This thesis has explored, through the political culture of the Catholic Monarchy, three expeditions pursued by the Spanish into the borders of Charcas and Tucumán in the second half of the sixteenth century. These entradas mark three different moments in the process of settlement and expansion of royal jurisdiction in Charcas.

The journeys of encomendero Martín de Almendras between 1564 and 1565 took place at a time when a young Audiencia de Charcas was trying to extend and settle its authority which brought conflict with the Audiencia de Lima and the governor of Chile. Against the backdrop of a viceroyalty without a viceroy, and an ambitious encomendero group, and indigenous uprisings occurring in Tucumán and along the southeast Charcas border, the Audiencia de Charcas moved swiftly to restore order and extend its jurisdiction, first over the Chichas and Chiriguanaes, and then in the most conflictive and remote Tucumán, where the Catholic Monarchy presence was more tenuous and where jurisdiction was highly contentious. In effect, the province was torn between Chile and Charcas, and the Audiencia de Lima which was exercising power in the absence of a viceroy, sided with the former as means to limit the latter. On the ground, and for some time, the alleged death of Francisco de Aguirre, the governor of Tucumán, was seen by the Audiencia de Charcas as a great opportunity to expand its jurisdiction by sending a 'new governor'. News of Aguirre being alive and in office did not deter Martín de Almendras and the Audiencia de Charcas' plan to move forward to seize the province in its name, yet it was not Almendras who in the end who would bring Tucumán back to the sphere of influence of Charcas, but his men who arrested Aguirre and sent him to La Plata, saving the province for the Audiencia de Charcas. The expeditions show that jurisdiction was contested and had to be legitimised and fought, even against other Spaniards and their jurisdictions. Frequently juxtaposed, a jurisdiction had to be settled and this had to be done not only through paperwork but also with help of armed men on the ground and theatrically. The Monarchy had nothing to lose as the downscaling of jurisdiction and the dispersion of

authority kept such conflicts largely at a local level preventing large-scale problems that could threaten the status-quo and jeopardise government. The mantra of keeping "the land quiet" was of tantamount importance for the monarchy and its elites.

The highly ornamented and elaborated entrada of don Francisco de Toledo, the fourth viceroy of Peru, to the Chiriguanaes in 1574 marked a second moment in the early history of Charcas. In contradiction to prior historiography which, based on the image of nation-states created in the early nineteenth century, sees Toledo as a law reformer, planner and organiser, or the mastermind behind a strong 'colonial state', the expedition shows a viceroy who went into Charcas with a plan that had to be changed many times and negotiated with different parties. The viceroy had a very authoritative and fixed approach over how to exert his influence and make the monarch present in Peru, one which frequently clashed with local elites generally accustomed to rule the land, and to a weak and highly negotiable royal presence. Toledo travelled to the dense Andean slopes inhabited by the Chiriguanaes largely surrounded by his courtiers, and after facing challenges, was lucky to leave the lowlands alive. The expedition shows a jurisdiction that had matured in the decade before Toledo's rule and that was more localised and increasingly relied on knowledgeable agents, such as captains, to represent royal authority, rather than the presence of royal dignitaries like the 'King's living image'. There was no room for high royal officials in Charcas that had become aware of its possibilities and limitations as a district of the global monarchy. Challenging historiographic views that see the Catholic Monarchy as archaic, absolutist, inefficient, and bureaucratic, its political system, as this expedition shows, combined a high dose of localism, de-centralisation, pragmatism, and consensus, all characteristics that Toledo at times found challenging.

The final expedition included in this research was carried out by Juan Lozano Machuca in 1584 and shows two key components in the Catholic Monarchy's resilience and adaptation: the miniaturisation of politics and its polycentrism. The entrada was part of a larger armed effort against the Chiriguanaes that took place on three war fronts. The event was the perfect opportunity for the Audiencia de Charcas to demonstrate that it could take on military functions of a viceregal nature and negotiate, organise, and execute an expedition against the rebels with little cost to the

Crown and with an enduring impact along the border, this is, the complete opposite to Toledo's costly entrada. Lozano Machuca, an hidalgo close to Toledo and a royal officer, helped to secure the funds that were needed to pursue the expedition. However, it was not he who would emerge triumphant of this event, but those 'practical' members of his crew who brought the expedition to completion. The Audiencia gave credit and power to those individuals with strong local connections who were able to keep the land trouble-free. In effect, this pragmatical approach made the monarchy resilient and flexible, as laws and strategies were changed, discussed, and scrutinised at a small scale. Those implementing decisions were always 'good or bad' agents, keeping the monarchy's reputation safe.

This thesis also shifted the discussion on jurisdiction that has largely been approached from a legal perspective to the symbolic and ritual sphere, as it demonstrated the importance of presence associated with the concept. Jurisdiction aimed to make a distant authority present, yet, ambiguously, by bringing such presence, its absence was being acknowledged. In the dramaturgy of the political in Spanish American societies, jurisdiction was embodied, exerted, performed, staged, ritualised, and displayed. It was anchored in space through towns and cities, and their churches, convents, and cabildo buildings, which symbolised possession and irradiated their political and religious power over a discontinuous area. Over distances, jurisdiction was measured in terms of journeys, of how many days it would take someone to travel from one point to the next. When such journeys acquired political meaning, such as during visitas or entradas, there was also a political and religious liturgy to follow which turned them into processions, never dissimilar to those frequently organised to mark religious festivals and/or civic occasions, and which often included punishment and violence. Rituals and ceremonies made jurisdiction feel real and close to those involved. They reaffirmed loyalties and replayed political fictions, both needed in remote lands such as the Charcas borders.

With the borders in focus, this thesis analysed the transformation of geographical and cultural areas into political boundaries during the sixteenth century, including the situation in the last decades of Tahuantinsuyu. With its vast armies, a complex road network and a sophisticated warehouse system, Tahuantinsuyu's

original solution to the southeast Charcas borders was one that combined fortresses and exchanges, that largely relied on alliances with indigenous groups who were recompensed with privileged roles and status for their participation in the polity's expansion. In line with Tahuantinsuyu's political cycles, such partnerships had to be renewed with every new Inca and were already under strain at the time of its collapse.

The space vacated by Tahuantinsuyu was not occupied by the Spanish, but by the Chiriguanaes, who were able to expand at the expense of the chaos that ensued. The Catholic Monarchy's aggregational and integrational expansionism, which transformed land into new possessions, dispersing authority among agents with sometimes conflicting and juxtaposed jurisdictions, integrated and comprehended the fragmented world of Chiriguanaes factions through its own political culture. Such expansionism relied heavily on local elites, who adapted rules and regulations to meet their needs and those of their political allies, including the indigenous groups with whom they coexisted. However, this fragmentation also exposed border towns and their vecinos to chronic infighting which thwarted the first attempts to establish Spanish settlements near Chiriguanaes land. Further attempts, undertaken in a more organised manner, would be more successful, yet living conditions in border villages, which resembled fortified settlements, always remained fragile and vulnerable. The border was seen as an area with no law, no justice, and therefore no King and no religion. It was not a space empty of people as it would be seen in later years for there were always, at least in the Spanish imagination, crowds of indigenous souls waiting to be evangelised, waiting to be placed under the jurisdiction of the Catholic Monarchy. Devoid of law and justice, it became a space for outcasts, somewhere to hide among or close by unconquerable indigenous peoples. The land and its inhabitants were classed 'at war', a status the monarchy could do little to change in Charcas throughout its long history and one it inadvertently reinforced because of its own political constraints and inability to establish permanent jurisdiction along the border, something that when achieved, was always ephemeral.

From an ideological point of view, this study contributes to rebuilding the strategic narratives that were used to justify armed action and unleash violence and coercion against indigenous peoples seen as unconquerable and hostile with the

purpose of securing privileges, status, and honour, in a political system based on an 'economy of rewards and *mercedes*'. Such strategic narratives were centred on the potential loss of Porco and Potosí, stereotypical views of the Chiriguanaes based on carefully constructed and circulated 'hegemonic knowledges' that emphasised the childlike status of indigenous peoples and their 'natural bad inclination to sin and vice', and, lastly, the potential loss of Tucumán, all which justified continuous war and enslavement. Such narratives show how local elites saw themselves and wanted to be perceived as part of the Catholic Monarchy, whose principles and defence they carried out, always awaiting the King's approval and rewards.

Through a fiction carefully crafted over time, the elites of Charcas saw themselves as the guardians of these borders. In their imagination their presence guaranteed the monarchy the mineral wealth it needed, keeping its new vassals, its indigenous peoples, in peace and order. However, guardians can only exist if there is something or somebody to be guarded from, and the Chiriguanaes fitted the stereotype of savages that local elites recurrently conveyed in strategic narratives to justify any expedition against them. Although this symbiotic relation between the Chiriguanaes and local elites might seem to have trapped both sides in a recurrent cycle of violence and trade from which neither side could escape, this whole process was constantly changing and was quite fluid. The way that different border groups and Chiriguanaes factions articulated with each other and with the Audiencia, and through it with other Catholic Monarchy spaces, is likely to have varied over time. The conflicts in Tomina in the early 1580s between captains García Mosquera and Segura on one side, and Rodas on the other, that involved their Chiriguanaes factions, which have only been explored superficially in Chapter Four, provide a glimpse of this. The arrangements between Chiriguanaes and the Spanish are also likely to have intensified the incursions of the former against other lowland natives in search for captives. They probably changed the whole perception that the Chiriguanaes had of other indigenous peoples. Such dynamics have not been studied yet and because of their complexity and their importance, as the Catholic Monarchy's presence in the borders relied on them, require further investigation.

In summary, all three expeditions show how, as Charcas grew in importance for the monarchy, so did the ambitions of its own elite. The creation of an Audiencia was a key stage in this shift. The Audiencia was seen as the ideal institution to channel and make the monarch present in a district where royal presence had been weak and where vecinos were largely self-reliant and independent. A more densely 'politically equipped' region, with numerous towns and cities, and a thriving civic and religious life, combined with mineral wealth and resources, including a settled indigenous population, would always weigh favourably for the Audiencia and its elites. However, this process of consolidation of Charcas must not be mistaken as a journey to 'political independence' or a sign of 'proto-national patriotism'. It was simply the transition that most Catholic Monarchy districts hoped to make as part of their own political journeys.

This thesis should hopefully be a small contribution to a growing scholarship that highlights that it is anachronistic to analyse the Catholic Monarchy through the prism of the nation-states that succeeded it. The downscaling of politics, that relied on localisation of laws, as well as a high degree of flexibility and authority dispersion, moved the stage to the local sphere and presents an image that challenges traditional views of a centralised, slow-to-react, almost monolithic, inefficient, and prone-to-red tape monarchy, one that nation-states reproduced and tried to emphasise in their search for a newly imported modernity that quite never found its home in Latin America. Indeed, the sixteenth century Catholic Monarchy is still alive and not only in its manuscripts, works of art, and buildings. The region's soul searching must continue, but the journey should necessarily include the area's most distant history to make it meaningful.

Glossary of terms

Audiencia: A body of government and justice of the Catholic Monarchy with jurisdiction over a vast area around a main town or city and by extension the region under its jurisdiction.

Acuerdos: Any resolutions or "agreements" the Audiencia came to. The room where such debates took place was also known as Acuerdos.

Alcalde Ordinario: Magistrate attached to a Cabildo.

Aposentador: Responsible for settling and organising a military encampment.

Beneméritos: Worthy old conquistadors.

Cabildo: Town council.

Cacique: Indigenous leader (Hispanised Arawak).

Cajas Reales: Royal coffers. They were frequently situated in major cities.

Camarero/Campero: Chamberlain.

Capac Ñam: The official main Inca road.

Capitulaciones y asientos: Contracts drafted for the exploration and pacification of new areas and the establishment of cities and towns.

Cédula: Decree.

Real cédula: Royal decree.

Consejo de Indias: The Castille body responsible for overseeing the Indies or Spanish America and the Philippines.

Corregidor: Spanish official with administrative and judicial authority.

Corregimiento: Jurisdiction of a Corregidor.

Criado: Normally someone who was raised as part of a large family. It can also mean someone familiar with social and political connections. It could also mean a servant.

Cumbi: Fine Inca cloth.

Depositario: Legal post to oversee unclaimed or litigious assets.

Encomendero/a: Holder of an encomienda.

Encomienda: Grant of indigenous peoples to an individual as a personal reward for merits or services that gave the recipient the right to exact tribute in kind or cash and, until 1549, labour services, and who in return undertook to provide Christian instruction and protect those same natives.

Encomienda en depósito: Grant of indigenous peoples kept aside for a time when such natives could be reached and conquered.

Entrada: Military or religious expedition into unexplored or unpacified territory.

Gobernación: Jurisdiction of a governor.

Gobernador: Governor.

Huaca: Andean deity.

Indios de Guerra: Warlike natives, as opposed to ‘friendly indigenous peoples.

Justicia Mayor: Post with responsibilities over the delivery of justice.

Licenciado: Title given to a person with a degree of bachelor or a licentiate.

Kuraka: Andean ethnic lord.

Maese de Campo: Camp-master.

Maloca: Collective Chiriguanaes dwelling.

Mascaipacha: Knitted tassel fringe that only the Inca rulers wore. A symbol of authority.

Mercedes: Royal rewards.

Mestizaje: Racial mixing.

Mita: Andean rotational labour draft.

Mitayo: Male adult native compulsorily serving under the mita.

Mitimaes: Andean colonists removed from their original settlements to occupy land as colonists of Tahuantinsuyu.

Naciones: A denomination used by the Spanish to refer to groups of indigenous peoples who possibly shared similar cultural patterns.

Oidor: Spanish judge and member of an Audiencia.

Orejones: High-ranking Tahuantinsuyu official and advisor.

Panaca: Inca royal lineage.

Paje de guión: Responsible for bearing the coat of arms of a noble person.

Parcialidad: Kinship group within an indigenous community.

Policía: It is used as being kept in "policía" or in a good order, meaning by this, abiding by Christian customs, and respecting royal authority. This could be done through the establishments of villages and towns.

Presidio: Garrison, fort.

Probanza de méritos y servicios: Report on someone's merits and services ordinarily drafted with the help of a notary and/or solicitor/lawyer for the purpose of obtaining privileges or rewards from the Crown.

Procurador: Representative, solicitor, attorney.

Proveedor oficial: Responsible for supplying goods to an expedition.

Puna: Dry highland grasslands characteristic of the southern Andes.

Quinto: Tax of one fifth the value of an item. Generally paid on silver, among other items.

Quipocamayos: Those with the ability to read quipos or knotted cords used in Andean cultures to store information.

Reducción: Settlement formed by the amalgamation of several smaller settlements or created by drawing together natives.

Reducido: Forced settled native.

Regidor: Cabildo post.

Relación: An account.

Relaciones geográficas: Geographical accounts.

Reparto de encomienda: Distribution of encomienda grants.

Requerimiento: Legal document read to Indigenous peoples about to be conquered.

Residencia: Judicial review of the conduct of a Spanish official.

Situaciones; Rewards or pensions assigned to individuals or collectives based on tributes collected from encomiendas placed under the Crown.

Tasa: tribute.

Traslado: Copy of a document or a section, frequently with the purpose of providing further evidence as part of a legal process.

Vecino: Citizen of a town.

Veedor: Inspector.

Visita: Tour of inspection of an area.

Visitador: Royal official responsible for conducting a visita.

Yanacona: Native servant.

Bibliography and sources

Unpublished sources:

Archivo y Bibliotecas Nacionales de Bolivia (ABNB)

ABNB, ALP, CACh-38, [1585] Auto de la Audiencia de La Plata y declaración del capitán Arias de Herrera, teniente general, sobre su sentir de la pretendida entrada y guerra a la cordillera del general Juan Lozano Machuca contra los indios chiriguanaes.

ABNB, EC1618, [1574] Probanza de Melchor de Rodas.

ABNB, EC1674, [1573] Visita de Agustín de Ahumada a los Chichas.

ABNB, EP3, fols. 447r-447v, Donación de tres fanegadas de tierra para sembrar maiz en Mojotorillo en terminus de Santiago de la Frontera de Tomina de Melchor de Rodas a Miguel Martín. 13 de enero de 1584.

ABNB, EP16, fols 195v-197v, Convenio para trueque de mina. 8 de octubre de 1572.

ABNB, EP18, fols 399v-399r, Poder especial que otorga Catalina Ñusta, india, viuda mujer de Juan Bautista Morisco, a Alonso Gutiérrez, para que en nombre suyo pueda cobrar de Fray Pedro Gutiérrez, capellán del virrey Francisco de Toledo trescientos y más pesos de plata corriente, los cuales le mandó dar por el tiempo que le sirvió en la entrada a los indios chiriguanaes, [1578].

ABNB, EP20, 319r-320r, Poder de León de Ayance y Gasión de Torres de Mendoza, a Diego de Zárate, vecino de la ciudad de La Paz, para compra de ganado y ropa, o plata para Chiriguanaes, [1584].

Archivo General de Indias (AGI)

AGI, Charcas, 31, R1, N2, [1600] Relación cierta de Diego Felipe de Alcaya.

AGI, Charcas 35, [1578] Cartas de Juan Lozano Machuca a SM.

AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576] Información de méritos y servicios de don Juan Colque Guarache.

AGI, Charcas, 78, N20, [1583] Probanza de Cristóbal Ramirez de Montalvo.

AGI, Charcas, 78, N34, [1585] Probanza de Antonio Alderete Riomayor.

AGI, Charcas, 35, [1561-1614], Cartas y expedientes de oficiales reales.

AGI, Charcas ,79, N11, [1592] Probanza de Lope Vazquez Pestana.

AGI, Charcas, 79, N14, [1590] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Núñez Maldonado. Traslado de 1600 de una información de 1590. Con parecer de la Audiencia de 1599.

AGI, Charcas, 79, N22, [1592-1593] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Francisco Aymozo [sic], cacique principal y gobernador de los indios yamparaes de Yotala y Quilaquila.

AGI, Charcas, 79, N25, [1593] Probanza de Francisco de la Cuba.

AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, [1600] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, capitán. Traslado de 1600 de una información de 1598.

AGI, Charcas, 81, N11, [1601-1610] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Julio Ferrufiño, contador y juez oficial de La Paz. Traslado de 1610 con informaciones de 1601-1606-1610. Dos ejemplares de traslados de 1606 con informaciones de 1601-1606. Otro traslado de 1601 con información y parecer del mismo año.

AGI, Charcas, 84, N10, [1605] Probanza de Fernando de Toledo Pimentel.

AGI, Charcas, 85, N5, [1606] Probanza de Juan Alonso de Vera y Zárate

AGI, Charcas, 85, N10, [1607] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Fernando de Irarrazábal y Andía, capitán. Información contenida de 1607. Con parecer de la Audiencia. Hay otra información de 1607 de sus méritos y servicios, y los de su padre Francisco de Irarrazábal y Andía, con una petición y un decreto al final de la misma de 1610.

AGI, Charcas, 86, N17, [1610] Probanza de Diego de Zárate Irarrazábal y Andía.

AGI, Charcas, 87, N19, [1618] Informaciones Gabriel Paniagua de Loaisa.

AGI, Charcas, 93, N1, [1646] Probanza de Francisco de Maturana Trascapo.

AGI, Charcas, 94, N19, [1589] Probanza de Hernando de Salazar.

AGI, Charcas, 418, L1, [1563] Registro de oficio y partes: reales cédulas y provisiones, etc., conteniendo disposiciones de gobierno y gracia para las autoridades y particulares del distrito de la Audiencia de Charcas.

AGI, Charcas, 418, L1, Título de factor y veedor de la provincia de los Charcas, en lugar de Juan de Anguciana, suspendido a raíz de la visita que a él, y demás oficiales reales, tomó el licenciado Castro, del Consejo de Indias.

AGI, Contaduria, 1805, [1575] Gastos de la guerra de los chiriguanaes.

AGI, Contratación, 5792, L1, [1573] Nombramiento de Juan Lozano Machuca como factor y veedor de Charcas

AGI, Indiferente, 425, L24, [1567] Real provisión de notaría de las Indias para Juan Lozano Machuca.

AGI, Indiferente, 2086, N83, [1573]. Expediente de concesión de licencia para pasar a Nueva Toledo, a favor de Juan Lozano Machuca, escribano, factor y veedor de la Real Hacienda de Nueva Toledo (Charcas), con tres criados, uno de ellos casado, y tres esclavos.

AGI, Justicia, N1, R2, [1565-1571]. Jerónimo de Alanís, mercader, vecino de la ciudad de La Plata contra los herederos del Capitán Martín de Almendras, sobre el pago de 8.000 pesos.

AGI, Lima, 207, N8, [1578] Probanza de Francisco de Valenzuela.

AGI, Lima, 207, N13, [1581] Probanza de Juan Ortiz de Zarate.

AGI, Lima, 207, N25, [1575] Probanza de Pedro Gutiérrez Flores.

AGI, Lima, 208, N24, [1589] Probanza de Diego de Aguilar.

AGI, Lima, 209, N1, [1589] Probanza Rodrigo Campuzano de Sotomayor.

AGI, Lima, 212, N8, [1598] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Cristóbal de Baranda, capitán, alguacil mayor de Charcas y Potosí, pacificador de los chiriguanas y pacificador en Chile como alférez de la compañía del capitán Fernando de Córdoba y Figueroa. Información y parecer de la Audiencia de Lima.

AGI, Lima, 212, N19, [1599] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Juan de Reinoso, paje del virrey Francisco de Toledo, vecino de Lima, pacificador de los chiriguanas en Charcas, luchó contra los ingleses en Panamá. Información y parecer de la Audiencia de Lima.

AGI, Lima, 213, N4, [1600] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Alvaro Ruíz de Navamuel, secretario de la gobernación del Perú y secretario de la Audiencia de Lima. Consta también la información de Sebastián Sánchez de Merlo,

vecino de Lima, secretario de la Audiencia de Panamá, que marchó al Perú con Cristóbal Vaca de Castro.

AGI, Lima, 213, N9, [1601] Probanza Juan Bautista Gallinato.

AGI, Lima, 214, N5, [1602] Probanza de Gaspar Flores.

AGI, Lima, 218, N2, [1611] Probanza de Antonio Zapata.

AGI, Lima, 241, N9, [1648] Informaciones de oficio y parte: Alonso Troncoso Lira y Sotomayor. Vecino de las fronteras de Tomina.

AGI, MP, Buenos Aires 12, [1588] Esta es la cordillera en que habita la nación chiriguana, que por la parte del Este confina con la provincia de los Charcas en distancia de 170 leguas de longitud (sic) Norte Sur, y de longitud por lo más angosto 20.

AGI, Justicia, 1125, N5, R1, [1551] El capitán Cristóbal Barba, con el adelantado Juan Ortiz de Zárate, ambos vecinos de la ciudad de La Plata, sobre el derecho a los indios moyos.

AGI, Panama, 13, R16, N70, [1577] Carta del doctor Alonso Criado de Castilla, oidor de la Audiencia de Panamá, en que da cuenta de los siguientes puntos: disminución del comercio en aquel reino por los robos y asaltos de corsarios, en particular de los ingleses luteranos, aliados con los negros cimarrones, que entraron por Nombre de Dios hasta el río de las Balsas, por donde salieron al Golfo de San Miguel en la Mar del Sur; conveniencia de reducir a los indios del asiento de Choruca a uno de los pueblos que tienen doctrina; valuación de las mercaderías por debajo de los precios en que se venden después, en especial las perlas; cuentas que se han tomado a Baltasar de Sotomayor y otros oficiales antiguos; problemas de invernar la flota en aquellas partes; fraudes que se cometen en los pleitos de acreedores por parte

de los mercaderes de aquel reino; juzgado de bienes de difuntos y cosas que interesan para su buena administración, cobranza, depósito, y entrega a los interesados; diligencias que hizo con la gente que vino con el capitán Losada para el socorro de Chile, la cual no aceptó a Juan Lozano Machuca, factor de la Plata, que sucedió en el cargo al citado capitán tras su fallecimiento; aprobación de su matrimonio con Casilda de Vera, hija del licenciado Diego de Vera.

AGI, Panama, 61, N67, [1578] Informaciones de Diego de Frias Trejo.

AGI, Patronato, 120, N2, R6, [1575] Probanza de Diego de Valera.

AGI, Patronato, 122, R2, N9, [1578] Informaciones de los méritos y servicios del general Juan Lozano Machuca, que fue nombrado en comisión para levantar gente en Valladolid, Toro, Zamora, Salamanca, Medina del Campo, Toledo, y otras partes, con cuya gente pasó al socorro de Chile y ayudó a su conquista, y estando allí fue nombrado sucesor del general Juan Lozada tras su muerte

AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580] Información de los méritos y servicios de los generales Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, desde el año de 1536 en la conquista y pacificación de Perú, habiéndose hallado en el cerco de la ciudad de Cuzco perseguidos por Mango Inca, cuyos servicios hicieron en compañía de los capitanes Hernando y Juan Pizarro. Constan asimismo los servicios hechos por Diego de Almendras, hermano del general Martín de Almendras.

AGI, Patronato, 124, R10, [1580] Información de Garci Martin de Castaneda.

AGI, Patronato, 124, R11, [1580] Información de los méritos y servicios de don Fernando de Zárate en la conquista del reino de Perú, castigo y persecución

de los indios chiriguanaes con don Francisco de Toledo. Son dos informaciones.

AGI, Patronato, 125, R4, [1582] Probanza de Pedro de Segura.

AGI, Patronato, 126, R11, [1582] Probanza de Alonso de Peñafiel.

AGI, Patronato, 126, R17, (1606). Información de los méritos y servicios de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, maese de campo, en la conquista de Perú, con el presidente Gasca, sirviendo contra Gonzalo Pizarro.

AGI, Patronato, 126, R18, [1582] Información de los méritos y servicios de Roque de Cuéllar y de su hijo Pedro, en la conquista y pacificación de Perú con el licenciado Gasca, persiguiendo además a los tiranos de aquel reino.

AGI, Patronato, 127, N1, R12, [1584] Información de los méritos y servicios de Juan Pérez de Zorita en la conquista y pacificación de Perú y persecución de Francisco Hernández Girón, habiendo servido también en las guerras de Italia, Argel, y Tremecén.

AGI, Patronato, 126, R6, [1582] Méritos y Servicios de Diego Pantoja de Chaves.

AGI, Patronato, 127, N1, R17, [1583] Probanza de Toribio Bernaldo y Rodrigo de Arce.

AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, [1584] Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Francisco Arias de Herrera, que sirvió en la conquista y pacificación de Perú y particularmente en el sosiego de los indios chichimecas, también en la toma del Peñón, batalla de Lepanto, habiendo ido dos veces a la China y con socorros a las islas Filipinas.

AGI, Patronato, 131, N1, R3, [1587] Información de los méritos y servicios de Hernando de Cazorla, maese de campo general, hechos en la conquista de Perú,

sirviendo particularmente contra Gonzalo Pizarro y en varias batallas contra indios levantados.

AGI, Patronato, 131, N2, R3, [1588] Probanza de Rodrigo de Orellana.

AGI, Patronato, 132, N1, R4, [1589] Información de Juan Gutierrez de Beas.

AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R7, [1590] Probanza de Alonso de Paredes.

AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, [1590] Información Juan Mejía Miraval.

AGI, Patronato, 133, R5, [1591] Información de los méritos y servicios de Francisco de Guzmán y Juan de Rivamartín, que sirvieron en Nueva España y después pasaron a Perú hacia 1537 y se hallaron en la conquista de aquel reino y de los indios chiriguanaes.

AGI, Patronato, 136, N1, R4, [1596] Información de méritos y servicios del capitán Juan Ladrón de Leyba.

AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R2, [1598] Información de los méritos y servicios del capitán Luis de Fuentes y Vargas, corregidor y poblador de la villa de San Bernardo de la Frontera de Tarija y conquistador de otros pueblos de Perú.

AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, [1598] Probanza de Luis Hernández Barja.

AGI, Patronato, 141, R1, [1603] Probanza de Juan de Villegas.

AGI, Patronato, 144, R1, [1608] Probanza de Luis de Mendoza y Rivera.

AGI, Patronato, 146, N3, R1, [1613] Probanza de Juan de la Reinaga Salazar.

AGI, Patronato, 147, N4, R3, [1618] Probanza de don Pedro de Portugal y Navarra.

AGI, Patronato, 149, N1, R1, [1627] Méritos y Servicios. Lorenzo de Cepeda y Hermanos.

AGI, Patronato, 189, R 26, [1569 sic] [1579] Relaciones de las mercedes hechas por Francisco de Toledo, virrey de Perú, a los sujetos que se expresan en dichas relaciones.

AGI, Patronato, 190, R23, [1577] Representación de Diego de Porras sobre el origen y estado de las compañías de lanzas y arcabuceros en Perú. Acompaña una relación de lo que han supuesto los tributos en Perú, destinados al pago de dichas lanzas y arcabuces.

AGI, Patronato, 190, R25, [1578] Información recibida a petición del virrey de Perú, don Francisco de Toledo, sobre las enfermedades que padecía en aquel reino, y edad que tenía cuando fue a él.

AGI Patronato, 235, R1, [24 octubre 1571] Chiriguanaes. Ynformacion que se hizo por mandado del excelentisimo señor visorrey del Peru sobre la cordillera de los chiriguanaes por su persona que su excelencia ymbio y lo que piden los dichos yndios que se haga con ellos para salir de paz.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R2, [1573/1574] Parecer del presidente y oidores de las Audiencias de los Charcas y La Plata, sobre el modo de hacer la guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y castigo que debía imponérseles.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R3, [1573] Información hecha en la Audiencia de La Plata, de orden del virrey del Perú, Francisco de Toledo, sobre averiguar la aparición de un joven entre los indios chiriguanaes que se dijo ser Santiago Apostol, enviado por Jesús para predicarles y convertirlos a la religión católica.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R4, [1574] Relacion de lo que se hizo en la jornada que el excelentisimo señor virrey del Piru don Francisco de Toledo hizo por su persona entrando a hazer Guerra a los chiriguanaes de las fronteras y cordilleras desta provincial en el año de setenta y quatro.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R5, [1574] Acuerdo que celebró el virrey con algunos prelados de religiones de la ciudad de La Plata, sobre si convendría hacer guerra a los indios chiriguanaes y declararlos por esclavos.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R7, [1582] Información hecha por la justicia de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera, en virtud de Real Provisión, sobre la conducta y trato que observaban los indios chiriguanaes.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R9, [1583] Autos y diligencias hechas por la Audiencia de La Plata, sobre los daños, muertes y robos que los indios chiriguanaes cometían en aquellas fronteras, y guerra que contra ellos se ha pregonado. Contienen estos autos las capitulaciones y asiento que se tomó con el capitán Miguel Martínez, sobre la población de la villa de San Miguel de la Laguna y lo que en ella sucedió.

AGI, Patronato, 235, R10, [1586] Testimonio de los autos formados en la Audiencia de La Plata, sobre la guerra que debía hacerse a los indios chiriguanaes. Acompaña la descripción de aquella tierra y de la provincia de Santa Cruz de la Sierra.

AGI, Patronato, 237, R7, [1582] Información hecha por la justicia de la villa de Santiago de la Frontera, en virtud de Real Provisión, sobre la conducta y trato que observaban los indios chiriguanaes.

AGI, Quito, 35, N24, [1567-1571] Expediente de confirmación del oficio de canciller de la audiencia a Juan Lozano Machuca.

Biblioteca Nacional de España (BNE)

BNE, Ms 2,927, Libro de cédulas y provisiones del Rey Nuestro Señor para el gobierno de este reino y provincia, justicia y hacienda y patronazgo real, casos de Inquisición y eclesiasticos y de indios y de bienes de difuntos y de otras materias, que se han enviado a esta Real Audiencia de La Plata.

BNE, Ms 3,043, Ordenanzas y Comisiones para el Reino de Granada y Obispado de Quito.

BNE, Ms. 3,044, Papeles varios tocantes al gobierno de Indias.

BNE, Ms. 6,643, El héroe, Baltasar Gracián.

Biblioteque Nacionale de France (BFN)

MS Espagnol 175, ffs, 90-91v, Mémorial du capitaine "Joan Ladron de Leyba, corregidor y justicia maior de la frontera de Pazpaia", pour obtenir que le capitaine Alvaro de Paz Villalobos ne s'entremette pas dans son gouvernement.

British Library

British Library, Ms 13,977, Memoria de las casas y conventos y doctrinas que tiene la horden de Nuestra Señora de Nuestra Merced en las Yndias del Peru.

Published primary sources:

Acosta, José de. *Historia natural y moral de las Indias*. Sevilla: Casa de Juan Leon, 1590.

Arsans de Orzúa y Vela, Bartolomé. *Historia de la villa imperial de Potosí.* Providence: Brown University Press, 1965 [1705].

Barco Centenera, Martín del. *Argentina y conquista del Rio de la Plata, con otros acaecimientos de los reynos del Perú, Tucumán, y Estado del Brasil.* Lisbon: Pedro Crasbeek, 1602.

Barco Centenera, Martín del. *The Argentine and the Conquest of the River Plate*. Buenos Aires: Instituto Cultural Water Owen, 1965.

Barriga, Victor M. *Los mercedarios en el Perú en el siglo XVI. Documentos del Archivo General de Indias. 1518-1600.* Vol. 3. Arequipa: Establecimientos Graficos La Colmena SA, 1942.

Barriga, Victor M. *Mercedarios ilustres en el Perú. El padre fray Diego de Porres, misionero insigne en el Perú y en Santa Cruz de la Sierra.* Vol. II. Arequipa: Establecimientos Graficos La Colmena SA, 1949.

Betanzos, Juan de, María del Carmen Martín Rubio, Horacio Villanueva Urteaga, and Demetrio Ramos Pérez, eds. *Suma y narración de los incas*. Madrid: Atlas, 1987, [1551].

Calancha, Antonio de la. *Chronica moralizada del orden de San Augustin en el Perú con sucesos exemplares vistos en esta monarchia*. Barcelona: Pedro Lacaballeria, 1638.

Candela, Guillaume. *Entre la pluma y la cruz: El clérigo Martín González y la desconocida historia de su defensa de los indios del Paraguay: Documentos inéditos (1543-1575)*. Asunción, Paraguay: Editorial Tiempo de Historia, 2018.

Capoche, Luis. *Relación general de la villa imperial de Potosí*. Vol. CXXII. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles. Madrid: Atlas, 1958, [1585].

Casassas, José María. "Carta del factor de Potosí Juan Lozano Machuca (al virrey del Perú don Martín Enríquez) en que da cuenta de cosas de aquella villa y de las minas de los Lipes (Año 1581)." *Estudios Atacameños. Arqueología y Antropología Surandinas.*, no. 10 (1992): 30–34.

Comajuncosa, Antonio, and Corrado Alejandro. *El colegio franciscano de Tarija y sus misiones. noticias históricas recogidas por dos misioneros del mismo colegio.* Quaracchi: Tipografía del Colegio de San Buenaventura, 1884.

Cieza de León, Pedro. *Crónica del Perú.* Cuarta Parte. Vol 2. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 1994, [1551].

Díaz de Guzmán, Ruy. *Argentina: Historia del descubrimiento y conquista del Río de la Plata*. Buenos Aires: Editorial de la Facultad de Filosofía y Letras, Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2012, [1612].

Egaña, Antonio de, ed. *Monumenta peruana. (1565-1575)*. Vol. I. Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1954.

Enciso Contreras, José. *Cedulario de la Audiencia de La Plata de Charcas (siglo XVI)*. Sucre: ABNB, 2005.

Espada, Marcos Jiménez de la. *Relaciones geográficas de Indias: Perú*. Vol. II. Ministerio de Fomento. Impreso en la Casa Real, 1885.

Espinoza Soriano, Waldemar. "El reino aymara de quillaca-asanaque, siglos XV y XVI." *Revista Del Museo Nacional de Lima* XLV (1981): 175–274.

Garay, Blas. *Colección de documentos relativos a la historia de América y particularmente a la historia de Paraguay.* Vol. 2. Asunción: Talleres Nacionales de Martín Kraus, 1901.

García-Gallo, Alfonso, and Diego de Encinas. *Cedulario indiano o cedulario de Encinas*. Vol IV, Madrid: Boletín Oficial del Estado, 2018 [1596].

Garcilaso de la Vega, El Inca. *Primera parte de los commentarios reales.* Lisbon: Oficina de Pedro Crasbeeck, 1609.

Gonçalez Holguin, Diego. *Vocabulario de la lengua general de todo el Peru llamada lengua qquichua, o del inca*. Ciudad de Los Reyes (Lima): Francisco del Canto, 1607.

Guamán Poma de Ayala, Felipe, *El primer nueva corónica y buen gobierno*. México: Siglo Veintiuno, 2006 [1615].

Gutiérrez de Santa Clara, Pedro. *Historia de las guerras civiles del Perú (1544-1548)*. Vol. 2. Madrid: Librería General de Victoriano Suárez, 1904.

Julien, Catherine, Kristina Angelis, and Zulema Bass Werner de Ruiz. *Historia de Tarija. Corpus documental.* Vol. VI. Tarija: Editora Guadalquivir, 1997.

Julien, Catherine J. *Desde el Oriente: Documentos para la historia del oriente boliviano y Santa Cruz La Vieja, 1542-1597*. Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Fondo Editorial Municipal, 2008.

Konetzke, Richard. *Colección de documentos para la historia social de la formación de Hispanoamérica. 1493-1810.* Vol. Vol 1 (1493-1592). Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Instituto Francisco de Vitoria, 1953.

Las Siete Partidas Del Sabio Rey Don Alonso El Nono, Nuevamente Glosadas Por El Licenciado Gregorio López Del Consejo Real de Indias de Su Magestad. Vol. 1. Salamanca: Andrea de Portonari, 1555.

Levillier, Roberto. *La Audiencia de Charcas. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. 1561-1579.* Vols. 1 and 2. Madrid: Colección de Publicaciones Históricas de la Biblioteca del Congreso Argentino, 1918.

Levillier, Roberto. *Audiencia de Lima. Correspondencia de presidentes y oidores. (1549-1564).* Vol. I. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1922.

Levillier, Roberto. *Gobernación de Tucumán. Probanzas de méritos y servicios de los conquistadores. Documentos del Archivo de Indias. (1583-1600).* Vol. 2. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1920.

Levillier, Roberto. *Gobernantes del Perú. Cartas y papeles. Siglo XVI*. Vol. 3, 4, 6, 9. Madrid: Sucesores de Rivadeneyra, 1921-1924.

Lizárraga, Reginaldo de. *Descripción colonial*. Libro segundo. Buenos Aires: Librería de la Facultad, 1916 [1605].

Lohmann Villena, Guillermo and Sarabia Viejo, María Justina, eds, *Francisco de Toledo: Disposiciones Gubernativas Para El Virreinato Del Perú. 1575-1581*. Vol. II. Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1986.

Loredo, Rafael. "Relaciones de repartimientos que existían en el Perú al finalizar la rebelión de Gonzalo Pizarro." *Revista de La Universidad Católica de Perú* VIII, no. 1 (1940): 51–62.

Loredo, Rafael. *Los Repartos; Bocetos para la nueva historia del Perú*. Lima: No Identified Publisher, 1958.

López de Caravantes, Francisco. *Noticia general del Perú*. Vol. 6. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles. Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1989, [1630-1631].

López Villalva, José Miguel (director). *Acuerdos de la Real Audiencia de La Plata de los Charcas (1561 – 1568)*. Vols. 1, 2. Sucre: Corte Suprema de Justicia de Bolivia, Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, Embajada de España en Bolivia, Agencia Española de Cooperación Internacional para el Desarrollo, 2007.

Mariño de Lovera, Pedro. *Crónica del reino de Chile*. Vol. VI. Colección de Historiadores de Chile y Documentos Relativos a la Historia Nacional. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta del Ferrocarril, 1865 [1594].

Matienzo, Juan de. *Gobierno del Perú.* Paris: Lima: IFEA, 1967 [1567].

Maurtua, Victor. *Juicio de límites entre el Perú y Bolivia. Prueba peruana presentada al gobierno de la República Argentina*. Vols. 2, 9, Barcelona: Imprenta de Henrich y Cia, 1906.

Medina, José Toribio. *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de Chile.* Vols. VI, VII, Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1896.

Melendez, Fray Ivan. *Tesoros verdaderos de las Yndias en la historia de la gran provincia de San Juan Bautista del Peru.* Vol. 3. Roma: Imprenta de Nicolas Angel Tinassio, 1681.

Miraflores, Marqués, and Miguel Salva. *Colección de documentos inéditos para la historia de España*. Vol. L. Madrid: Imprenta de la Viuda de Calero, 1867.

Mujía, Ricardo. *Bolivia-Paraguay. Exposición de los títulos que consagran el derecho territorial de Bolivia, sobre la zona comprendida entre los rios Pilcomayo y Paraguay, presentada por el doctor Ricardo Mujía, enviado extraordinario y ministro plenipotenciario de Bolivia en el Paraguay. Anexos.* Vol. II. La Paz: Empresa Editora "El Tiempo," 1914.

Murua, Martín de. *Historia general del Perú. De los orígenes al último inca.* Madrid: Cambio16, 1992 [1606].

Nuñez Cabeza de Vaca, Alvar. *Relación de los naufragios y comentarios*. Madrid: Libreria General de Victoriano Suárez, 1906 [1542].

Otte, Enrique, and Guadalupe Albi Romero, eds. *Cartas privadas de emigrantes a Indias, 1540-1616*. Sevilla: Consejería de Cultura, Junta de Andalucía: Escuela de Estudios Hispano Americanos de Sevilla, 1988.

Pärssinen, Martti, and Jukka Kiviharju, eds. *Textos andinos: corpus de textos khipu incaicos y coloniales. T. 2:* Acta Ibero-Americana Fennica 6. Madrid: Inst. Iberoamericano de Finlandia, 2004.

Pizarro, Pedro. *Descubrimiento y conquista del Perú*. Vol. VI. Lima: Imprenta y Librería San Martí Ca, 1917, [1571].

Platt, Tristán, Thérèse Bouysse-Cassagne, and Olivia Harris, eds. *Qaraqara-Charka: Mallku, inka y rey en la provincia de Charcas (siglos XV-XVII): Historia antropológica de una confederación aymara*. 1. ed. Lima Perú: La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos (IFEA); Plural Editores; University of St. Andrews; University of London; Fundación Cultural del Banco Central de Bolivia; Inter-American Foundation, 2006.

Real Academia Española. *Diccionario de la lengua castellana en que se explica el verdadero sentido de las voces su naturaleza y calidad con las phrases o modo de hablar los proverbios y refranes y otras cosas convenientes al uso de la lengua*. Vol. I. Madrid: Imprenta de la Real Academia Española, 1726.

Romera Iruela, Luis, and María del Carmen Galbís Diez. *Catalogo de pasajeros a Indias durante los siglos XVI, XVII y XVIII*. Vol. 1. Sevilla: AGI, 1980.

Rosales, Diego. *Historia general de el reyno de Chile. Flandes indiano.* Vol. II. Valparaiso: Imprenta del Mercurio, 1878 [1674].

Rowe, John. "Probanza de los incas nietos de conquistadores." *Histórica* IX, no. 2 (1985): 193–245.

Pachacuti Yamqui Salcamaygua, Joan de Santa Cruz. *Relación de antiguedades deste reyno del Piru: Estudio etnohistórico y linguístico*. Edited by Pierre Duviols and César Itier. Lima, Institut français d'études andines, 1993, [1613].

Sarmiento de Gamboa, Pedro. *Historia de los incas*. Madrid: Miraguano Editores, 2001 [1572].

Torres de Mendoza, Luis. *Colección de documentos inéditos relativos al descubrimiento, conquista y organización de las antiguas posesiones españolas de América y Oceanía sacados de los archivos del reino y muy especialmente del de Indias*. Vol. 4. Madrid: Imprenta de Frias y Cia, 1865.

López de Velasco, Juan. *Geografía y descripción universal de las Indias*. Madrid: Establecimiento Tipográfico de Fortanet, 1894, [1571-1574].

Vargas Machuca, Don Bernardo. *Milicia y descripción de las Indias*. Vol. 1. 2 vols. Madrid: Libreria de Victoriano Suárez, 1892 [1599].

Secondary sources:

Rolena Adorno, *The Polemics of Possession in Spanish American Narrative* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2007).

Agüero, Alejandro. "Las categorías básicas de la cultura jurisdiccional." In *De justicia de jueces a justicia de leyes: Hacia la España de 1870*, Vol. VI. Cuadernos de Derecho Judicial. Madrid: Consejo General del Poder Judicial, 2006.

Agüero, Alejandro. *Castigar y perdonar cuando conviene a la república. La justicia penal de Córdoba del Tucumán, siglos XVII y XVIII*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Políticos y Constitucionales, 2008.

Agüero, Alejandro. "Ciudad y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen. La tradición castellana." In *El derecho local en la periferia de la Monarquía Hispana. Río de La Plata, Tucumán y Cuyo. Siglos XVI-XVIII*. Buenos Aires: Editorial Dunken, 2013.

Agüero, Alejandro. “Local Law and Localization of Law. Hispanic Legal Tradition and Colonial Culture (16th–18th Centuries).” In *Spatial and Temporal Dimensions for Legal History Research Experiences and Itineraries*, 101–29. Frankfurt am Main: Max Planck Institute for European Legal History, 2016.

Alconini Mujica, Sonia. *Southeast Inka Frontiers: Boundaries and Interactions*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2016.

Altman, Ida. *Emigrants and Society: Extremadura and America in the Sixteenth Century*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1989.

Alvarez, Salvador. “La guerra chichimeca.” In *Historia del reino de Nueva Galicia*, 211–62. Jalisco: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2016.

Arkush, Elizabeth N. *Hillforts of the Ancient Andes: Colla Warfare, Society, and Landscape*. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2011.

Arze Quiroga, Eduardo. *Historia de Bolivia. Fases del proceso hispano-americano: Origenes de la sociedad boliviana en el siglo XVI*. La Paz-Cochabamba: Los Amigos del Libro, 1969.

Assadourian, Carlos Sempat. *El sistema de la economía colonial. Mercado interno, regiones y espacio económico*. Lima: IEP, 1982.

Austin, Shawn Michael. *Colonial Kinship: Guaraní, Spaniards, and Africans in Paraguay*. Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 2020.

Aznar Vallejo, Eduardo. “The Conquests of the Canary Islands.” In *Implicit Understandings. Observing, Reporting and Reflecting on the Encounters Between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era.*, 134–156. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994.

Bakewell, P. J. *Mineros de la montaña roja: el trabajo de los indios en Potosí, 1545-1650*. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1989.

Barnadas, Josep. M. *Charcas. Origenes historicos de una sociedad colonial. 1535-1565*. La Paz: CIPCA, 1973.

Barragán Vargas, Mario E. *Historia temprana de Tarija*. Tarija, Bolivia: Grafica Offset Kokito, 2001.

Barrientos Grandón, Javier. *El gobierno de las Indias*. Madrid: Marcial Pons, 2004.

Barrientos Grandón, Javier. "'Méritos y servicios': Su patrimonialización en una cultura jurisdiccional (s. XVI-XVII)." *Revista de Estudios Histórico-Jurídicos* XL (2018): 589–615.

Barriera, Dario G. *Abrir puertas a la tierra: microanálisis de la construcción de un espacio político: Santa Fe, 1573-1640*. Santa Fe (Argentina): Museo Histórico Provincial Brigadier Estanislao López, 2017.

Barriera, Dario. *Historia y justicia: Cultura, política y sociedad en el Río de La Plata*. Buenos Aires: Prometeo Libros, 2019.

Benton, Lauren A. "Making Order out of Trouble: Jurisdictional Politics in the Spanish Colonial Borderlands." *Law & Social Inquiry* 26, no. 2 (Spring 2001): 373–401.

Benton, Lauren A. *Law and Colonial Cultures: Legal Regimes in World History, 1400-1900*. Cambridge, UK; New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2002.

Brendecke, Arndt. *Imperio e información: funciones del saber en el dominio colonial español*. Translated by Griselda Mársico. Madrid: Iberoamericana Vervuert, 2016.

Bridikhina, Eugenia. *Theatrum mundi. Entramados del poder en Charcas colonial*. Lima: Institute français d'études andines, 2015.

Boccara, Guillaume. "Génesis y estructura de los complejos fronterizos euro-indígenas. Repensando los márgenes americanos a partir (y mas allá) de la obra de Nathan Wachtel." *Memoria Americana* 13 (2005): 21–52.

Bouza Alvarez, Fernando J. *Palabra e imagen en la corte: Cultura oral y visual de la nobleza en el Siglo de Oro*. Madrid: Abada Editores, 2003.

Bouysse-Cassagne, Thérèse. *La Identidad aymara. Aproximación histórica. (siglo XV, siglo XVI)*. La Paz: Hisbol/IFEA, 1987.

Del Busto, Jose Antonio. *La hueste perulera*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1981.

Calvo, Thomas, and Aristarco Regalado Pinedo. *Historia del reino de la Nueva Galicia*. Jalisco: Universidad de Guadalajara, 2016.

Cañeque, Alejandro. *The King's Living Image: The Culture and Politics of Viceregal Power in Colonial Mexico*. New York, N.Y: Routledge, 2004.

Cañeque, Alejandro. *Un imperio de mártires: Religión y poder en las fronteras de la Monarquía Hispánica*. Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2020.

Cañizares-Esguerra, Jorge. "Typology in the Atlantic World. Early Modern Readings of Colonization." In *Soundings in Atlantic History. Latent Structures and Intellectual Currents, 1500-1830.*, 237–264. London: Harvard Univ. Press, 2009.

Cardim, Pedro, Tamar Herzog, José Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, and Gaetano Sabatini, eds. *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?* Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.

Castillo, David. "Gracián and the Art of Public Representation." In *Rhetoric and Politics: Baltasar Gracián and the New World Order*, 191–209. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1997.

Cervantes, Fernando. *Conquistadores. A New History*. London: Penguin Books, 2021.

Clavero, Bartolomé. *Antidora: Antropología católica de la economía moderna*. Milano: Giuffrè, 1991.

Clavero, Bartolomé. "Justicia y gobierno. Economía y gracia." In *Real Chancillería de Granada: V Centenario 1505-2005.*, 121–48. Granada: Junta de Andalucía, Consejería de Cultura, 2006.

Centenero de Arce, Domingo. "Una monarquía de lazos débiles? Circulación y experiencia como formas de construcción de la Monarquía Católica" In *Oficiales reales. Los ministros de la Monarquía Católica. (Siglos XVI-XVIII).* Valencia: Universitat de Valencia, 2012.

Colajanni, Antonino. "El virrey Toledo como 'primer antropólogo aplicado' de la edad moderna. Conocimiento social y planes de transformación del mundo indígena peruano en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI." In *El silencio protagonista. El primer siglo jesuita en el virreynato del Perú. 1567-1667,* 51–95. Quito: Abya-Yala, 2004.

Colajanni, Antonino. *El virrey y los indios del Perú: Francisco de Toledo (1569-1581), la política indígena y las reformas sociales*. Quito, Ecuador: Abya Yala, 2018.

Cole, Jeffrey A. *The Potosí Mita, 1573-1700: Compulsory Indian Labor in the Andes*. Stanford, Calif: Stanford University Press, 1985.

Combès, Isabelle. *Etno-historias del Isoso: Chané y chiriguanos en el Chaco boliviano (siglos XVI a XX)*. La Paz, Institut français d'études andines, 2005.

Combès, Isabelle. "Grigotá y Vitupue. En los albores de la historia chiriguana (1559-1564)." *Bulletin de l'Institut Français d'Études Andines* 41, no. 1 (2012): 57–79.

Combès, Isabelle. "De luciferinos a canonizables: Representaciones del canibalismo chiriguano." *Boletín Americanista*, 2, LXIII, no. 67 (2013): 127–41.

Cook, Noble David. *Born to Die: Disease and New World Conquest, 1492-1650*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998.

Córdoba Ochoa, Luis Miguel. "Guerra, imperio, y violencia en la Audiencia de Santa Fe, Nuevo Reino de Granada. 1580-1620." Universidad Pablo de Olavide, 2013.

Costa, Pietro. *Iurisdictio. Semantica del potere politico nella pubblicistica medievale (1100-1433).* Milano: Giuffre Editore, [1969] 2002.

Covey, R. Alan. *How the Incas Built Their Heartland: State Formation and the Innovation of Imperial Strategies in the Sacred Valley, Peru*. History, Languages, and Cultures of the Spanish and Portuguese Worlds. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006.

D'Altroy, Terence N. *The Incas*. Malden, Mass: Blackwell, 2002.

Deeds, Susan M. *Defiance and Deference in Mexico's Colonial North: Indians under Spanish Rule in Nueva Vizcaya*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2003.

Díaz Ceballos, Jorge. *Poder compartido: Repúblicas urbanas, monarquía y conversación en Castilla de Oro, 1508-1573*. Madrid: Marcial Pons Historia, 2020.

Duviols, Pierre. *La lutte contre les religions autochtones dans le Perou colonial. "L'extirpation de l'idolatrie" entre 1532 et 1660*. Lima: IFEA, 1971.

Egginton, William. *How the World Became a Stage: Presence, Theatricality, and the Question of Modernity*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 2003.

Elliott, John. *Imperial Spain, 1469-1716*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970.

Elliott, John. "A Europe of Composite Monarchies." *Past and Present*, no. 137 (November 1992): 48–71.

Escribano Páez, José Miguel. *Juan Rena and the Frontiers of Spanish Empire, 1500-1540*. New York, NY: Routledge Taylor & Francis Group, 2020.

Faudree, Paja. "Reading the 'Requerimiento' Performatively: Speech Acts and the Conquest of the New World." *Colonial Latin American Review* 24, no. 4 (October 2, 2015): 456–78.

Folger, Robert. *Writing as Poaching. Interpellation and Self-Fashioning in Colonial Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios*. Leiden-Boston: Brill, 2011.

García-Abásolo, Antonio F. *Martín Enríquez y la reforma de 1568 en Nueva España*. Sevilla: Excma. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1983.

García Recio, José María. *Análisis de una sociedad de frontera: Santa Cruz de La Sierra en los siglos XVI y XVII*. Publicaciones de La Excma. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla. Sección Historia. V Centenario Del Descubrimiento de América, no. 9. Sevilla: Excma. Diputación Provincial de Sevilla, 1988.

Garriga, Carlos. "Orden jurídico y poder político en el Antiguo Régimen." *Revista de Historia Internacional* 16 (2004): 13–44.

Garriga, Carlos. "Patrias criollas, plazas militares. Sobre la América de Carlos IV" In *La América de Carlos IV*, Vol. 1. Cuadernos de Investigaciones y Documentos. Buenos Aires: Instituto de Investigaciones de Historia del Derecho, 2006.

Garriga, Carlos. "Concepción y aparatos de justicia: Las reales audiencias de las Indias." *Cuadernos de Historia* 19 (2009): 203–44.

Gayol, Víctor. "'Por todos los dias de nuestra vida...' Oficios de pluma, sociedad local y gobierno de la monarquía." In *Los oficios en las sociedades indianas.*, 301–29. México, D. F: UNAM, 2020.

Gazulla, Fray Policarpo. *Los primeros mercedarios en Chile. 1535-1600.* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta La Ilustración, 1918.

Giudicelli, Christophe. "Encasillar la frontera. Clasificaciones coloniales y disciplinamiento del espacio en el área diaguito-calchaquí. Siglos XVI-XVII." *Anuario IEHS*, no. 22 (2007): 161–211.

Gómez Rivas, León. *El virrey del Perú don Francisco de Toledo*. Serie Ia.--Monografías, no. 37. Toledo: Instituto Provincial de Investigaciones y Estudios Toledanos, Diputación Provincial, 1994.

Graña, Mario Julio. “Autoridad y memoria entre los killakas. Las estrategias discursivas de don Juan Colque Guarache en el sur andino. S. XVI.” *Historica* XXIV, no. 1 (julio 2000): 23–47.

Graña, Mario Julio. “La verdad asediada. Discursos de y para el poder. Escritura, institucionalización y élites indígenas surandinas. Charcas. Siglo XVI.” *Andes. Antropología e Historia*, no. 12 (2001): 123–39.

Graubart, Karen B. *Republics of Difference: Religious and Racial Self-Governance in the Spanish Atlantic World*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2022.

Griffiths, Nicholas. *The Cross and the Serpent: Religious Repression and Resurgence in Colonial Peru*. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1996.

Guevara-Gil, Armando, and Frank Salomon. “A ‘Personal Visit’: Colonial Political Ritual and the Making of the Indians in the Andes.” *CLAHR* 3, no. 1–2 (1994): 3–36.

Gustafson, Bret. “Were the Chiriguano a Colonial Fabrication? Linguistic Arguments for Rethinking Guaraní and Chané Histories in the Chaco.” In *Reimagining the Gran Chaco: Identities, Politics, and the Environment in South America*, 53–72. Florida, US: University Press of Florida, 2021.

Hanke, Lewis. *The Spanish Struggle for Justice in the Conquest of America*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1949.

Hanke, Lewis. *Los virreyes españoles en América durante el gobierno de la casa de Austria. Peru.* Vol. 1. Biblioteca de Autores Españoles. Madrid: Ediciones Atlas, 1978.

Haring, Clarence Henry. *The Spanish Empire in America*. New York and Burlingame: First Harbinger Books, 1963.

Hemming, John. *The Conquest of the Incas*. London: Macmillan, 1970.

Herzog, Tamar. *Ritos de control, prácticas de negociación: Pesquisas, visitas y residencias y las relaciones entre Quito y Madrid (1650-1750)*. Madrid: Fundación Ignacio Larramendi, 2000.

Herzog, Tamar. *Frontiers of Possession: Spain and Portugal in Europe and the Americas*. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2015.

Hespanha, António Manuel. *Vísperas del Leviatán. instituciones y poder político. (Portugal, siglo XVII).* Translated by Fernando Jesús Bouza Alvarez. Madrid: Taurus, 1989.

Hespanha, António Manuel. *La gracia del derecho. Economía de la cultura en la Edad Moderna*. Madrid: Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 1993.

Hespanha, António Manuel. *Caleidoscópio do antigo regime*. São Paulo: Alameda, 2012.

Hespanha, António Manuel. "The Legal Patchwork of Empires." Review of *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850*, by Laurent Benton and Richard J Ross. *Rechtsgeschichte* 22, 2014: 303–14.

Hespanha, Antonio Manuel. *A ordem do mundo e o saber dos juristas: imaginários do antigo direito europeu.* Lisbon: Independently Published, 2017.

Hutchinson, Robert. *The Spanish Armada*. London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 2014.

Hyland, Sabine. *The Jesuit and the Incas: The Extraordinary Life of Padre Blas Valera, S.J*. History, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2003.

Jara, Alvaro. *Guerra y sociedad en Chile. La transformación de la guerra de Arauco y la esclavitud de los indios.* Santiago de Chile: Editorial Universitaria, 1971.

Julien, Catherine. "Colonial Perspectives on the Chiriguana (1528-1574)." In *Resistencia y Adaptación Nativa En Las Tierras Bajas Latinoamericanas.*, 17–76. Quito: Abya-Yala, 1997.

Julien, Catherine. "History and Art in Translation: The Paños and Other Objects Collected by Francisco de Toledo." *Colonial Latin American Historical Review* 8, no. 1 (1999): 61–89.

Julien, Catherine. "Kandire in Real Time and Space: Sixteenth-Century Expeditions from the Pantanal to the Andes." *Ethnohistory* 54, no. 2 (April 1, 2007): 245–72.

Jurado, María Carolina. "«Descendientes de los primeros». Las probanzas de méritos y servicios y la genealogía cacical. Audiencia de Charcas, 1574-1719." *Revista de Indias* 74, no. 261 (August 30, 2014): 387–422.

Klein, Herbert S. *Historia de Bolivia*. La Paz: Libreria Editorial "Juventud," 1997.

Konetzke, Richard. *América Latina. II. La época colonial.* Translated by Pedro Scaron. México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1977.

Langer, Erick Detlef. *Expecting Pears from an Elm Tree: Franciscan Missions on the Chiriguano Frontier in the Heart of South America, 1830-1949*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2009.

Lantigua, David. *Infidels and Empires in a New World Order: Early Modern Spanish Contributions to International Legal Thought*. Cambridge, United Kingdom; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge University Press, 2020.

Lázaro Avila, Carlos. *Las fronteras de América y los "flandes indianos."* Colección Tierra Nueva e Cielo Nuevo 35. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas, Centro de Estudios Históricos, Departamento de Historia de América, 1997.

Levillier, Roberto. *Francisco de Aguirre y los orígenes del Tucumán. 1550-1570*. Madrid: Imprenta de Juan Pueyo, 1920.

Levillier, Roberto. *Biografías de conquistadores de la Argentina. Siglo XVI*. Madrid: Juan Pueyo, 1928.

Levillier, Roberto. *Don Francisco de Toledo. Supremo organizador del Perú. Su vida, su obra. (1515-1582)*. Buenos Aires: Colección de Publicaciones Históricas de la Biblioteca del Congreso Argentino, 1935.

Levin Rojo, Danna, and Cynthia Radding Murrieta, eds. *The Oxford Handbook of Borderlands of the Iberian World*. Oxford Handbooks. New York: Oxford University Press, 2019.

Lisi, Francesco Leonardo. *El tercer concilio limense y la aculturación de los indígenas sudamericanos: estudio crítico con edición, traducción y comentario de las actas del concilio provincial celebrado en Lima entre 1582 y 1583*. Salamanca: Universidad de Salamanca, 1990.

Lockhart, James. *The Men of Cajamarca. A Social and Biographical Study of the First Conqueror of Peru*. Austin: The University of Texas Press, 1972.

Lockhart, James. *Spanish Peru, 1532-1560: A Colonial Society*. Madison, Wis: University of Wisconsin Press, 1974.

Lohmann Villena, Guillermo. "Las compañías de gentilhombres de lanzas y arcabuces de la guarda del virreinato del Perú." *Anuario de Estudios Americanos*, no. 13 (1956): 141–215.

Lohmann Villena, Guillermo. *Juan de Matienzo, Autor del "Gobierno del Perú" (su Personalidad, su Obra).* Sevilla: Escuela de Estudios Hispano-Americanos, 1966.

Lorandi, Ana María, and Roxana Boixados. "Etnohistoria de los valles calchaquíes en los siglos XVI y XVII." *Runa,* no. XVII–XVIIII (1988 1987): 263–419.

Lorandi, Ana María. "La resistencia y rebeliones de los diaguito-calchaqui en los siglos XVI-XVII." *Cuadernos de Historia* 8 (1988): 99–122.

Lorandi, Ana María. *Ni ley, ni rey, ni hombre virtuoso: Guerra y sociedad en el virreinato del Perú, siglos XVI y XVII*. Buenos Aires: Barcelona: Universidad de Buenos Aires, Facultad de Filosofía y Letras; Gedisa Editorial, 2002.

Lopetegui, León. *El padre José de Acosta S.I. y las misiones*. Madrid: Consejo Superior de Investigaciones Científicas. Instituto Gonzalo Fernández de Oviedo, 1942.

MacCormack, Sabine. *Religion in the Andes: Vision and Imagination in Early Colonial Peru*. Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1991.

MacLachlan, Colin M. *Spain's Empire in the New World: The Role of Ideas in Institutional and Social Change*. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1991.

Mangan, Jane E. *Trading Roles: Gender, Ethnicity, and the Urban Economy in Colonial Potosí*. Durham [N.C.]: Duke University Press, 2005.

Martínez Cereceda, José Luis. *Gente de la tierra de guerra: Los lipes en las tradiciones andinas y el imaginario colonial*. Colección Estudios Andinos 7. Lima, Perú: Santiago, Chile: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú; Dirección de Bibliotecas, Archivos y Museos de Chile, 2011.

Matthew, Laura E. *Memorias de conquista: De conquistadores indigenas a mexicanos en la Guatemala colonial*. Wellfleet, MA, 2017.

Mazín Gómez, Oscar. "Architect of the New World. Juan Solórzano Pereyra and the Status of the Americas." In *Polycentric Monarchies: How Did Early Modern Spain and Portugal Achieve and Maintain a Global Hegemony?*, 27–42. Eastbourne: Sussex Academic Press, 2012.

McLeod, Murdo. "Self-Promotion: The Relaciones de Méritos y Servicios and Their Historical and Political Interpretation." *Colonial Latin American Historial Review* 7, no. 1 (Winter 1998): 25–42.

Medina, José Toribio. *Historia del Santo Oficio de la Inquisición de Lima. (1569-1820)*. Vol. I. Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Gutenberg, 1887.

Medina, José Toribio. *Diccionario biográfico colonial de Chile.* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta Elzeviriana, 1906.

Medinaceli, Ximena. "La ambigüedad del discurso político de las autoridades étnicas en el siglo XVI. Una propuesta de lectura de la probanza de los Colque Guarachi de Quillacas." *Revista Andina* 38 (Primera Mitad del 2004): 87–104.

Mendoza Loza, Gunnar, *Obras completas*, Vol 1. Sucre: Fundación Cultural del Banco Central de Bolivia/Archivo y Biblioteca Nacionales de Bolivia, 2005.

Merluzzi, Manfredi. *Politica e governo nel Nuovo Mondo: Francisco de Toledo viceré del Perù (1569-1581)*. Roma: Carocci, 2003.

Merluzzi, Manfredi. *Gobernando los Andes: Francisco de Toledo virrey del Perú (1569 - 1581)*. Translated by Patricia Unzain. Lima: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, 2014.

Millones, Luis. *El Retorno de las huacas. Estudios y documentos del siglo XVI.* Lima: IEP, 1990.

Miskimmon, Alister, Ben O'Loughlin, and Laura Roselle. *Strategic Narratives: Communication Power and the New World Order*. New York; London: Routledge, Taylor & Francis Group, 2013.

Montoya Guzmán, Juan David. "La fabricación del enemigo: Los indios pijaos en el Nuevo Reino de Granada, 1562-1611." *TRASHUMANTE. Revista Americana de Historia Social.* 19 (2022): 96–117.

Morong Reyes, Germán. *Saberes hegemónicos y dominio colonial. Los indios en el Gobierno del Perú de Juan de Matienzo (1567)*. Rosario [Santa Fe] Argentina: Prohistoria Ediciones, 2016.

Morris, Craig, and Adriana Von Hagen. *The Incas: Lords of the Four Quarters*. London: Thames & Hudson Ltd, 2011.

Mumford, Jeremy Ravi. *Vertical Empire: The General Resettlement of Indians in the Colonial Andes*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2012.

Murra, John V. *La organización económica del estado inca*. Translated by Daniel R. Wagner. México: Siglo Veintiuno, 1978.

Murray, B. P., B. K. Horton, R. Matos, and M. T. Heizler. "Oligocene-Miocene Basin Evolution in the Northern Altiplano, Bolivia: Implications for Evolution of the Central Andean Backthrust Belt and High Plateau." *Geological Society of America Bulletin* 122, no. 9–10 (September 1, 2010): 1443–62.

Nakashima, Roxana, and Lia Guillermina Oliveto. “Las informaciones de méritos y servicios y el imperio global de Felipe II a través de la trayectoria de Francisco Arias de Herrera.” *Revista Electrónica de Fuentes y Archivos*, no. 5 (2014): 120–28.

Nesvig, Martin Austin. *Promiscuous Power: An Unorthodox History of New Spain*. Austin: University of Texas Press, 2018.

Newson, Linda. “Indian Population Patterns in Colonial Spanish America.” *Latin American Research Review* 20, no. 3 (1985): 41–74.

Newson, Linda. *Life and Death in Early Colonial Ecuador*. The Civilization of the American Indian Series, v. 214. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1995.

Newson, Linda. *Supervivencia indígena en la Nicaragua colonial*. University of London Press, 2021.

Nolasco Pérez, Fray Pedro. *Religiosos de la merced que pasaron a la América española*. Sevilla: Tipografía Zarzuela, 1924.

Nordenskiold, Erland. “The Guarani Invasion of the Inca Empire in the Sixteenth Century: An Historical Indian Migration.” *Geographical Review* 4, no. 2 (August 1917): 103–21.

Nowell, Charles. “Aleixo García and the White King.” *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 26, no. 4 (November 1946): 450–66.

Oliveto, Lia Guillermina. “Ocupación territorial y relaciones interétnicas en los Andes Meridionales. Tarija, entre los desafíos prehispánicos y temprano coloniales.” Universidad de Buenos Aires, 2010.

Oliveto, Lia Guillermina. “Chiriguanos: La construcción de un estereotipo en la política colonizadora del sur andino.” *Memoria Americana* 18, no. 1 (June 2010): 47–73.

Oliveto, Lia Guillermina, and Paula Zagalsky. “De nominaciones y estereotipos: Los chiriguanos y los moyos moyos, Dos casos de la frontera oriental de Charcas en el siglo XVI.” *Bibliographica Americana*, no. 6 (September 2010).

Oliveto, Lia Guillermina. “De mitmaqkuna incaicos en Tarija a reducidos en La Plata. Tras las huellas de los moyos moyos y su derrotero colonial.” *Anuario de Estudios Bolivianos. Archivisticos y Bibliográficos* 17 (2011): 463–90.

Oliveto, Lia Guillermina. “Piezas, presos, indios habidos en buena guerra, cimarrones y fugitivos. Notas sobre el cautiverio indígena en la frontera oriental de Tarija en el siglo XVI.” In *Vivir en los márgenes. Fronteras en América colonial: Sujetos, prácticas e identidades, siglos XVI-XVIII.*, 29–66. Mexico: Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas, UNAM, 2021.

Ots Capdequi, José María. *El estado español en las Indias.* México: El Colegio de México, 1941.

Owens, John B. *“By My Absolute Royal Authority”: Justice and the Castilian Commonwealth at the Beginning of the First Global Age*. Rochester (N.Y.): University of Rochester Press, 2005.

Palomeque, Silvia. “Casabindos, cochinocas y chichas en el siglo XVI. Avances de investigación.” In *Las tierras altas del área Centro Sur Andina entre el 1000 y el 1600 D.C.*, 233–63. Jujuy: EDIUNJU, 2013.

Palomeque, Silvia. “Los chicha y las visitas toledanas. Las tierras de los chicha de Talina (1573-1595).” In *Aportes multidisciplinarios al estudio de los colectivos étnicos surandinos reflexiones sobre Qaraqara-Charka tres años después.*, 117–89. La Paz: Plural-IFEA, 2013.

Parssinen, Martti. *Tawantinsuyu. The Inca State and Its Political Organization.* Helsinki: Societas Historicas Finlandiae, 1992.

Paz, Gustavo, and Gabriela Sica. "La frontera oriental del Tucumán en el Río de la Plata (siglos XVI-XVIII)." In *Las fronteras en el mundo atlántico (Siglos XVI-XVIII)*, 293–330. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017.

Pietschmann, Horst. *El estado y su evolución al principio de la colonización española de América*. México: Fondo de Cultura Económica, 1989.

Pifarré, Francisco. *Historia de un pueblo*. Vol. 2. Los guaraní-chiriguano. La Paz: CIPCA, 1989.

Platt, Tristán, and Pablo Quisbert. "Tras las huellas del silencio: Potosí, los incas y Toledo." *Runa* XXXI, no. 2 (2010): 115–52.

Ponce Leiva, Pilar, and Alexander Ponsen. "Administration and Government of the Iberian Empires." In *The Iberian World. 1450-1820*, 300–319. London; New York: Routledge, 2020.

Powell, Philip. "Presidios and Towns on the Silver Frontier of New Spain. 1550-1580." *The Hispanic American Historical Review* 24, no. 2 (1944): 179–200.

Powell, Philip. "Portrait of an American Viceroy: Martín Enríquez, 1568-1583." *The Americas* 14, no. 1 (July 1957): 1–24.

Prado, Fabricio. "The Fringes of Empires: Recent Scholarship on Colonial Frontiers and Borderlands in Latin America." *History Compass* 10, no. 4 (April 2012): 318–33.

Presta, Ana María. *Espacio, etnias, frontera. Atenuaciones politicas en el sur del Tawantinsuyu. Siglos XV-XVIII*. Sucre: ASUR, 1995.

Presta, Ana María. *Encomienda, familia y negocios en Charcas colonial: Los encomenderos de La Plata, 1550-1600*. Lima: IEP, Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Banco Central de Reserva del Perú, 2000.

Presta, Ana María. "Portraits of Four Women: Traditional Female Roles and Transgressions in Colonial Elite Families in Charcas, 1550-1600." *Colonial Latin American Review* 9, no. 2 (2000): 237–62.

Presta, Ana María. "Hermosos, fértiles y abundantes'. Los valles de Tarija y su población en el siglo XVI." In *Historia, Ambiente y Sociedad en Tarija, Bolivia.*, 25–39. La Paz: Instituto de Ecología, Universidad Mayor de San Andrés-School of Geography, University of Leeds, 2001.

Presta, Ana María. "Los valles mesotérmicos de Chuquisaca entre la fragmentación territorial yampara y la ocupación de los migrantes qaraqara y charka en la temprana colonia." In *Aportes multidisciplinarios al estudio de los colectivos étnicos surandinos, reflexiones sobre Qaraqara-Charka tres años después.*, 27–60. La Paz: Plural-IFEA, 2013.

Quondam, Amedeo, and Eduardo Torres Corominas. *El discurso cortesano*. Translated by Cattedra di Spagnolo del Dipartimento di Scienze Documentarie, Linguistico-filologiche e Geografiche dell'Univ. Roma "La Sapienza". Madrid: Ed. Polifemo, 2013.

Rabasa, José. *Writing Violence on the Northern Frontier: The Historiography of Sixteenth Century New Mexico and Florida and the Legacy of Conquest*. Latin America Otherwise. Durham: Duke University Press, 2000.

Radding Murrieta, Cynthia. *Wandering Peoples: Colonialism, Ethnic Spaces, and Ecological Frontiers in Northwestern Mexico, 1700-1850*. Latin America Otherwise. Durham: Duke University Press, 1997.

Rama, Angel, and John Charles Chasteen. *The Lettered City*. Post-Contemporary Interventions. Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1996.

Ramirez Barrios, Julio Alberto. "En defensa de la autoridad real: Oficiales de la pluma de la Real Audiencia de Lima durante la rebelión de Gonzalo Pizarro (1544-1548)." *Revista de Historia Del Derecho* 63 (June 2022): 61–91.

Ramírez Barrios, Julio Alberto. *El sello real en el Perú Colonial: poder y representación en la distancia*. Lima, Sevilla: Fondo Editorial, Pontificia Universidad Católica de Perú, Editorial Universidad de Sevilla, 2020.

Ramos, Gabriela. "Política eclesiástica y extirpación de idolatrías: Discursos y silencios en torno al Taqui Onkoy." In *Catolicismo y extirpación de idolatrías. Siglos XVI-XVIII. Charcas. Chile. México. Perú*, 5:137–68. Cusco: Centro de Estudios Andinos "Fray Bartolomé de las Casas," 1993.

Ramos, Gabriela. "El Rastro de la discriminación. Litigios y probanzas de caciques en el Perú colonial temprano." *Fronteras de La Historia* 21, no. 1 (June 2016): 66–90.

Raffino, Rodolfo, Christian Vitty, and Diego Gobbo. "Inkas y chichas: Identidad, transformación y una cuestión fronteriza." *Boletín de Arqueología PUCP*, no. 8 (2004): 247–65.

Raffino, Rodolfo, Diego Gobbo, and Anahí Iácona. "De Potosí y Tarija a la frontera chiriguana." *Folia Histórica Del Nordeste*, no. 16 (2006): 83–129.

Rappaport, Joanne. *The Disappearing Mestizo: Configuring Difference in the Colonial New Kingdom of Granada*. Durham: Duke University Press, 2014.

Renard-Casevitz, France Marie, Thierry Saignes, Anne Christine Taylor, and Institut français d'études andines. *Al este de los Andes: relaciones entre las sociedades amazónicas y andinas entre los siglos XV y XVII*. Quito: Abya-Yala, 1988.

Revilla Orías, Paola A. *Entangled Coercion: African and Indigenous Labour in Charcas (16th-17th Century)*. 1st ed. Work in Global and Historical Perspective 9. Boston: De Gruyter Oldenbourg, 2020.

Restall, Matthew. *Seven Myths of the Spanish Conquest*. New York: Oxford University Press, 2003.

Ross, Richard, and Philip Stern. "Reconstructing Early Modern Notions of Legal Pluralism." In *Legal Pluralism and Empires, 1500-1850*, 109–43. New York; London: New York University Press, 2013.

Rostworowski de Diez Canseco, María. *History of the Inca Realm*. Translated by Harry B. Iceland. Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999.

Ruan, Felipe. "The Probanza and Shaping a Contesting Mestizo Record in Early Colonial Peru." *Bulletin of Spanish Studies* 94, no. 5 (2017): 843–69.

Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier. *Las dos caras de Jano: Monarquía, ciudad e individuo. Murcia, 1588-1648*. Murcia: Universidad de Murcia, 1995.

Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier, and Gaetano Sabatini. "Monarchy as Conquest: Violence, Social Opportunity, and Political Stability in the Establishment of the Hispanic Monarchy." *The Journal of Modern History* 81, no. 3 (September 2009): 501–36.

Saignes, Thierry. "Une frontiere fossile: La cordillera Chiriguano au XVIe siècle." PhD Dissertation, Universite de Paris, 1974.

Saignes, Thierry. “Andaluces en el poblamiento del Oriente Boliviano. En torno a unas figuras controvertidas. El fundador de Tarija y sus herederos.” In *Actas de Las II Jornadas de Andalucía y América. Universidad Santa María de La Rábida. Marzo 1982.*, 2:173–206, 1983.

Saignes, Thierry, and Isabelle Combès. *Historia del pueblo chiriguano*. Lima, Peru: La Paz, Bolivia: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos; Embajada de Francia en Bolivia: Plural Editores, 2007.

Saignes, Thierry. “La zonas conflictivas: Fronteras iniciales de guerra.” In *El primer contacto y la formación de nuevas sociedades.*, II:269–99. Madrid: Ediciones UNESCO, Ediciones Trotta, 2007.

Salinero, Gregorio. *Hombres de mala corte. Desobediencias, procesos políticos y gobierno de Indias en la segunda mitad del siglo XVI*. Madrid: Difusora Larousse - Ediciones Cátedra, 2018.

Sanabria, Hernando. *Cronica sumaria de los gobernadores de Santa Cruz (1560-1810)*. Santa Cruz de la Sierra: Publicaciones de la Universidad Boliviana Gabriel René Moreno, 1975.

Sanchez Concha Barrios, Rafael. “Las expediciones descubridoras: La entrada desde Larecaja hasta Tarija (1539-1540).” *Boletin del Instituto Riva Aguero* 16 (1989).

Scholl, Jonathan. “At the Limits of Empire: Incas, Spaniards, and the Ava-Guarani (Chiriguanaes) on the Charcas-Chiriguana Frontier, Southeastern Andes. (1450s-1620s).” University of Florida, 2015.

Seed, Patricia. *Ceremonies of Possession in Europe’s Conquest of the New World, 1492-1640*. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1995.

Seed, Patricia. *American Pentimento: The Invention of Indians and the Pursuit of Riches*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2001.

Scott, Heidi V. *Contested Territory: Mapping Peru in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries*. History, Languages, and Cultures of the Spanish and Portuguese Worlds. Notre Dame, Ind: University of Notre Dame Press, 2009.

Silva Lezaeta, Luis. *El conquistador Francisco de Aguirre.* Santiago de Chile: Imprenta de la Revista Católica, 1904.

Smietniansky, Silvia. "El uso motivado del lenguaje: Escritura y oralidad en los rituales de toma de posesión. El caso de Hispanoamérica colonial." *Revista de Antropología* 59, no. 2 (August 2016): 131–54.

Stern, Steve J. *Peru's Indian Peoples and the Challenge of Spanish Conquest: Huamanga to 1640*. Madison: Univ. of Wisconsin Press, 1986.

Tantaleán Arbulú, Javier. *El virrey Francisco de Toledo y su tiempo: Proyecto de gobernabilidad, el imperio hispano, la plata peruana en la economía-mundo y el mercado colonial*. 2 vols. Lima, Perú: Universidad de San Martín de Porres, Fondo Editorial, 2011.

Trelles Arestegui, Efraín. *Lucas Martínez de Vegazo: Funcionamiento de una encomienda temprana inicial*. Lima: Pontificia Universidad Católica del Perú, Fondo Editorial, 1991.

Truchuelo, Susana, and Emir Reitano. *Fronteras en el mundo atlántico (siglos XVI-XIX)*. La Plata: Universidad Nacional de La Plata. Facultad de Humanidades y Ciencias de la Educación, 2017.

Turner Bushell, Amy. "Gates, Patterns, and Peripheries. The Field of Frontier Latin America." In *Negotiated Empires: Centers and Peripheries in the Americas*, 15–28. London: Taylor Francis Group, 2002.

Urquidi, José Macedonio. *El origen de la noble villa de Oropesa. La fundación de Cochabamba en 1571 por Gerónimo Osorio.* Cochabamba: Editorial Canelas, 1970.

Valcárcel, Luis E. *El virrey Toledo, gran tirano del Perú: Una revisión histórica*. Lima: Universidad Garcilaso de la Vega, 2015.

Vallejo, Jesús. "Power Hierarchies in Medieval Juridical Thought. An Essay in Reinterpretation." *Ius Commune* 19 (1992): 1–29.

Varón Gabai, Rafael. *La ilusión del poder: Apogeo y decadencia de los Pizarro en la conquista del Perú*. Lima: Instituto de Estudios Peruanos: Instituto Francés de Estudios Andinos, 1996.

Wachtel, Nathan. *Los vencidos. Los indios del Perú frente a la conquista española. (1530-1570).* Translated by Antonio Escohotado. Madrid: Alianza Editorial, 1976.

Wachtel, Nathan. "Los mitimaes del valle de Cochabamba: La política colonizadora de Wayna Capac." *Historia Boliviana* 1, no. 1 (1981): 21–57.

Wachtel, Nathan. "The Indian and the Spanish Conquest." In *The Cambridge History of Latin America*, I:207–37. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984.

Weaver Olson, Nathan. "A Republic of Lost Peoples: Race, Status, and Community in the Eastern Andes of Charcas at the Turn of the Seventeenth Century." University of Minnesota, 2017.

Williams, Caroline. "Opening New Frontiers in Colonial Spanish American History: New Perspectives on Indigenous-Spanish Interactions on the Margins of Empire." *History Compass* 6, no. 4 (2008): 1121–39.

Yun-Casalilla, Bartolomé. *Iberian World Empires and the Globalization of Europe 1415 -1668*. Palgrave Studies in Comparative Global History. Puchong, Selangor D.E: Springer Singapore, 2018.

Zanolli, Carlos. “Los chichas como mitimaes del inca.” *Relaciones de la Sociedad Argentina de Antropología* XXVIII (2003): 45–60.

Zanolli, Carlos Eduardo. *Tierra, encomienda e identidad: Omaguaca (1540-1638)*. Colección Tesis Doctorales. Buenos Aires: Sociedad Argentina de Antropología, 2005.

Zimmerman, Arthur Franklin. *Francisco de Toledo. Fifth Viceroy of Peru. 1569-1581*. New York: Greenwood Press, 1938.

Annex: List of participants of the expeditions

List of members of the 1564-1565 expeditions

Name	Position in the expedition	Documentary evidence	Social Position
Gerónimo González de Alanís	Maese de Campo	AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Información Juan Mejia Miraval, 15v and 84r.	Soldier. Mineral mill owner.
Antonio Alderete Riomayor		AGI, Charcas, 78, N34, [1585], Probanza Antonio Alderete Riomayor, 2r.	Soldier
Gaspar de Almendras	Martín de Almendras' nephew	AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580], Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 571.	
Martín de Almendras	Leader		Encomendero
Alonso de Carrión		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion	

		Juan Mejia Miraval, image 54v.	
Don Fernando Ayavire Cuysara		Platt, Tristán, et al eds. *Qaraqara-Charka: Mallku, Inka y Rey En La Provincia de Charcas*, 871.	Cacique Principal of Charcas
Gaspar Centeno		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 38r.	
Juan de Cianca		Acuerdos de Charcas V1.	Encomendero
Don Juan Calpa		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 64v.	Cacique Principal of Hatun Colla.
Don Juan Colque Guarache		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache.	Cacique Principal Quillacas, Asanaques, Sivaroyos and Haracapis
Juan Bautista Gallinato	Soldier	AGI, Lima, 213, N9, [1601], Probanza Juan Bautista Gallinato, 2r.	Soldier

Tomás Gonzalez		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, 87v.	
Andrés de Herrera		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, 52r.	
Gerónimo de Holguín	Soldier (named Captain by those who took Aguirre prisoner after Almendras's death).	Audiencia de Charcas, V1. Levillier, 208.	
Melian de Leguizamo		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, image 174.	
Andrés López		AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580], Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 548.	

		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, 84r.	
Diego López de Aguilera		AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580], Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 590.	
Juan Mejía Miraval		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, image 1r.	
Pero Mendez		AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580] Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 21.	
Friar Gonzalo Ballesteros		Fray Pedro Nolasco Pérez, *Religiosos de la merced que pasaron a la América española*, 294.	Mercedarian priest

Martín Monje	Martín de Almendras brother-in-law	Acuerdos de Charcas V1.	Encomendero
Sebastián Pérez		AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580], Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 562.	
Rodrigo Prieto		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 38a.	
Lope de Quevedo		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, image 15v.	
Leonis Ramírez		AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R8, Informacion Juan Mejia Miraval, 45v.	
Antonio de Robles		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 12r.	

Juan Rodríguez		AGI, Patronato, 124, R9, [1580], Información Pedro Alvarez Holguín y Martín de Almendras, image 581.	Soldier owner of a mineral deposit in Potosi.

List of members of the 1574 expedition

Name	Position in the expedition	Source	Social Position
Father Joseph de Acosta	Only travelled to the actual border and did not venture into Chiriguanaes territory.	Acosta, Jose de. *Historia Natural y Moral de Las Indias*. Sevilla: Casa de Juan Leon, 1590, 162.	Jesuit
Diego de Aguilar	Went with Juan Ortíz de Zárate. Gentilhombre de la Compañía de Lanzas	AGI, Lima, 208, N24, [1589], Diego de Aguilar, images 39 and 40. AGI, Lima, 208, N24, Probanza de Diego de Aguilar, image 15.	
Agustín de Ahumada		AGI, Patronato, 149, N1, R1, Méritos y Servicios. Lorenzo de Cepeda y Hermanos, image 23.	Visitador in La Plata.
Pedro de Albuquerque		AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, [1598], Luis Hernandez Barja, image 85.	Potosi resident
Francisco Aliaga de los Rios		AGI, Lima, 209, N1, [1589], Probanza Rodrigo Campuzano de Sotomayor, Image 5.	

Juan de Amor		AGI, Patronato, 189, R26, Mercedes concedidas por Toledo, 4r.	
Juan Arias		AGI, Patronato,132, N2, R7, Alonso de Paredes, 24v.	Vecino in La Plata
Rodrigo Arias		AGI, Lima, 218, N2, Antonio Zapata, 27r.	
Agustín de Arze Quirós	Served with Captain Barrasa and others.	AGI, Lima, 214, N5, [1602], Probanza de Gaspar Flores, image 6; AGI, Patronato, 127, N1, R17, Toribio Bernaldo y Rodrigo de Arce, image 1.	Los Reyes resident
León de Ayance		ABNB, EP20, Poder a Diego de Zárate para compra de Ganado para la Expedición de Toledo, 319r-320r	
Don Francisco Aymoro	Official Supplier of the Entrada	AGI, Charcas, 79, R22, [1592], Probanza de méritos y servicios de don Francisco Aymoro, 13.	Yampara cacique
Don Francisco de Ayra		AGI, Charcas, 56, in Platt et al, 722.	Cacique of Pocoata, Urinsaya.
Diego Barrantes Perero	Joined the expedition late.	AGI, Patronato, 127, N1, R17, Toribio Bernaldo y Rodrigo de Arce, image 55.	
Francisco Barrasa	Captain of the Viceroy's Guard and "Campero" -Military Camp Organiser-.		Criado of Toledo -Camarero de su Excelencia-.
Antonio Bello Gayoso		Biblioteca Nacional del Perú, Mss 511. 378-381 in Sarabia Viejo and Lohmann Villena, Francisco de Toledo. T2, 60.	
Pedro Benitez		AGI, Patronato, 131, N2, R3, Rodrigo de Orellana, image 31.	
Captain Francisco de Cáceres	Organised food supply logistics.	AGI, Lima, 207, N25, [1575], Pedro Gutiérrez de Flores, image 460.	
Captain Francisco Camargo		AGI, Lima, 218, N2, Antonio Zapata, 23r.	

Rodrigo de Campuzano Sotomayor		AGI, Lima, 213, N4, [1600], Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 61v.	
Alonso de Carvajal		Revista de Archivos y Bibliotecas Nacionales. V1 Y1, 108.	
Fray Francisco de Carvajal	Franciscan	AGI, Lima, 213, N4, [1600], Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 107r.	
Juan de Castro		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 51a.	
Hernando de Cazorla	One of don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa's Captains	AGI, Patronato, 131, N1, R3, Informacion de Hernando de Cazorla.	
Gaspar Centeno		AGI, Patronato, 132, N1, R4, Informacion de Juan Gutierrez de Beas, 13v.	
Don Juan Colque Guarache	Captain of all Indios that went to the expedition	AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Informacion de don Juan Colque Guarache.	Quillaca, Asanaque, Sivaroyo and Aracapi cacique
Fray Francisco del Corral	Augustinian	Calancha, Chronica Moralizada, 464	
Francisco de la Cuba		AGI, Charcas, 79, 25, [1593], Francisco de la Cuba, image 9.	
Captain Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha	Went with Juan Ortíz de Zárate	AGI, Patronato, 126, R18, Roque de Cuellar e hijo, image 20.	
Alonso Dominguez	Gentilhombre de los Lanzas	AGI, Lima, 213, N4, Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 36r.	
Ambrosio Fernandez Azeituno		AGI, Lima, 209, N1, [1589], Probanza Rodrigo Campuzano de Sotomayor, image 6.	
Sancho de Figueroa		AGI, Patronato, 133, R5, Francisco de Guzmán, Image 217.	Vecino of La Plata
Gaspar Flores	Gentilhombre de la Compañía de Arcabuceros	AGI, Lima, 214, N5, [1602], Probanza de Gaspar Flores, image 3.	
Diego de Frias Trejo	Alferez General	AGI, Panama, 61, N67, [1578], Diego de Frias Trejo.	

Juan de Gallegos		Levillier, Gobernacion del Tucuman. V2, 581.	
Captain Pablo de Gamboa		AGI, Lima, 218, N2, Antonio Zapata, 27r.	
García de Grijalva		AGI, Charcas, 46, Quoted in Los Virreyes Españoles en America by Hanke, 73.	Vecino of Potosi.
García Mosquera	Guide	AGI, Patronato, 235, R4, Relacion de lo que se hizo en la jornada que el excelentisimo señor virrey del piru don Francisco de Toledo hizo por su persona entrando a hazer Guerra a los chiriguanaes de las fronteras y cordilleras desta provincial en el año de setenta y quatro, n/d. 8	Soldier
Felipe Godoy		AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, [1598], Luis Hernandez Barja, image 142.	Potosi vecino
Gaspar de Grijalva		AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, [1598], Luis Hernandez Barja.	Vecino of Potosi.
Francisco Guana	Llama caravan shepherd -fletero-	AGI, Contaduria, 1805, [1575] Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, pl 293.	
Juan Gutiérrez de Beas	Went with Captain Alonso de Vera carrying food supplies when the expedition was returning.	AGI, Charcas, 79, N12, Probanza de Juan Gutiérrez de Beas [1589], 14v; AGI, Patronato, 132, N1, R4, Informacion de Juan Gutierrez de Beas, 1v.	Vecino of La Plata
Fray Pedro Gutiérrez Flores	Viceroy Toledo's Chaplain	AGI, Lima, 207, N25, Pedro Gutiérrez Flores, 10v.	
Francisco Guzmán	Proveedor General	AGI, Charcas, 78, N20, [1583], Probanza de Cristóbal Ramirez de Montalvo, 31r; AGI, Patronato 133, R5, Francisco de Guzmán.	Owner of a mineral mill in Potosi.
Lope Hernández		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don	Vecino of La Plata

		Juan Colque Guarache, f. 52r.	
Luis Hernandez Barja		AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, Luis Hernandez Barja.	
Gerónimo de Hinojosa		AGI, Patronato 131, N2, R3, Rodrigo de Orellana, Image 24.	
Pascual Juárez		ABNB, EP20, Declaración de Gómez Coton sobre fanegas que García Mosquera dejó cuando fue con la expedición de Toledo, 345r-346r.	
Pedro Jimenez del Castillo		AGI, Patronato, 137, N1, R4, [1598], Luis Hernandez Barja, image 117.	Potosi resident
Captain Francisco de Lasarte y Molina		AGI, Patronato, 134, R1, Diego de Peralta, image 45.	Vecino of La Plata and Visitador.
Captain Gutierre Laso de la Vega		AGI, Lima, 218, N2, Antonio Zapata, 52r.	
Felipe de León		AGI, Lima, 207, N25, [1575], Pedro Gutiérrez Flores, image 585.	Notary in Potosi
Gaspar López	Escribano Real -Royal Notary-	AGI, Contaduría, 1805, [1575], Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, pl 294.	
Pero López de Armesto	Lieutenant of the Captain of Ammunitions	AGI, Contaduría, 1805, [1575] Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, pliego 294.	
Iñigo de Luyando	Member of Compañía de Lanzas	AGI, Lima, 207, N13, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, 51r.	
Carlos de Malvenda		AGI, Patronato, 189, R26, Mercedes concedidas por Toledo, 4r.	
Miguel Martín		AGI, Patronato, 235, R7, Justicia de Santiago de la Frontera, image 109.	Soldier
Juan Martínez de Ribera		Revista de Archivos y Bibliotecas Nacionales. Year 1 Vol 1, 49.	
Francisco de Matienzo	Juan de Matienzo's son	Lohmann Villena, Matienzo. 84.	
Hernando de Maturana	Went with don Gabriel Paniagua de	AGI, Charcas, 93, N1, Francisco de Maturana, 46v	

	Loaysa and Juan de la Reinaga Salazar.		
Don Juan de Mendoza	Assisted with the withdrawal of the expedition	AGI, Patronato, 144, R1, Luis de Mendoza, image 1.	
Don Antonio de Meneses		AGI, Lima, 207, N13, Juan Ortiz de Zarate, 45r.	
Pedro de Mieres		AGI, Lima, 214, N5, [1602], Probanza de Gaspar Flores, image 11.	
Manuel de Morales	Llama caravan - fletero-	AGI, Contaduría, 1805, [1575] Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, Pl 291.	
Diego Moreno	Captain	AGI, Patronato, 131, N2, R3, Rodrigo de Orellana, Image 27.	Mine and mineral grinding mill owner.
Juan Bautista Morisco		ABNB, EP18, Poder a Catalina Ñusta viuda de Juan Bautista Morisco para cobrar de Fray Pedro Gutiérrez por el tiempo que sirvió en la entrada de los Chiriguanaes, 399r.-399v	
Diego Nuñez Bazán		José Macedonio Urquidi, El Origen de la Noble Villa de Oropesa, 335	
Antonio de Obregón	Gentilhombre de Arcabuces	AGI, Lima 213, N4, [1600], Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 28v.	
Gallo de Ocampo		AGI, Lima, 207, N8, [1578], Francisco de Valenzuela, 5r.	
Francisco Ochoa de Uralde		AGI, Patronato, 235, R7, Justicia de Santiago de la Frontera, image 115.	
Francisco de Orellana	Went with don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa		Tiquipaya encomendero
Juan Ortíz de Zárate	Captain for Potosi	AGI, Charcas. 85, 5, Juan Alonso de Vera y Zárate.	Criado of Toledo
Hernando Remón de Oviedo	Gentilhombre de la Compañía de Lanzas	AGI, Lima, 214, N5, [1602], Probanza de Gaspar Flores, 10v.	

Don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa	General Captain	AGI, Charcas, 87, N19, Informaciones Gabriel Paniagua de Loaisa.	Encomendero
Antonio Pantoja y Chaves		AGI, Patronato, 126, R6, [1582], Méritos y Servicios. Diego Pantoja de Chaves, image 7.	Son of Quillaca encomendero Diego Pantoja
Alonso de Paredes	Went with don Gabriel de Paniagua y Loaysa.	AGI, Patronato, 132, N2, R7, Alonso de Paredes, 2r.	
Juan Pavón	Went under Captain Diego Moreno	AGI, Patronato, 131, N2, R3, Rodrigo de Orellana, Image 27.	
Juan Pedrero de Trejo		Levillier, Gobernación de Tucumán. T2, 560.	
Alonso de Peñafiel		AGI, Patronato, 126, R11, Alonso de Peñafiel, image 3.	
Diego Peralta Cabeza de Vaca		AGI, Patronato, 134, R1, Diego de Peralta, Image 9.	Vecino of La Paz
Licenciado Martín Pérez de Recalde	Justicia Mayor del Campo	Lizárraga, Descripción Colonial, V2, 139.	
Alonso Pérez Negral		Revista de Archivos y Bibliotecas Nacionales. Year 1 Vol 1, 424.	
Juan Perez de Valenzuela	Went with Juan Ortíz de Zárate	AGI, Patronato, 124, R10, Garci Martin de Castaneda, image 21.	
Juan Pinto	Llama caravan shepherd -fletero-	AGI, Contaduría, 1805, [1575] Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, pl 293.	
Balthasar Ramírez	Priest	Descripcion del Reyno del Piru. In Juicio de Limites. Vol 1, 361.	
Cristóbal Ramírez de Montalvo		AGI, Charcas, 78, N20, [1583], Probanza de Cristóbal Ramirez de Montalvo, 31r; AGI, Patronato, 132, N1, R4, Informacion de Juan Gutierrez de Beas, 37v.	Vecino of La Plata.
Juan de la Reinaga Salazar	Captain. Was with Francisco de Orellana - they shared the same tent	AGI, Patronato, 131, N2, R3, Rodrigo de Orellana, Image 21; AGI, Patronato, 146, N3, R1, Juan de la Reinaga Salazar, 1v	Soldier

	and company of men-. In his Probanza it says he went with don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa		
Juan de Reinoso	Paje de Guion -was carrying Toledo's weapons and armour-	AGI, Lima, 212, N19, [1599], Juan de Reinoso, image 15.	
Melchor de Rodas	Sargento Mayor del Campo	AGI, Patronato, 131, N1, [1587], R3, Méritos y Servicios Hernando de Cazorla, image 19.	Soldier
Juan Rodriguez de Heredia	Went with Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa	V. Barriga. Mercedarios en el Peru, V3, 89.	
Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel	Secretary	AGI, Lima, 213, N4, [1600], Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 4r.	
Pedro de Saavedra		AGI, Panama, 61, N67, [1578], Diego de Frias Trejo, image 9.	
Francisco de Saavedra Ulloa	Went with Juan Ortíz de Zárate	AGI, Patronato, 126, R18, Roque de Cuellar e hijo, image 30.	Visitador de Orinoca and Totora -en cabeza de los Lanzas-.
Antonio Bautista de Salazar	Secretary to the Viceroy	AGI, Lima, 208, N24, [1589], Diego de Aguilar, images 39 and 40.	Gentilhombre de la Compañía de Lanzas
Hernando de Salazar		AGI, Charcas, 94, N19, Probanza de Hernando de Salazar, 245v.	
Fray Gerónimo de Salcedo	Franciscan	AGI, Lima, 213, N4, [1600], Alvaro Ruiz de Navamuel, 70r.	
Pedro Sande		AGI, Charcas, 53, [1574-1576], Probanza de don Juan Colque Guarache, f. 24r.	Mine owner
Fray Miguel de Santo Domingo	Secretary	Melendez, Tesoros Verdaderos. V3, 351	
Pedro Sarmiento de Gamboa			Cosmographer

Captain Pedro Sotelo Narbaez		Antonio de (Ed) Egaña, *Monumenta Peruana. (1586-1591)*, vol. III (Rome: Monumenta Historica Societatis Iesu, 1958), 113.	
Don Francisco de Toledo	Viceroy and Governor General		Viceroy of Peru
Fernando de Toledo Pimentel		AGI, Charcas, 84, N10, Fernando de Toledo Pimentel, 2r.	
Don Luis de Toledo Pimentel	Maese de Campo	AGI, Lima, 207, N25, [1575], Pedro Gutierrez Flores, 77r.	Viceroy Toledo's Uncle
Ginés de Torres		Revista de Archivos y Bibliotecas Nacionales. Year 1 Vol 1, 235.	
Gasión Torres de Mendoza	Went as Vecino of La Paz	AGI, Lima, 207, N25, [1575], Pedro Gutiérrez de Flores, image 266.	
Don Francisco de Valenzuela	Arrived too late from Los Reyes. Went to help Toledo with Ramirez de Quiñones	AGI, Lima, 207, N8, [1578], Francisco de Valenzuela, 8v.	
Diego de Valera		AGI, Patronato, 120, N2, R6, Diego de Valera, image 1.	
Dr Tomás Vazquez	One of Toledo's physicians	AGI, Contaduría, 1805, [1575], Gastos de la Guerra de los Chiriguanaes, pl 294	
Lope Vázquez Pestana		AGI, Charcas, 79, N11, Lope Vazquez Pestana, image 3.	
Gutierre Velazquez de Ovando		Levillier, Gobernación de Tucumán. T2, 568.	
Captain Alonso de Vera		AGI, Patronato, 132, N1, R4, Informacion de Juan Gutierrez de Beas, 1v.	
Gerónimo de Villarreal	Travelled with don Gabriel Paniagua de Loaysa	AGI, Patronato, 147, N4, R3, Probanza de don Pedro de Portugal y Navarra, image 14.	
Juan de Villegas		AGI, Patronato, 141, R1, Juan de Villegas, image 3.	

Juan de Yllanes		AGI, Charcas, 94, N19, Probanza de Hernando de Salazar, image 545.	
Antonio Zapata	Gentilhombre de la Compañía de Lanzas. Criado de Toledo. He was responsible for arranging the tents and setting up the camp.	AGI, Lima 218, N2, [1611], Probanza de Antonio Zapata, 2r.	
Diego de Zárate		AGI, Charcas, 86, N17, Probanza de Diego de Zárate Irarrazábal y Andía, 44v-45r.	Polo de Ondegardo's youngest brother
Fernando/Hernando de Zárate	Captain for La Plata	AGI, Charcas, 86, N17, Probanza de Diego de Zárate Irarrazábal y Andía, 44v-45r.	Juan Ortíz de Zárate's cousin

List of members of the 1584 expedition

Name	Position in the expedition	Source	Social position
Francisco Arias de Herrera	Teniente General	AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, [1584-1590], Probanza de Francisco Arias de Herrera, image 12.	
Rodrigo de Bustamante	Soldier	AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, [1584-1590], Probanza de Francisco Arias de Herrera, image 129-130.	
Antonio Carreño		AGI, Panama, 237, L12, ff. 113r-114r.	

Don Juan Colque (El Mozo)		Capoche, *Relación General de la Villa Imperial de Potosí*, 142-143.	Cacique of Quillacas, Asanaques, Sivaroyos and Aracapis
Pedro de Cuellar Torremocha	Maese de Campo	AGI, Patronato. 126, R17, Información de los méritos y servicios de Pedro de Cuéllar Torremocha, fl. 147.	Tomina corregidor
Captain Juan Dávalos de Oñate		AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, [1598], Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, image 22.	Vecino of La Plata.
Antonio Diez Matamoroso		AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, [1598], Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, image 71.	
Diego García de Paredes	Captain and Sargento Mayor	AGI, Patronato, 255, N4, G3, R1, [1591], Diego Garcia de Paredes, f. 2r.	
Captain Alonso González de Chamorro		AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, [1584-1590], Probanza de Francisco Arias de Herrera, image 234.	
Juan Lozano Machuca	Leader and organiser	AGI, Charcas 79, N14, Probanza Nuñez Maldonado.	Factor and Veedor in Potosi.
Francisco Mendez		ABNB, EP39, ff. 77r - 78r [1586]	
Pedro Mendoza de Quezada	Alferez	AGI, Patronato, 127, N2, R4, [1584-1590], Probanza de Francisco Arias de Herrera, Image 234; AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, [1598], Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, image 10.	
Fray Diego de Reynoso	Mercedarian friar	AGI, Charcas, 80, N17, 1, [1598], Pedro de Mendoza Quesada, image 32.	

Don Fernando de Toledo Pimentel	Don Francisco de Toledo's nephew	Levillier, Biografias de los Conquistadores de Argentina, 226	